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PREFACE

The Rhetoric of the Sublime

“In the words of J.B. Twitchell, the sublime has always been a complicated and ambiguous category. Nevertheless, a tension between the knowable, familiar world and the constant pressure of the unknown, the incomprehensible and uncontrollable, analysed in Edmund Burke’s influential study, remains a significant attribute of the sublime. The view of the sublime as a loss of a meaningful relation between words and the intensity of individual experience of reality (reflected in particular rhetorical devices) permeates aesthetics from Romanticism to postmodern art. The seminar is concerned especially with the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries (the Gothic, Romantic and Victorian traditions) but also with their influence on modern literature. Aesthetical discussions (Burkean and Wordsworthean, Kantian, poststructuralist) are welcome as well.”¹

The above paragraph was circulated as a call for proposals for seminar 32, titled “The Sublime Rhetoric and the Rhetoric of the Sublime in British Literature since the 18th Century,” for the last ESSE conference. The idea of the “sublime seminar” was initiated by Kamila Vranková and together we undertook the task of organising it and co-convening its two sessions. In July 2016, a group of enthusiastic scholars and teachers of English literature from different European universities came together to discuss the concepts of the sublime in Galway, at the National University of Ireland (NUI). The present issue of the *Eger Journal of English Studies* offers a representative selection of the Galway seminar papers on the rich theories and exciting readings of the sublime. Zoltán Cora (Szeged University, Hungary) tackles the early 18th-century British literary aesthetics of the sublime, focussing on Alexander Pope’s interpretation. Antonella Braidà (Université de Lorraine, Nancy, France) moves from the male sublime to Mary Shel-

1 See <http://www.esse2016.org/seminars.html>

ley's female and natural reading of the concept in the author's two novels. Alice Sukdolová (University of South Bohemia, Czech Republic) elaborates on the special features of sublimity in Victorian Gothic fiction, exemplified by Bram Stoker's *Dracula*. Christophe Den Tandt (Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium) discusses the aspects of the urban sublime in late Victorian fiction, in the context of H.G. Wells's early novels. While Kamila Vranková (University of South Bohemia, Czech Republic) presents the ethical aspects of the sublime in contemporary English fantasy fiction. Three more papers were presented in Ireland – by Eva Antal (Eszterházy Karoly University, Hungary) on the Burkean sublime, by Nataliya Novikova (Moscow Lomonosov State University, Russia) on Thomas Carlyle's ironic and sublime reading of heroism and by Christin Hoene (University of Potsdam, Germany) on the interpretation of the postcolonial sublime in Rushdie's *Midnight's Children* –, which, together with the present authors' related future articles and also enriched with others' writings, will hopefully be published in a separate volume, displaying the great variety of "the highest of the high" in literary, aesthetical and cultural studies.

Éva Antal

ALEXANDER POPE AND THE LONGINIAN TRADITION OF THE SUBLIME

Zoltán Cora

*Respicit Aeneas subito et sub rupe sinistra
moenia lata videt triplici circumdata muro,
quae rapidus flammis ambit torrentibus amnis,
Tartareus Phlegethon, torquetque sonantia saxa.
Porta adversa ingens solidoque adamante columnae,
vis ut nulla virum, non ipsi excindere bello
caelicolae valeant; stat ferrea turris ad auras [...]
(Vergilius: *Aeneis*, VI, 548–555.)*

In the context of early 18th-century British literary aesthetics, rhetoric and psychological interpretations of sublimity appear parallel, increasingly focusing on the affective potentials within the psychological mechanism of the sublime. On the one hand, this changing approach towards the sublime developed according to early 18th-century British authors' growing interest in sensibility and imagination. The original rhetoric category was widened towards a more empirical and psychological one. The reinterpretation of Longinus' *Peri hypsous* reinvigorated French and British classicist literary debates. At the same time, however, the new trend of reinterpreting the sublime was also a result of a selective rediscovery of the Longinian sublime and the reception of Lockean empiricism simultaneously. This paper offers insights into how the literary aesthetic discourse on the sublime became genuinely heterogeneous by the 1740s, and how it was 'prepared' to be reassessed and recapitulated by Edmund Burke, presenting a scheme which served as the representation of the unity of terror, astonishment and joy on a deeper, half-subconscious level (*sub-limen*).

Moreover, the aim of this study is to also explore and examine some aspects of how Alexander Pope interpreted sublimity within the context of early 18th-century British literary aesthetics. It is worth discussing var-

ious interpretations of the sublime in this period, because the first half of the 18th century witnessed the gradual transformation of the concept from its original, stricter, rhetoric interpretation towards a more imaginative and empiricist psychological aesthetic category. Within the realm of early 18th-century British literary aesthetics, I investigated in an earlier paper how the early 18th-century concept of the sublime developed towards the aesthetic concept with the major source of terror in the theories of Burke and Kant with John Dennis as the hallmark of this change (Cora 2014). Dennis was one of the first among the British literary critics of this period, who reinterpreted the rhetoric tradition of the Longinian sublime, and reconceptualised it by using the physico-theological theory of Thomas Burnet (*Sacred Theory of Earth* (1681)) (Cora 2014).

Although this process of transformation began with John Dennis in the early 18th century, this period still displays ambiguity in the interpretation of sublimity, namely, the above mentioned rhetoric and the empiricist-psychological trends. Because Alexander Pope had a direct debate with Dennis on the merits of literary criticism, including the nature of sublimity, it is worth investigating Pope's ideas on the sublime. Thus, one can also see the different facets of contemporary interpretations of sublimity.

My hypothesis is that Pope belongs to that group of critics who interpret the sublime as a rhetoric category which needs erudition and refined taste (the peripathetic tradition of the sublime), following the classical model of the urban sublime by Horace and Cicero (*sublimitas urbana*). The latter concept is based on the classicist notion of *urbanitas* (Ramage 1964: 390–414).¹ Most of Pope's contemporaries tended to shift the interpretation of the sublime towards a more empiricist and psychological basis. Yet, Pope belongs to that stream of literary aesthetics of neoclassicism, which springs from a wide spectrum of sensibility. This stream brings about heterogeneous interpretations of sublimity from finer ones derived from a crisp and grand style to those that spring from wild nature's affective force of awe and terror. However, prior to discussing Pope's critical theory, it is worth investigating the tradition of the sublime in neoclassicist literary aesthetics.

The paper also hypothesises that while the enthusiastic and passionate aspects of the sublime originate not only from 18th-century philosophy,

1 For further examples of the parallels between the satirisation of Pope and Horace, see Sanders (1996), 280–285.

but rather from Greek peripathetic rhetorical theory and Platonic philosophy, yet the ontological and psychological significance of *terror* in the sublime becomes elaborated only in the 18th century. As for the structure of the paper, a short philosophical investigation on how various postmodern thinkers, first of all, Jean-François Lyotard, Hans Bertens and Guy Sircello, rephrased the problem of the sublime is followed by a longer section, in which I elaborate on how the Burkean and the Kantian sublime can be reinterpreted from the perspective of the Longinian tradition. Finally, the question is investigated of how the sublime can be hypothesised as an affective source for human insights, both rhetorically and empirically in the early 18th century.

Some poststructuralist aesthetic theories about the sublime appear as fashionable concepts with three well-identifiable critical points. First, according to Guy Sircello, the *epistemological transcendence* means that imagination overpowers cognition in sensing the sublime. Thus, thinking is disabled, therefore, creating a theory of the sublime is impossible, because theoretical working-out necessarily relies on cognition, which is in this case overwritten by excess imagination (Sircello 1993). Secondly, the notion of *ontological transcendence* refers to the fact that the sublime has its effects on human beings, thus, it exists, if only in an unreachable way, as a consequence of the former transcendence (Sircello 1993: 542–550). Whereas, finally, according to the poststructuralist critic, Jean-François Lyotard, the concept of *radical openness* in general implies that the sublime presents the unrepresentable: the lack of the *validity* of reality yields an invention of other realities (Lyotard 1993: 109–133), as also pointed out by Hans Bertens:

an art of negation, a perpetual negation [...] based on a neverending critique of representation that should contribute to the preservation of heterogeneity, of optimal dissensus [...] [it] does not lead towards a resolution; the confrontation with the unrepresentable leads to radical openness (Bertens 2005: 128).

Although postmodernism revisits this basic ontological question with a critical theoretical refinement and builds it into its terminology (Bertens 2005: 126–128), I do not think it produces any fundamentally new perspectives or interpretations of the sublime. Because the very tradition — in the form postmodern critical thinkers refer to them — that began with

Longinus and continued much later with Kant, in itself carries this contradiction between the *eidetic* and *ontic* aspects of the sublime. In addition, if this aesthetic and philosophic tradition is reconsidered, Hans Bertens' conclusion of an emerging "radical openness" acquires a more complex meaning.

Authors of classical antiquity interpreted the sublime in a rhetorical-formal way with its final intention of exciting delight and affection in the audience of the orator. The *genus sublime*, also known as the *genus grande*, was the strongest among the three basic rhetorical modes (*genus tenue, mediocre et grande*), and it united a large variety of rhetorical elements. Though many authors can be pinpointed as significant within this rhetorical tradition, for our discussion, it is Longinus, or occasionally called Pseudo-Longinus, who in his work, entitled *Peri hypsous (On the Sublime)*, united these rhetoric features and inevitably stands as the very source of the modern tradition of the sublime (for the questions of authorship and dating, see Adamik 1998: 169–172; Nagy 1935: 363–378; "Pseudo-Longinus" 2001: 513–514; Kennedy 1997: 306; Russell 1965: x–xi; Russell 1981: 72–73; Longinus 1991: xvii–xxi). Albeit his person is much debated, yet he most probably lived in Rome in 1st century A.D. In that period the capital city of the Roman Empire was the centre of elitist classicism and 'Greek renaissance' within Latin culture that implied emulation and confrontation with the Greek tradition (Kennedy 1997: 307–308). It is this vivid and exuberant context that inspired Longinus, the Greek philologist, to write his treatise on a topic which had been taken up by numerous authors in the previous centuries, including Theophrastos, Cornificius, Cicero, or Horace.

Longinus conceived the sublime by using original compositions of the peripathetic rhetorical practice and Platonic ideas on intuition and beauty to bring about a new reception theory with a unique literary technique (Malm 2000: 1–10; Usher 2007: 2892–303). The sublime appeared as the manifestation and result of the interplay of congenial and great thoughts, strong emotions, rhetorical modes, artistic performance, and an elevated style. The way Longinus unites the Platonic interpretation and the rhetorical technique of the *genus sublime*, thus constructing a new meaning for the sublime, is indispensable to understand the transformation of the concept from a purely rhetorical to a more imaginative and affective notion

(for examples of the literary compilation technique in order to achieve the sublime aesthetic effect, see Longinus, *On the Sublime*, 11–16).

In a similar fashion to his Greek contemporaries, Longinus relied on peripathetic and Platonic thoughts on artistic creation (Innes 2002: 259–284). With respect to the ideas of greatness, beauty, affection and partly perfection, Longinus dwelt on the idea of harmony with respect to sublimity (Longinus 1991: cap. I–II.). It is also one of the primary propositions of Kant as well concerning the interplay of imagination and cognition. Plato, when discussing poetic and rhetorical truth, rejects mimesis on ethical and ontological grounds. However, not entirely: those artistic forms which are nearest to the abstract ideas they represent and are thereby based on the invention (*heuresis*) of eternal and universal principles, are ethically acceptable. As for art, music and poetry, and subsequently, beauty and harmony (sublimity is not distinguished from beauty in early Greek thought) had to have a constant or fixed point of reference. If they are capable of representing the *eidos*, the universal concept in each and every phenomenon, then they are nearer to the idea (Plato, *Republic* 475d–476b, *Symposium* 210e²).

In addition, Plato revered Homer, recognised the power in his poetry, which he attributed to the fact that the master managed to attain Beauty, which is a constant principle only accessible to philosophers, and to one who can imperviously lead the souls wherever he wants (*psychagogy*). This most affective ability is not residing in the *eidos*, it is not eidetic beauty, though it has to meet certain prescribed measures not to appear mean or fustian. The affective force is subsequently not resulting from them. In the Platonic dialogue, *Ion*, Socrates derives this ability of Ion from divine origins (Plato, *Ion* 536a). It is not *techné* that makes Ion a magnetic musician and actor (*rhapsodos*), but his enthusiasm (*enthusiasmos*). Therefore, the enthusiastic *rhapsodos* unites the eidetic and non-eidetic elements of sublime art by intuitive identification, by his moving emotions and the terrible manifestations of his imagination in a harmonious way that makes him attractive to the audience (Plato, *Ion* 534c–d). In turn, if an artistic creation or phenomenon meets this principle, which nevertheless retains an aspect

2 For Platonic works I only indicated the section markers without the page numbers because in many cases certain themes recur at different parts of the section. For the references of the dialogues see Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, *Plato: the Collected Dialogues* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961); Allan Bloom, ed. and trans., *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1991).

that cannot be fully comprehended, then that artwork or object attains a perfect affective power to the human mind. It is also a source and explanation residing within the affective power of the Kantian sublime which has its origins in classical conceptions of the sublime, reinterpreted and transmitted by Longinus.

Notwithstanding this theoretical refinement, Kant also had a direct source and fore-runner in the mid-18th-century treatise of the Irish philosopher, historian, and politician, Edmund Burke. Burke also distinguished the sublime from beauty, since he thought that sublime is an external objective quality which is reflected in its effects, and can be recognised through these effects. In his essay, Burke provides an “objective” natural spectroscopy among which one can distinguish categories and aesthetic judgments directed by our Taste. The most common causes of the sublime according to his wide view are: obscurity, the idea of power, vacuity, darkness, solitude, silence, infinity, nature, large objects, and uniformity (Burke, *Enquiry*, Part I, 2, 3–23).³ In addition, sublime comes with the feeling of terror, astonishment and reverence: “Indeed, terror is in all cases whatsoever, either more openly or latently, the ruling principle of the sublime” (Burke, *Enquiry*, 2, 2.). He also states that “astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror. In this case the mind is so entirely filled with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, not by consequence reason on that object which employs it” (Burke, *Enquiry*, 2, 1.) For Burke sublime can also be an imitation of a great talent in literary works of art that have effects, such as astonishment, admiration, and grandeur, similar to natural phenomena (Burke, *Enquiry*, Part V, 1–6.). Therefore to copy and compete with a genius appears as an ambition in order to create something *original*: imitation is thus anti-mimetic, or, more precisely, mimetic and non-mimetic at the same time, which results in a creative (re)thinking of artistic expression. As it has been pointed out, this idea was basically entertained by Plato and subsequently Longinus when discussing the artistry of the *enthusiastic rhapsodos*.

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Immanuel Kant discussed the sublime as being different from beauty, since sublimity incites strong emotions, respect and fear from the spectator, but at the same time, it gives de-

3 In the case of Burke’s work, the Arabic numbers refer to chapters and subchapters.

light and joy. It points beyond the sensuous world, reaching out to infinity. Human beings are capable of perceiving either sublime objects, such as the ocean, or a huge mountain, (*mathematical sublime*), or sublime forces, such as a storm, or a volcano (*dynamical sublime*). During the latter process, our imagination arrives at a disharmony with cognition (judgment), since the cognitive part tries to reach totality, attempts to grasp reality in its entirety, but is in-capable of receiving the sublime as a whole (as the sublime is infinite and affective). In the former case, the “collapse” of cognition enables us only to conceptualise the object as a mathematical progression without being able to imagine it, and it leads to the certainty of ideas. That is precisely the reason why Kant contrasted sublimity with beauty: beauty is always framed and finite and it can be grasped with our understanding. As for the sublime, it is unintelligible, since it cannot be conceptualised, yet one elevates the idea of the totality of one’s own mind over the sensation of the sublime (and the source of one’s joy). Thus, human beings transcend themselves over nature, being aware that they are superior to it and its phenomena, as they are free to elevate themselves beyond sublimity (Kant 2000: §23–28, *passim*.) The aesthetics of the sublime can have subsequently no conceptual framework. Language can never make it wholly intelligible and communicable, according to Kant, since only conceptual thoughts can be explicated and communicated. Consequently, one needs intuition and imagination to decipher sublime aesthetics through poetry or art. Kant adds that sublime aesthetics:

is very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature out of the material which the real one gives it [...] it is really the art of poetry in which the faculty of aesthetic ideas can reveal itself in its full measure [...] give imagination an impetus to think more, although in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended in a concept, and hence in a determinate linguistic expression. (Kant 2000: 192–93 [§49])

Though Burke’s ideas on the sources of the sublime are the primary sources for Kant as well, Burke’s empirical interpretation strongly differs from Kant’s ideas on reflective aesthetic judgments, which are metaphysical in their nature. In the Kantian sublime there is a conflict between judgment and imagination within the sublime, wherein imagination cannot articu-

late the desire of the totality of the judgment. The imbalance, the lack of harmony in the mind between imagination and judgment is solved so that judgment raises the mind to a level of abstract freedom where it can face with nature as a totality and finally overcome it, thus creating a balance between imagination and cognition. Consequently, a considerable difference lies in the fact that for Kant the sublime is only present in the mind, and it is far from being an objective empirical quality as it is for Burke.

However, at the same time, it is quite obvious that poetic or artistic acts imply constructedness, that is, *techné*. As it has been explained so far, the role of *techné* in sublimity is as old as the tradition of the sublime itself. Plato's *Ion* points towards non-rhetoric, non-eidetic origins of the sublime along with the already existing rhetorical tradition. Socrates was explaining to Ion that divine poetic powers are gifted to the poet, channelled through his art while the poet is inspired and filled with holy awe (*enthusiasmos*). On the contrary, the rhetorical interpretation of the sublime style (*genus grande*) views the sublime as an effect raised by the orator through the refined and systematic application of figures and tropes (*schemata dianoeias et lexeos*).

In order to endeavour to explicate this duality of the nature of the sublime, and to argue for the hypothesis put forward in the introduction, namely, that the affective scope of the sublime began to expand in 18th-century British aesthetics, it is worth looking at a different interpretation of the epistemological and ontological problem posed by the sublime. In order to provide further reinforcement to my argument, it is now worth revisiting the treatise of Longinus.

Longinus originates the sublime from five sources that arise from *physis* (tendency toward elevated thought or *enthusiastic pathos* — the latter is also a Platonic idea), or from *techné* (*schemata dianoeias and lexeos*, that is, tropes and figures; *phrasis*, and *synthesis*) (Longinus 1991: Section 7). The hypothesis for the latter group of sources is that words are harmoniously allocated like musical notes in a congenial composition. And since harmony is innate to human beings, if it meets the former preconditions of *physis*, it has the effect of touching the soul (Longinus 1991: Section 39). *Physis* and *techné* are subsequently necessarily supplementary. Besides Plato, Longinus dwells on the peripathetic rhetorical tradition that had gradually developed in Greek rhetoric since Gorgias and Aristotle, which assumes

that *techné*, literally conceived, also arises from nature (*phainen*). This idea repeats the original theory of mimesis by Aristotle (Aristotle, *Physics*, Book B: 194a).⁴ Therefore, Longinus thinks that only art can reveal nature, but at the same time art conceals itself through *techné*: *physis* disappears. Nature loves to conceal itself (*physis kruptesthai philei*) is a thought attributed to Heraclitus in the classical tradition. In addition, every art is limited in the sense that it transforms *physis* into a 'static form'. Presentation appears as knowledge (*mathésis*) but a knowledge that is inherently limited, while great art requires great talent (*genius*). However, according to Longinus, even a genius must rely on art:

Nature supplies the first main underlying elements in all cases, but study enables one to define the right moment and appropriate measure on each occasion, and also provides steady training and practice. [...] Great qualities are too precarious when left to themselves, unsteadied and unballasted by knowledge, abandoned to mere impulse and untutored daring; they need the bridle as well as the spur. Demosthenes shows that this is true in everyday life when he says that while the greatest blessing is good fortune, the second, no less important, is good counsel, and that the absence of the second utterly destroys the first. We might apply it to literature, with talent in the place of fortune and art in that of counsel. The clinching proof is that only by means of art can we perceive the fact that certain literary effects are due to sheer inborn talent. If, as I said, those who object to literary criticism would ponder these things, they would, I think, no longer consider the investigation of our subject extravagant or useless (Longinus 1991: Section 2, 5.)

If sublime art is the achievement of the genius whose art is based on *techné* as a development out of nature, then the question arises how it is actually achieved. The Longinian idea implies that the genius elevates his art by

⁴ For the works of Aristotle I only indicated the section and caput markers without the page numbers because in many cases certain themes recur at different parts of the section. For the references see *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).

imitation (*mimesis*) and emulation (*zélotis*). But even this *mimesis* is not a technical one. It is rather something “mysterious” like a contagion. This idea is taken up by Kant when he discusses that the essence with which the genius vests art cannot be transmitted, it is unique because it does not rest on any concept (and only conceptual phenomena are communicable). The genius is not acting on rational grounds when creating art (Kant 2000: 186–97). *Mimesis* of the congenial art is subsequently non-mimetic, it is not imitation (*Nachahmung*), but creative rethinking of the heritage with the elements of inheritance (*Nachfolge*) (Kant 2000: 162–164). Kant also adds that the disciple needs to meet the original sources again that the genius originally used, and at the same time it has to learn the mode of availing himself of these sources (Kant 2000: 186–191). It is rather agonistic competition, the engine of which, according to Longinus, is impression by ethos (*apotypòsis*), for instance, a beautiful plastic artwork, or a good performance. Though in great art *techné* is an ally to nature, it is different in the case of the beautiful, where it is perfection and harmonious resemblance to humans (*eidetic beauty*), and in the case of the sublime, where it rather rests on *logos*, on non-eidetic origins. In this latter instance, *techné* works best if it is concealed from view, wherein *physis* is allowed to be presented as natural pathos (Longinus 1991: Section 35). The *logos* of the sublime is thus a true *logos*, since it unveils. But it also needs delicacy, disguise which is the very essence of veiling the unveiled (*dialanthané*). And the tool for disguise is the shining or light of the figure (*dèlon oti tô phòti autô*). As Longinus points out:

We should not here omit, dear friend, though we shall deal with it very briefly, a subject we have studied, namely, that figures naturally reinforce greatness and are wonderfully supported by it in turn. I shall explain why and how this happens. The cunning use of figures arouses a peculiar suspicion in the hearer’s mind, a feeling of being deliberately trapped and misled. This occurs when we are addressing a single judge with power of decision, and especially a dictator, a king, or an eminent leader. He is easily angered by the thought that he is being outwitted like a silly child by the expert speaker’s pretty figures; he sees in the fallacious reasoning a personal insult; some-

times he may altogether give way to savage exasperation, but even if he controls his anger he remains impervious to persuasion.

That is why the best use of a figure is when the very fact that it is a figure goes unnoticed. Now greatness and passion are a wonderful help and protection against the suspicions aroused by the use of figures; cunning techniques, when overlaid with beauty and passion, disappear from view and escape all further suspicion. [...] How has an orator there concealed the figure? Clearly, by its very brilliance. Just as dimmer lights are lost in the surrounding sunshine, so pervading grandeur all around obscures the presence of rhetorical devices. Something not very different happens in painting: light and shade are represented by colors on the same plane, yet the light is seen first, it not only stands out but seems much nearer. In the same way, great and passionate expressions affect our minds more closely; by a kind of natural kinship and brilliance they are seen before the figures, whose artistry they overshadow and keep hidden (Longinus 1991: Section 17, 29).

Therefore, on the basis of what has been said so far, the sublime can be interpreted as shining — the “truth” of great art, the appearance of its radiance (*phainesthai dia laprotèta*). But the real essence of art remains cryptical, since light casts it into the shadow (*ekphanestaton*). In addition, the “Longinian shining” or light metaphors are supplemented by heliotropes in the sense Jacques Derrida refers to them (Derrida 1982: 207–271). It is pointed out in one of the studies of Jacques Derrida that *heliotropism* is one of those deep undercurrents in Western philosophy that constantly return in diverse forms. One might also add that in cultural representations as well. Sun and sunlight metaphors, such as tropes of light, brilliance, and resplendence, all imply a metaphysical assumption of vision as well. Thus, I think, the sublime can also be seen as a transmitter, a channel, or, at the very least, an intermittent dimension, but at the same time a gateway as well, through which a nonrepresentational quality and a prohibition, crystallised in the inscription, could be played out. Therefore, the sublime not

only unites tropes of light and shadow, but also poses a possibility of problematising ontological and epistemological limits and non-limits (Nancy 1984: 76–103). Longinus sees Homer writing the *Odyssey* as a setting sun (Longinus 1991: Section 9). He also refers to the Book of Genesis ('*Fiat lux!*'), as an instance of pure epiphany (Longinus 1991: Section 9).

However, this shining has to be sought for, needs to be cleared. The motive power hereby is human yearning: nature implanted in us the ability of contemplations and the urge to rival our predecessors, the yearning that cannot be overcome (*érôs*) for great things, for the divine beyond the earthly realm (*daimoniôteron*) (Longinus 1991: Section 35). Thus humans are, as Lacoue-Labarthe argues, "metaontic", "metacosmic beings" (Lacoue-Labarthe – Kuchta 1991: 225). The source of astonishment or terror when sublime emerges is this very clarification, the unveiling of our transcendence beyond finite and rational limitations. The essence of the sublime is subsequently "beyond the light", and is in turn in contrast to beauty as appearance.⁵

Consequently, in a philosophical sense it is plausible to argue for this aspect of terror in the sublime as a valid source of insight into truth or in the case of art, into its essence. And even if the sublime does not lead to "truth" in any conceptually conceived way, still it conveys a presentation of the unrepresentable, thus validating and consolidating non-rational ways of attaining knowledge of human existence. In my opinion, this is what Guy Sircello summarized in the relation under the terms of *epistemological* and *ontological transcendence*. Nevertheless, as it has been shown, the Longinian basis holds a very similar proposition as partly repeated and reinterpreted in Burke's and Kant's theories: a larger scheme which serves as a representation of the unity of terror, fear, pity and joy on a deeper, half-subconscious level (*sub-limen* — i.e. below the threshold). Thus, this seems to answer the problem of *epistemological transcendence*: the reality of the *sub-limen* cannot be perceived directly (non-real), hence an invention of the reality of the sublime becomes possible in the human mind. Consequently, using Sircel-

5 For a further elucidation of how veiling and unveiling functions concerning the presentation of the unrepresentable, and the non-rational ways of attaining knowledge of human existence see Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Colophon, 1971), 17-87; Martin Heidegger, *The Will to Power as Art*, trans. David Farrell Krell, vol. 1. *Nietzsche* (New York: Harper, 1979), 80, 109-10.

lo's concept again, the *ontological transcendence* opens up a vista for gaining an aesthetic though valid knowledge of the world.

Nonetheless, the result poststructuralist aesthetics arrives at — radical openness — is in my view insufficient as a critical concept, or at the very least, lacks refinement because it does not say anything about the sublime itself, it only reflects on a potential repercussion of its epistemology. As has been pointed out earlier, the critical notion of Bertens is neither novel, nor is it a meticulously elaborated concept. Perhaps this is not even simply semantics or the question of a more elaborate philological and philosophical analysis: the existence of sublimity and our perception of it reflect something of the transcendental realities in great art that eventually and perhaps for our sake remain unveiled in our human life.

However, these considerations had their origins in early 18th-century British aesthetics. The sublime of Longinus inspired many generations of philosophers, orators, and writers from the late Roman to modern times. The work of Longinus had been known in England since the mid-17th century, as it was translated into Latin by two English authors (Langbaine 1636, Hall 1652).⁶ In the preface to his translation, John Hall emphasized the psychological, elevated, divine, and inspirational qualities of the sublime.

Nevertheless, more frequent allusions to the sublime appeared only after 1674 when Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux's work on Longinus (*Traité du sublime ou du merveilleux dans le discours traduit du grec de Longin*) was translated into English. French literary debates on the notion of sublimity also influenced early 18th-century British literary critics, who elaborated on the conceptualisation of the sublime so as to gradually transform it from its original, narrower and stricter rhetorical interpretation towards a more imaginative and empiricist psychological aesthetic category. Thus, the early 18th-century concept of the sublime developed towards that aesthetic concept which finally became the major source of terror in the aesthetic theory of Burke and later authors. It is therefore essential to note that the Kantian and Burkean ideas of greatness and astonishment in the aesthetics of the sublime had a very firm source in the 18th-century classicist literary and rhetorical tradition.

6 Editio princeps in England: Gerard Langbaine (Oxford, 1636); first English translation by John Hall: *Peri Hypsous, or Dionysius Longinus of the Height of Eloquence rendered out of the originall by J. Hall Esq.* (1652). Republications: 1698, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1733, 1743, 1752.

Although the late 17th-century French literary debate and its English reception signalled a reinvigoration of the theory of the sublime, it did not lose its deeply rooted classical origins. In my view, this is also shown by the tendency that, on the one hand, changes in 18th-century English interpretations of the sublime ran parallel to the altering interpretations of the work of Longinus. On the other hand, this process of aesthetic interpretation was neatly connected to the main tenets of British empiricism as well. With respect to periodisation, it can be plausibly argued that from Boileau's reception to the mid-18th century the sublime was gradually transformed from a more formal, structural and rhetorical mode towards a psychological and empiricist, imaginative, less literary and more sensational one (Monk 1960: 1–62). Within this process passion, enthusiasm and astonishment obtained higher values. As B. H. Bronson pointed out, “[s]ublimity is constantly in the thought of Dennis and his contemporaries, made vividly aware of Longinus by Boileau” (Bronson 1967: 18.). The sublime is a most prevalent concept used in defense of the irregular and the unbounded as well.

Alexander Pope, the ‘national critic’ and the author of *An Essay on Criticism* (1711) gained huge popularity and plaudits in a relatively short period. The Catholic and Tory leader of the *Martinus Scriblerus Club* (John Gay, Dr. John Arbuthnot, Thomas Parnell, and Jonathan Swift among the members) became an *arbiter elegantiae* besides Addison and Shaftesbury in the early 18th century. It is not by chance that Samuel Johnson praises Pope's style which “exhibits every mode of excellence that can embellish or dignify composition – selection of matter, novelty of arrangement, justness of precept, splendour of illustration, and propriety of digression” (Johnson quoted by Fairer, 1989: 25). I argue that Pope's views on the sublime can be understood only by interpreting his thoughts on literary taste simultaneously. It is John Dennis, whom Pope saw as a bad critic, who ‘provoked’ the writing of a theory of art and literary criticism in a poetic form (Rogers 1975: 29). The *Essay* imitated Horace's *Ars poetica*.

Pope formed his judgements of taste according to two key concepts (for the forerunners of Pope with regard to this, see Fairer 1989: 34–36). *Manners* is the skill of distinguishing between good and bad, which ideally aims to create a humorous, tolerant and perceptive rapport, the ‘great manner’. He discusses it in the *Essay* as follows:

Be niggards of advice on no pretence;
For the worst avarice is that of sense.
With mean complaisance ne'ev betray your trust,
Nor be so civil as to prove unjust.
Fear not the anger of the wise to raise;
Those best can bear reproof who merit praise. (lines
578–583)⁷

In this respect, Pope adhered to the intentions of the Club, since all of its members took pains to establish an educated public discourse, in which artistic performances could be judged and assessed according to exact aspects governed by a refined taste. The other source of judgements of taste is the ability to distinguish between the beautiful and the ugly. This ability also helps the critic to compare works of art on the basis of understanding the cultural context and the artistic intention. Consequently, Pope thinks that one has to strive for universality when forming judgements of taste so that Truth (in the sense of natural law) could be revealed. The uncovering of truth, however, is a personal, human and at the same time moral obligation as well, and not an abstraction or metaphysical finiteness:

Learn then what Morals Criticks ought to show,
For 'tis but half a Judge's Task, to Know.
'tis not enough, Taste, Judgement, Learning, join;
In all you speak, let Truth and Candor shine:
That not alone what to your Sense is due,
All may allow; but seek your Friendship too. (560–565)

In addition, because of their universality, these judgements have to be based upon sense and naturalness. According to Pope, sense is a moderate form of understanding, which also has decorum:

'Tis hard to say, if greater Want of Skill
Appear in Writing or in Judging ill;
But, of the two, less dang'rous is th' Offence,
To tire our Patience, than mis-lead our Sense:
Some few in that, but Numbers err in this,

⁷ The paper's quotations, referring to lines, are derived from the following edition: Pope, Alexander: *An Essay on Criticism*, in Butt, John (ed.): *Alexander Pope's Collected Poems*, London, J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1965, 180-215.

Ten Censure wrong for one who Writes amiss;
 A Fool might once himself alone expose,
 Now One in Verse makes many more in Prose. (1–7)

Ratio as opposed to the vacuity of mind and the lack of erudition, which has to harmonise with artistic expression and is part of critical intelligence, but at the same time it is poignant and sensible:

Pride, where Wit fails, steps in to our Defence,
 And fills up all the mighty Void of Sense!
 [...]

 Some dryly plain, without Invention's Aid,
 Write dull Receipts, how Poems may be made:
 These leave the Sense, their Learning to display,
 And those explain the Meaning quite away. (209–210;
 114–117)

If taste is refined in due accordance with the principles of the art of poetics, precision and decorum with the help of Sense, then, as Andrew Sanders also argues, style impresses with the sensation of naturalness (Sanders 1996: 287–289).

The essence of nature is invisible, can only be witnessed in its manifestations, and it sets limitations to talent within which one's lore can be perfected by art. Pope interprets Nature as divine force (l. 68–73), and as the cosmos itself, the order, symmetry and harmony of which the work of art must imitate and reflect (l. 74–87) (for further details of the complexity of the concept of nature in the 18th century, see Lovejoy 1960). By its internal, lively essence, Nature is the opposite of “artificiality” and at the same time, the source of inspiration, while art provides those forms into which this inspiration could diffuse and create beauty:

In Wit, as Nature, what affects our Hearts
 Is not th' Exactness of peculiar Parts;
 'Tis not a Lip, or Eye, we Beauty call,
 But the joint Force and full Result of all. (243–246)

Even if the *Essay* is the “handbook of Augustan orthodoxy” (Bronson, 1967: 18), Pope, in a timely manner, corrects the seemingly rigid notions attributed to nature by moving between great wits and less gentler forms

of Nature. It can be noted that Pope's "pathetic tenderness" (Bronson 1967: 20) provides for full-fledged extravagancies and lovely descriptions of a gentler Nature in "Windsor Forest" (1704) (Bronson, 1967: 18–21). Therefore, it can also be argued that Pope also swings in a stream of early 18th-century heterogeneous interpretations of sublimity from finer ones derived from a crisp and grand style to those that spring from wild nature's affective force of awe and terror, even if he mostly represents the peripathetic tradition within. Artistic intention, naturalness and creative force are therefore *sine qua nons*; however, similarly to Horace, Pope allows for minor mistakes in case of the genius, thus enabling licence (*licentia*):

If, where the Rules not far enough extend,
 (Since Rules were made but to promote their End)
 Some Lucky Licence answers to the full
 Th' Intent propos'd that Licence is a Rule.
 Thus Pegasus, a nearer way to take,
 May boldly deviate from the common Track.
 Great Wits sometimes may gloriously offend,
 And rise to Faults true Criticks dare not mend;
 From vulgar Bounds with brave Disorder part,
 And snatch a Grace beyond the Reach of Art,
 Which, without passing thro' the Judgment, gains
 The Heart, and all its End at once attains. (146–155)

The great thought of Longinos, which inspires sublime, is coupled with Wit on the wings of Pegasus. Yet, it can rarely soar:

True Ease in Writing comes from Art, not Chance,
 As those move easiest who have learn'd to dance,
 'Tis not enough no harshness gives Offence,
 The Sound must seem an Eccho to the Sense.
 Soft is the Strain when Zephyr gently blows,
 And the smooth Stream in smoother Numbers flows;
 But when loud urges lash the sounding Shore,
 The hoarse, rough Verse shou'd like the Torrent roar.
 (362–369)

This swiftly and elegantly moving sublimity is joined with Sweetness and Light (11–16), Candor and Truth (562–563), as well as Ease. Pope also

lists the opposites of these qualities: meanness and witlessness (36–41); lack of independence, avarice, the platitudinous and the untrue (566–583). What is more, he often plays with light, if he discusses the clear, grand and sublime style or criticism, and thus represents the requisites of clarity metaphorically as well:

But true Expression, like the', unchanging Sun,
Clears and improves whate'ev it shines upon,
It gilds all Objects, but it alters none. (315–317)

The poet transforms the negative 'downward pressure' of rules into positive 'compression'. His concentrated energy moves between the poles of contraction and release. Hence, sublimity is manifested in the grand style, and only poetic Wit is able to reach true Sublime, the par excellence examples of which the author finds in the works of masters of classical antiquity with their perceived universal validity. Moreover, Pope elaborates on the idea of universal values in his later work of moral philosophy, *An Essay on Man* (1733–1734). In this work, Man is represented as a part of the all-pervasive harmony of the order of nature, which binds every creature according to the principle of the "great chain of Being" with God at its end. It is also characteristic of Pope and his age's poetry that Man is at the centre of urban satirisation, too:

Know then thyself, presume not God to scan,
The proper study of mankind is man.
Placed on this isthmus of a middle state,
A being darkly wise, and rudely great:
With too much knowledge for the sceptic side,
With too much weakness for the stoic's pride,
He hangs between; in doubt to act, or rest;
In doubt to deem himself a god, or beast;
In doubt his mind or body to prefer;
Born but to die, and reasoning but to err;
Alike in ignorance, his reason such,
Whether he thinks too little, or too much:
Chaos of Thought and Passion, all confused;
Still by himself abused or disabused;
Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all;

Sole judge of truth, in endless error hurl'd:
 The glory, jest, and riddle of the world! (*Epistle II, Argument*, 1–15 quoted in Hollander 1973)

Furthermore, in almost all cases, these interpretations originate from the Longinian philological tradition with their wide-ranging allusions, from which the limits of this paper enabled only a few to be examined. Moreover, Pope explicitly praises Longinos:

Thee, bold Longinus! all the Nine inspire,
 And bless, their Critick with a Poet's Fire
 An ardent Judge, who Zealous in his Trust,
 With Warmth gives Sentence, yet is always Just;
 Whose own Example strengthens all his Laws,
 And Is himself that great Sublime he draws. (675–680)

What is more, this line ends a beautiful series of *enkomiastions*, praising Horace (653–664), Dionysius Halicarnasseus (665–666), Petronius (667–680), and Quintilianus (669–674). Finally, the poet crowns this with his own critical standpoint (719–746). In sum, Pope belongs to that group of critics who interpret the sublime as a rhetoric category which needs erudition and refined taste (the peripathetic tradition of the sublime), following the classical model of the urban sublime by Horace and Cicero, thus constituting the category of the urban sublime (*sublimitas urbana*). Most of Pope's contemporaries tended to shift the interpretation of the sublime towards a more empiricist and psychological basis. Yet, Pope belongs to that stream of literary aesthetics of neoclassicism, which springs from a wide spectrum of sensibility. This stream brings about heterogeneous interpretations of sublimity, including finer ones derived from a crisp and grand style. Pope provides a *par excellence* example of what he meant by the *genus sublime*, positioning himself as the spearhead of this tradition, inspiring others in his wake.

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BEYOND THE PICTURESQUE AND THE SUBLIME:
MARY SHELLEY'S APPROACH TO NATURE IN THE NOVELS
FRANKENSTEIN AND *LODORE*

Antonella Braida

It is somewhat striking that Mary Shelley's moment of high personal creativity, the summer of 1816, should have coincided with a climatic catastrophe of world-wide proportions, the eruption of the Indonesian volcano Tambora.¹ One could be tempted to associate the ravages caused by the creature with the deaths provoked by the "year without a summer" in which *Frankenstein* was written. In fact, Mary Shelley's fiction – perhaps because of the climactic changes she witnessed – reveals a complex approach to the natural world that invites an ecocritical reading. This may be, however, this paper takes up Ralph Pite's invitation to re-contextualize any ecocritical approach by taking into consideration the complex approaches to nature, theoretical and practical, that were available to a nineteenth-century female writer. As he claims, "In order to have an ecological literature, we need to develop an ecological idea of reading both for history and for texts. For the Romantics to be green, we will need to read them in a green way" (359). As a woman who travelled extensively throughout Europe, Mary Shelley noted in her diaries and letters the changing landscape that caught her imagination. This article claims that these impressions played an important role in shaping her fiction. By focusing on two novels, *Frankenstein* (1818) and *Lodore* (1835), situated respectively at the beginning and at the end of her narrative production, this article will outline the evolution of Shelley's discourse on nature and the landscape.

The picturesque and the sublime in *Frankenstein*

The British Romantic approach to the natural world is dominated by a pictorial stance: poets and novelists often share with travel writers the search

1 On this subject see the study by Gillian D'Arcy Wood, *Tambora, The Eruption that Changed the World* (2014) (Kindle edition).

for the “picturesque”, the beautiful and the sublime. Mary Shelley’s works illustrate the limits of the aesthetic vocabulary of the sublime and the beautiful as well as advocating the return to a peaceful state that could be termed “pastoral”. Mary Shelley’s travel and fiction writing is inspired for its terminology by the two canonical approaches to landscape: Edmund Burke’s *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful* (1756) and William Gilpin’s definitions of the picturesque in his *Three Essays on Picturesque Beauty; On Picturesque Travel; and on Sketching Landscape* (1772). This aspect of Shelley’s approach to nature was also the driving force behind the Shelleys’ tours in Europe and in particular in Switzerland in 1814 and 1816, recounted in *History of a Six Weeks’ Tour*.²

In *Frankenstein*, the narrators’ description of the power of the landscape is mediated by Shelley’s own experience of her two visits to Mont Blanc, and by the characters’ own attitude to the natural world. In fact, the two aspects cannot be separated because of the narrative structure of multiple intradiagetic narrators. The novel is characterised by a constant change of scenery that is subjected to multiple descriptions by the three peripatetic narrators. The explorer Walton, the student Frankenstein and his creature, share an incessant change of country that alternates in their descriptions between the sublime and the picturesque. While the landscape of the Swiss Alps is associated with the Burkean sublime, as was typical in nineteenth-century aesthetic theory from John Dennis (1657–1734)³ onwards, the landscape of the Rhine Valley first and of Matlock (Derbyshire) and of the Lake District secondly, are described as being “picturesque”. The central question asked here concerns the narrative function of these descriptions. The picturesque is invoked at a time of respite in Frankenstein’s sufferings in which nature has purposely been chosen to revive his spirits after the deaths of William and Justine. As a good disciple of Gilpin, Frankenstein notes in his narrative the most significant “stations”, or spots, and their picturesque richness:

2 Twentieth-century criticism has provided many contemporary readings of the Romantic sublime, from Thomas Weiskel’s to Angela Leighton’s to the more recent approaches by Philip Shaw and Timothy Costelloe.

3 See also Addison’s *Essays on the Pleasures of the Imagination*, published in *The Spectator*, 412 (1712) and Mark Akenside’s poem *Pleasures of the Imagination* (1744)

The course of the Rhine below Mayence becomes much more *picturesque*. The river descends rapidly, and winds between hills, not high, but *steep*, and of *beautiful* forms. We saw many *ruined castles* standing on the edges of *precipices*, surrounded by black woods, *high and inaccessible*. This part of the Rhine, indeed, presents a singularly *variegated landscape*. In *one spot* you view *rugged hills, ruined castles overlooking tremendous precipices*, with the dark Rhine *rushing beneath*; and, on the sudden turn of a promontory, flourishing vineyards, with green sloping banks, and a meandering river, and populous towns, occupy the scene. (106–7. My italics)

The description is marked by a switch to the present tense and the use of the third person, which introduces a “picture effect”, one that is shared by a reader transformed into a spectator.⁴ This effect can be ascribed to the figure of speech “hypotyposis” (Louvel). The “one spot” follows the traditional practice, introduced by Gilpin and his followers, of indicating select “stations” that enable the viewer to benefit from the enjoyment of a picturesque or beautiful scenery. The scene conforms to Gilpin’s definitions for its unity of composition and for its “*roughness*” that “forms the most essential point of difference between the beautiful and the picturesque” (Gilpin, Essay I, “On Picturesque Beauty”, 6). In his second “Essay on Picturesque Travel”, Gilpin points out that the search for the picturesque is an intellectual activity, a “scientific employment” (Gilpin, Essay II, “On Picturesque Travel”, 49), in which the traveller recreates the landscape in his mind by applying his knowledge of paintings or prints of seventeenth-century landscape painting by Salvator Rosa or Claude Gelée, le Lorrain (1600–82). Frankenstein’s description follows Gilpin’s analysis as it is characterised by a cold detachment and abstraction. Frankenstein’s complete domination of nature strikes one especially when compared to Clerval’s. His description, introduced as direct speech, expresses his impression of the landscape through the language of sensibility and the passions, namely, through the use of adjectives and verbs that express a feeling, rather than a pictorial quality:

4 On Romantic visual culture, see John Barrell (1980), Peter Garside and Stephen Copley (1996) and Luisa Calé (2006).

The mountains of Switzerland are *more majestic and strange*; but there is *a charm* in the banks of this *divine* river, that *I never before saw equalled*. [...] Oh, surely, *the spirit that inhabits and guards this place has a soul* more in harmony with man, than those who pile the glacier, or retire to the inaccessible peaks of the mountains of our own country. (107, my italics)

For Clerval the landscape, rather than being an assembly of pleasing elements to be framed in the mind for future comparison with select paintings, is a living entity, endowed with a “soul” or “spirit” separate from the human mind and yet in harmony with it. Frankenstein/the narrator ascribes Clerval’s attitude to a Wordsworthian belief in the need for reciprocity between man and nature, as established in the poem “Tintern Abbey”:

He was a being formed in the “very poetry of nature”. [...] The scenery of external nature, which others regard only with admiration, he loved with ardour:

–‘The sounding cataract
 Haunted *him* like a passion: the tall rock,
 The mountain, and the deep and gloomy wood,
 Their colours and their forms, were then to him
 An appetite; a feeling, and a love,
 That had no need of a remoter charm,
 By thought supplied, or any interest
 Unborrowed from the eye.’

And where does he now exist? Is this gentle and lovely being lost for ever? Has this mind so replete with ideas, imaginations fanciful and magnificent, which formed a world, whose existence depended on the life of its creator; has this mind perished? Does it now only exist in my memory? No, it is not thus, your form so divinely wrought, and beaming with beauty, has decayed, but your spirit still visits and consoles you unhappy friend. (108)

Shelley’s juxtaposition of intertextual reference to Wordsworth and the narrator’s prolepsis produce dramatic irony: Clerval’s demise by the creature was not prevented by nature. Shelley here reverses the role nature has in Wordsworth’s poetry: while for example in the poem “Nutting” nature

replies with mildness or utter passiveness to the poet's act of plunder, in *Frankenstein* nature becomes the plunderer in the form of the monster. This identification between the creature and nature has been suggested, for example, by Peter Brooks, "It is as if the Monster, generated within the sanctum of nature, at home in its most sublime settings, might himself represent the final secret of nature, its force of forces" (215–6). One can certainly claim that nature is a facilitator of the creature's project of destruction.

The picturesque descriptions in the novel thus have a double function: they create a respite in the build-up of tension, and they are contrasted with Clerval's Wordsworthian philosophy of nature. Yet, as will be shown, *Frankenstein* dominates the aesthetic discourse in the novel as he becomes the spokesperson of Burkean approaches to the sublime.

The sublime in *Frankenstein*: contrasting the Burkean and the material sublime

Paul A. Cantor identifies in *Frankenstein* "a protest against Romantic titanism, against the masculine aggressiveness that lies concealed beneath the dreams of Romantic idealism. [...] a protest in the name of domesticity against the destructive effects of the Romantic heroic ideal" (89). While I do not disagree with Cantor, I believe Shelley's project in *Frankenstein* involves a different approach to sublime experience, one that contrasts the transcendent Romantic sublime with what has been identified as the "material sublime".

As John G. Pipkin has cogently pointed out, the absence of transcendental sublimity in Romantic women writers has prompted feminist critics to find alternative aesthetic discourses. Anne Mellor, in particular, has championed a "feminine sublime" by which women writers embrace a closer connection with the natural world that does not involve possessiveness or plunder. While this category does explain partly the gendered, male characterisation of the British discourse on the sublime and the exclusion of women writers, it does not apply to poets such as Charlotte Smith or Mary Tighe, or, indeed, to Mary Shelley. In fact, women writers did suggest an alternative sublime experience, one that rejects transcendence as a final solution to the threatening experience of the sublime. As Pipkin explains, in these instances "the transformative turn away from the feel-

ing of terror is paradoxically accompanied by a turn toward the material source of that same terror; these are the transformations encompassed by the material sublime” (601). Women writers may then conclude a sublime experience with feelings of commiseration or identification with the material world, resulting in a moment of personal defiance, empowerment, or self-realization” (601). However, the material sublime, far from being limited to women writers, was first named in Keats’s poem “Epistle to J. H. Reynolds”. For Keats, as Onno Oerlemans explains “the material sublime is in this instance not just a sense of awe and fear [...] but a sudden recognition that it is possible to see at once how thought and existence are estranged from a clear awareness of the physical world, and that they are inexplicably rooted in it” (Oerlemans, Introduction). The material sublime thus often verges on the Gothic for its capacity to accept the “otherness” of the natural world and its threats to the subject.

Shelley’s decision to set the most important events of the plot in extreme natural locations, Mount Blanc and the North Pole, invokes from the contemporary reader the expectation of the extreme feelings of “astonishment” ascribed by Edmund Burke to the sublime. In Burke’s *A Philosophical Enquiry* there is ambiguity and blurring between the feelings produced by the sublime, and the objective qualities capable of producing such feelings (darkness, vastness). Furthermore, in the attempt to locate the origin of the sublime experience in our senses (through passions) Burke emphasizes their delusionary nature. For example, in the discussion concerning “darkness”, Burke refutes Locke’s identification of superstition as the main origin of fear of the dark, and claims a more general, physiological or animal fear linked to the sense of danger: “for in utter darkness, it is impossible to know in what degree of safety we stand; we are ignorant of the objects that surround us [...] we may fall down a precipice the first step we take” (130). More importantly, he confirms the narrative merit of associating the supernatural with darkness: “As to the association of ghosts and goblins; surely it is more natural to think, that darkness being originally an idea of terror, was chosen as a fit scene for such terrible representations” (130). I believe, here Burke makes an important contribution to explaining the rules of the uncanny in literature as he concedes that our emotions can be raised by “ideas [that] have never been at all presented to the senses of any men” (158).

Burke adds a section on “Words” to the second edition of *A Philosophical Enquiry*, which further increases the sense that the sublime is based on “indeterminacy”, as exemplified by Milton’s poetry. By quoting Milton’s description of the travels of the fallen angels as “a universe of Death” Burke concludes that “we do not sufficiently distinguish, in our observations upon language, between a clear expression, and a strong expression [...] the latter belongs to the passions” (159–160). Having done so, he sets the task of finding limits to the dangerous violence of emotions, but, according to Adam Phillips, “The text is riddled with images of sometimes punitive constriction [...] – while Burke tries to impose strict laws and very narrow limits on the recalcitrant material of the passions, and of language itself” (xviii).

In *Frankenstein*, Mary Shelley exploits Burke’s suggestions concerning “darkness” by setting the appearance of the creature within the natural sublime. While in his youth Frankenstein’s feelings at the visit of the *Mer de glace* correspond to what Burke terms the “inferior effects” of the sublime, namely “admiration, reverence, and respect” (53), by comparison, the appearance of the creature is described in terms that correspond to Burke’s definition of the sublime in nature and in real life. In fact for Burke the sublime, in Adam Phillips’ words, “makes reasoning impossible and is the antithesis of philosophical enquiry because it is always in excess of any kind of limit or boundary” (xxi–xxii). These are the feelings described by Frankenstein; after astonishment and awe, he is overwhelmed by the creature and uses the language of indeterminacy employed by Burke:

As I said this, I suddenly beheld the figure of a man, at some distance, advancing towards me with *superhuman* speed [...]. I perceived, as the *shape* came nearer, (*sight tremendous and abhorred!*) that it was the wretch whom I had created. (65)

The appearance of the creature, barely visible, seems to have been generated by the elements. The sublime landscape contributes to making the creature responsible for Frankenstein’s feelings of terror and awe. In both passages, Shelley uses the word “shape” to describe the creature, thus invoking Milton’s “death” cited in Burke’s treatise as an example of “obscurity” (55). According to Burke, in Milton “in this description all is dark, uncertain, confused, terrible, and sublime to the last degree” (55). However, the sub-

lime experience in Milton is partly redeemed by its didactic aim, as it is meant to incite the reader to accompany its terror of “death” with religious awe. In Shelley the reader partakes of Frankenstein’s experience of terror and fear as he is forced to acknowledge the physical existence of his creature and the experience generated ends in despondency rather than awe thus turning the natural into material sublime.

It can also be noted that the material sublime merges into the Gothic by introducing other conventions of the genre, like the moon-lit environment, and in the appearance of the creature in the Orkneys (*Frankenstein*, 115). This association between Frankenstein’s “vision” of the creature and the environmental *topoi* of Gothic horror, forces the reader into the uncertainty that characterises the pure fantastic, as noted by Nora Crook (68).⁵ Thus, the sublime in *Frankenstein* collaborates with the Gothic project of the narrative: it becomes, in Lovejoy’s definition, “a substitution of one for another way of conceiving of ‘Nature’” (Lovejoy 164).

In *Lodore*, like in *Frankenstein*, sublime landscapes are evoked for their beneficial effect and the two novels share the same complex interrelationship between man and nature. Kate Ellison, for example, finds that the novel “could be called *Frankenstein* without the science” (230). In creating the Byronic character of *Lodore*, nature, namely the wilderness in Illinois, has the power of taming his ambitions and pride and leaves way to a Wordsworthian contemplation and *Lodore* becomes “contented with his lot” (*Lodore*, 59). This happiness is only temporary; at the first adversity, his choice is to “meet the trials” by returning to the English high society that had seen his demise. Nature seems to prevent this choice of Byronic plunge into action, and the overpowering feeling caused by the Niagara Falls threaten him into annihilation as *Lodore* contemplates suicide:

One day, occupied by such thoughts, he stood watching the vast and celebrated cataract, whose everlasting and impetuous flow mirrored the dauntless but rash energy of his soul. A vague desire of plunging into the whirl

5 As Nora Crook explains, because of this uncertainty, one can consider “the novel an example of the ‘pure-fantastic’, to use the terminology of the formalist critic, Tzvetan Todorov. For Todorov, the ‘pure-fantastic’ is an inherently subversive genre, which, forcing the reader to hesitate irresolvably between alternative explanations, calls into question the nature of ‘reality’ itself” (Crook 68).

of waters agitated him. His existence appeared to be a blot in the creation; his hopes, and fears, and resolves, a worthless web of ill-assorted ideas, best swept away at once from the creation. (147)

This ability to be overwhelmed by nature is thus another example of the material sublime in Shelley. Moreover, in *Lodore* while the male characters are threatened by nature, female characters are identified with it, as the creature in *Frankenstein*. In the episode quoted above Fanny Dernham's providential and almost supernatural appearance saves Lodore. Villiers, whose pride in refusing help is a lighter version of Lodore's Byronism, envisages a return to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's state of nature beyond and before "culture" and "property":

"How false and senseless all this truly is!" he pursued. "Find a people who truly make earth, its woods and fells, and inclement sky, their unadorned dwelling-place, who pluck the spontaneous fruits of the soil, or slay the animals as they find them, attending neither to culture nor property, and we give them the name of barbarians and savages – untaught, uncivilized, miserable beings – and we, the wiser and more refined, hunt and exterminate them [...]. *The more barriers we place between ourselves and nature, the more completely we cut ourselves off from her generous but simple munificence*". (282, my italics)

Men like Lodore or Villiers are the perpetrators of this division even when they are able to envisage an alternative viewpoint. Thus Villiers, while contemplating a society different from the one dominated by possession and economic status, cannot listen to Ethel's words about the existence of a different order of things in which man and nature belong to the same world:

"But is this necessary?" asked the forest-bred girl: "when I lived in the wilds of Illinois – the simplest abode, food and attire, were all I knew of human refinements, and I was satisfied". Villiers did not appear to heed her remark. (282)

In *Lodore* Mary Shelley thus associates the division between man and the natural world, culture and nature, to a male experience. This dichotomy is at the origin of the male experience of the sublime: incapable of grasping the “otherness” of the natural world, male characters will either dominate it or transcend it by negating it. The introduction of the material sublime implies the failure of their project and the persistence of the “otherness” of nature. Moreover, by moving from the natural sublime to the wider cultural implication of the relationship between man/woman and nature Shelley circumvents the obstacles concerning women writers’ struggle with the masculine aesthetic ideology of the transcendent sublime.

Beyond the picturesque and the sublime: Shelley’s commitment to nature

Yet what is nature for Mary Shelley? It cannot be dismissed in its physical aspect of “landscape”. As Timothy Morton points out, “Nature’ is a key Enlightenment and Romantic term, ‘Nature’ can be an abstract principle, an intrinsic value including a widening circle of beings: ‘man’, woman, child, slave, animal ... plant? mineral?” (700). In Mary Shelley the term “nature” had progressed from the enlightenment meaning, which referred to the universal characters of mankind as illustrated by Mary Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Man*, to a more clearly identified lexical field, which dealt with the vegetal and animal species, or the countryside as opposed to the city.⁶ While the picturesque and the sublime are intrinsically instrumental in Shelley’s narrative project, in both *Frankenstein* and *Lodore* Shelley reveals a wholistic approach to the natural world compatible with a certain environmental commitment, which ranges from pictorial interest, to landscape gardening, to agriculture.

In *Frankenstein*, the respect for nature is illustrated by the idealised small Swiss communities represented by Victor’s family and the De Laceys. Victor’s family has chosen to reside mainly on a “*campagne*” on Belrive, “the eastern shore of the lake” where Elizabeth lives in “admiration and delight” of the scenery “the sublime shapes of the mountains, the changes

⁶ The *OED* devotes three pages to the different treatments of nature: “The material world, or its collective objects and phenomena, esp. those with which man is most directly in contact; freq. the features and products of the earth itself, as contrasted with those of human civilization”. *OED*, XX, 247–50. The authors cited are Cowper (*Hope*), and Dryden’s translation of Virgil’s *Georgics*.

of the seasons, tempest and calm, the silence of the winter, and the life and turbulence of our Alpine summers” (*Frankenstein*, Chapter 2). As Elizabeth confirms, life is controlled by immutable laws: “The blue-lake and snow-clad mountains – they never change. And I think our placid home and contented hearts are regulated by the same immutable laws.” As for the De Lacey, the creature states that “their food, as I afterwards found, was coarse, but it was wholesome; and they procured a sufficiency of it. Several new kinds of plants sprang up in the garden, which they dressed; and these signs of comfort increased daily as the season advanced” (*Frankenstein*, 110). Moreover, the creature is shown to be at ease with the elements that he is able to dominate: “The caves of ice, which I only do not fear, are a dwelling to me, and the only one which man does not grudge” (146). As Carol J. Adams has pointed out, his declared vegetarianism is both a sign of community with nature and of his aspiration to be accepted by men (108–119). As Morton has pointed out “Frankenstein serves as a template for the nature debate. The creature is both utterly natural (made of pieces of other life forms) and unnatural” (700).

In *Frankenstein* Shelley contrasts this depiction of an ideal society in which man and nature are in harmony with Victor’s Miltonic dream to learn “the secret of heaven and earth” (36). His dream is also fraught by his incapacity to partake his scientific enquiries with Elizabeth. He reproduces his family’s sexual division of roles, in which women are docile and domestic companions.

In *Lodore* Shelley further develops the theme of the Garden of Eden with an ironic but clear attack on Milton’s Eve as a model for female education. Lord Lodore “drew his chief ideas from Milton’s Eve, and adding to this the romance of chivalry, he satisfied himself that his daughter would be the embodied ideal of all that is adorable and estimable in her sex” (65). The narrator is explicit in claiming that the aim is not to foster independence and thus keep Ethel in his own sphere of influence, if not “possession”. However, the chief model invoked for the relationship between Lodore and the wilderness in Illinois is Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*. Recurrent epigraphs and citations equate Lodore to Prospero and Ethel to Miranda, like, for example, the incipit of Book I, Chapter 3:

Miranda. - Alack! What trouble
Was I then to you!

Prospero. - O, a cherubim
Thou wast, that did preserve me!

THE TEMPEST

SUCH was the Englishman who had taken refuge in the furthest wilds of an almost untenanted portion of the globe. Like a Corinthian column, left single amidst the ruder forms of the forest oaks, standing in alien beauty, a type of civilization and the arts, *among the rougher, though perhaps no less valuable, growth of Nature's own.* (61, my italics)

The narrator here adheres to Lodore's colonial values and he is presented as the model of the civilized man subduing the coarse wilderness. Significantly, nature is here depicted in negative terms that suggest its imperfection in the absence of human intervention (*among the rougher, though perhaps no less valuable, growth of Nature's own*). As a new Robinson Crusoe, Lodore comes fully equipped with the practical skills in agriculture that he has been able to acquire during his travels around Europe: "When questioned he detailed practices in Poland and Hungary, and gave his reasons why he thought them applicable to the soil in question" (55). Despite his lack of formal education, he shines in comparison with the settlers who see him as a model of the cultivated English society from which he has excluded himself. The narrator presents him as the best representative of the old world, "a type of civilization and the arts". Yet, like in *Frankenstein*, Shelley introduces an ironic undertone that invites the reader to question the narrator's statements. For example, the narrator's supposed disparagement of the native Americans' knowledge is contradicted in Book III, where the internal focalisation highlights Ethel's superiority over her husband Villiers for her adaptability and practical skills, which she learnt from the Indians:

The white inhabitants of America did not form her only school. The Red Indian, and his squaw were also human beings, subject to the same necessities, moved, in the first instance, by the same impulses as herself. All that bore the human form were sanctified to her by the spirit of sympathy; and she could not, as Edward did, feel herself wholly outcast and under ban, while kindness,

however humble, and intelligence, however lowly, attended upon her. (374)

The frequent references to *The Tempest* are highly significant as an expression of a female writer's stance and as an expression of the myth of America. Shelley's focus on the figure of Miranda, according to Lisa Vargo, shows her attempt to create "a character who embodies the ideals of the domestic", one in which "Shelley is critical of how such figures embody male fantasies of feminine passivity" (31–2). This is also achieved by undermining the idea of the white settlers' superiority thus merging feminist and postcolonial approaches, all implicit in *The Tempest*, as contemporary postcolonial readings have shown (Ashcroft and Fielder).

The conclusion of the novel confirms Shelley's desire to introduce a wholistic approach to nature and society. As part III of the novel brings Cornelia into the center of the plot, the narrator celebrates her decision to sacrifice her entire source of income for her daughter as the epitomy of a woman's contentment:

She walked back to her little garden and stooped to gather some fresh violets, and to prop a drooping jonquil heavy with its burthen of sweet blooms. She inhaled the vernal odours with rapture. "Yes," she thought, "nature is the refuge and home for women: they have no public career — no aim nor end beyond their domestic circle; but they can extend that, and make all the creations of nature their own, to foster and do good [...]. It is better to love, to be of use to one of these flowers, than to be admired of the many — the mere puppet of one's own vanity". (442–3)

By changing her focus from male to female ambition, Mary Shelley is able in *Lodore* to express a positive message that has universal import. The cultivation of the garden, the Medieval topos of the "Hortus Conclusus", or enclosed garden, does not result in a renunciation and isolation of women from society; rather it places them into a wider context that matters more than "the niggard rules of society, which gives us only the drawing-room or ball-room" (442). As has been demonstrated, Cornelia's return to nature also implies a return to her domestic duties towards her daughter.

Well before the recent spur of ecocriticism, Mary Poovey pointed out the originality of Shelley's approach to the natural world:

Mary Shelley also distrusts nature, for, far from curbing the imagination, nature simply encourages imaginative projection. Essentially, Mary Shelley's understanding of nature coincides with those of Wordsworth, Wollstonecraft, and Percy Shelley. But where these three trust the imagination to disarm the natural world of its meaninglessness by projecting human content into it, Mary Shelley's anxiety about the imagination bleeds into the world it invades. (Poovey 126)

Poovey's analysis would still hold were it not for the oversimplification of three authors whose natural vision we would now perceive as being quite discordant. Should we consider Mary Shelley's approach to nature as close to Shelley's "deep ecology" (Pite) or, to Wordsworth's more complex ideology of nature's educational role, or to Mary Woolstonecraft's more scientific approach steeped in her readings of natural history? (Ruston) I believe Shelley's works reveal her implication in the main contemporary debates relating to the natural world. McKusik has identified in *The Last Man* "an insight that constitutes the conceptual core of modern ecological thought". The complex approach to nature in *Frankenstein* and *Lodore* reveals a desire to break the taboo of the male transcendental sublime by showing the dark side of human nature when divorced from its feminine half, as the myth of Plato's *Symposium* taught Shelley. Moreover, Shelley's vision of the relationship between man in nature and man and nature in *Lodore* and *Frankenstein* evolves into a personal awareness of the way in which nature can help women overcome the limits of patriarchal society – by eroding the confines between the domestic and the natural world – that can be termed "ecofeminist".

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THE GOTHIC, ROMANTIC AND VICTORIAN TRADITION
WITH RESPECT TO THE POETICS OF THE SUBLIME

THE SPACE OF TRANSYLVANIA AND VICTORIAN LONDON IN
BRAM STOKER'S DRACULA

Alice Sukdlová

Tracing the Romantic Sublime in Victorian fiction, the changes in late 19th century discourse through which the Romantic Sublime was generally rejected due to its nature of excessive romantic subjectivity, egoism and lack of social responsibility cannot be ignored. However, speaking of the transitional nature of the sublime in 19th century fiction¹ it becomes clear that the Victorians found the Romantic Sublime potentially attractive and thus subconsciously present in their works. Nevertheless, what is a more relevant aspect in the Victorian novel is the human aim at the rationalising of events which attempts to define the relationship of literature and science in the 19th century. Questioning the criteria of objectivity and rationality in the course of the narrative becomes relevant namely in Bram Stoker's *Dracula* where scientific and technological progress is undermined by the sublime presence of the undead in spite of the human effort to use all available documentary material to witness the case.

The moment of transgression

Dracula as a late Victorian novel represents the constant process of transgressing not only the rational order of things but also moral boundaries with a tendency of the main entity towards perversion and crime, resulting in the madness of others. These essential elements of the Romantic Sublime characterise the transgression of the term “sublime” between the 18th

1 See Stephen Hancock, *The Romantic Sublime and Middle-Class Subjectivity in the Victorian Novel*, Routledge, 2005, 81.

and 19th centuries.² According to Michel Foucault, transgression is an action which

involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line where it displays the flash of its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its origin; it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses. The play of limits and transgression seems to be regulated by a simple obstinacy; transgression incessantly crosses and recrosses a line which closes up behind it in a wave of extremely short duration, and thus it is made to return once more right to the horizon of the uncrossable. (Foucault 34)

The moments of transgression become essential for the understanding of space in *Dracula*. As Dracula moves from his castle in Transylvanian forests and mysteriously sets out on the journey over the Mediterranean sea to reach the sacred place of Whitby, the space he occupies displays particular sublime features which evoke fear in other characters. Dracula's aim clearly is to evoke fear and demonstrate his power from the moment Jonathan Harker, who becomes acquainted with the Other for the first time in Dracula's castle, enters the region. The sublime fear from the unknown and the uncanny occurs immediately upon entering the Borgo pass which brings Harker to the region of the Transylvanian wilderness.

Dracula is largely associated with the transgression of any rational explanation of the Victorian world, the functioning of Victorian society and its moral and social rules and thus becomes an essential part of the Romantic Sublime. Simultaneously, he functions as the violent and ruthless Other, as an entity which invades England and attempts to extend his power to manipulate his victims and spread contagion through the blood of his prey. Such features of the novel point to the literary tradition of decadence, nevertheless Dracula as a character and especially the space he occupies constitute the essence of the Romantic Sublime in Bram Stoker's novel.

Dracula's movement in space can be described on the basis of Foucault's definition of transgression which "is not related to the limit as black to the white, the prohibited to the lawful, the outside to the inside, or as the open area of a building to its enclosed spaces. Rather, their relationship takes the form of a spiral which no simple infraction can exhaust" (Foucault 35).

² For more, see Martin Procházka, *Romantismus a romantismy*, Karolinum, 2005.

Dracula's swift and mysterious approach to the English coast is reminiscent of a spiral of uncontrolled movement which is demonstrated through his limitlessness as it points to the infinite and sublime element. The trajectory of his movement transgresses all possible rational explanations and Dracula remains out of reach before he accesses the most civilised centre of Victorian society. Dracula therefore occupies the so called smooth space³ whose line of flight takes the form of the spiral movement and thus undermines the principle of space striation as created by Victorian civilisation aims (Deleuze and Guattari).

Dracula's presence both in Whitby and in London is closely associated with the theme of repressed or freed sexuality, which, according to Foucault, "in the new discourse leads to the emptiness of transgression, to the limit of our consciousness, the way our consciousness can read our unconscious" (32). Dracula therefore represents the model of freed and uncontrolled sexuality which corresponds to his dangerous Otherness and focuses upon the unconscious and repressed fears and desires of Victorian society.

In this respect, *Dracula* reflects the false assumption that the masculine aspect of human behaviour becomes associated with the aesthetic quality of the sublime and the feminine aspect with the beautiful (Hancock). This principle seems to be reflected in the structure of *Dracula* where male power and dominance are balanced by the presence of female beauty and wit. Nevertheless, through the character of Mina we can perceive the becoming strength of Victorian womanhood and her firm desire to survive and help the group of Harker's friends stop and destroy the monster. Another female character who represents pure beauty and innocence becomes a victim of Dracula's desire, thus the only positive quality of Lucy's beauty turns into the monstrosity of becoming a vampire and is prevented from spreading the pestilence in the most violent and extreme manner. The perfection of male characters thus relies on their masculine empowerment which is partially enforced through the threat of violence imposed both on Dracula and his victims. What becomes equally important in the female aspect of

3 In the chapter "Treatise on Nomadology" in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari define the category of smooth space as representing the dynamics of forces. Smooth space is related to the aesthetic expression of space, i.e. how a space is perceived by the narrator or character. The smooth space is generally associated with force, which arrives from outside to break constraints and open new vistas. See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

the sublime is the heroine's moral authority which suggests a transition to a new system of treating the sublime aspect of human nature.⁴

Oceanic and gothic sublime

In the space representations of the novel *Dracula*, the two essential forms of the Kantian sublime that reflect upon the magnitude of nature in correspondence with the expanse of the reader's imagination can be recognised. The first concept of the Gothic sublime can be traced in the character's presence near Dracula's castle as registered by Jonathan Harker and his company. In this respect the novel takes the cyclical structure of entering an unknown region and returning to it. The two moments of transgression that are associated with space can thus be defined as stepping over the threshold which is submerged into the Gothic sublime. The turning point in *Dracula* is then bound to the moment of the landing of Dracula's ship in the harbour of Whitby. This particular landscape of the seaside and the space of the sea itself is bound to the Kantian idea of the oceanic sublime which is intertwined with the presence of the Gothic sublime in the surroundings of the tomb in Whitby.

The oceanic sublime

Kant designates the ocean as an important icon of the natural sublime as he stresses the turbulence and power of the waves. The oceanic sublime undoubtedly evokes fear, enlarging the consciousness through the confrontation between the terror from the unknown and the dangerous power of water, especially in the storm. In the Romantic and post-romantic tradition the admiration of the mighty space of the ocean becomes associated with the freedom of movement and the search for the moment of transcendence. However, the oceanic vistas can easily "veer into the uncanny" (Den Tandt, 42) and thus late-Victorian prose reflects upon the presence of the ocean as the image of the sublime horizon in connection with the idiom of terror. The scene of Dracula's arrival in the ship clearly points to the presence of the uncanny and human consciousness confronted by terror at

⁴ See the opening chapter of *The Romantic Sublime and Middle-Class Subjectivity in the Victorian Novel*, which mentions the feminine sublime modes discussed by Anne Mellor and Barbara Freeman among others.

the moment of the ship's arrival in the storm. Sinister happenings in the scene are foreshadowed through romantic postulates in the metaphors of the roaring sea while using monotonous colours with the dominating grey:

Everything is grey – except the green grass, which seems like emerald amongst it; grey earthy rock; grey clouds, tinged with the sunburst at the far edge, hang over the grey sea, into which the sand-points stretch like grey fingers. The sea is tumbling in over the shallows and the sandy flats with a roar, muffled in the sea-mist drifting inland. The horizon is lost in a grey mist. All is vastness; the clouds are piled up like giant rocks, and there is a “brool” over the sea that sounds like some presage of doom. (Stoker 93)

In connection with the philosophy of space as understood by Deleuze and Guattari, the perception of space of blurred lines between the horizon, the sky and the sea points to the absolute, as the space of the ocean is classified as smooth space *par excellence* and human orientation in space becomes extremely difficult. Generally speaking, the space of the harbour becomes smooth with the coming of the night and the storm intensifies the notion of the potential dangers of the approaching death endangering human existence. The prophecy of an old sailor referring to the strange ship appearing on the horizon gives way to romantic interpretations of Dracula's arrival: “There's something in that wind and in the hoast beyond that sounds, and looks, and tastes, and smells like death. It's in the air. I feel it comin'” (Stoker 94).

Typically enough of 19th century poetics of space, Stoker associates the space of the night with supernatural elements and the power of vile forces. Open spaces, including the shore and the harbour become unsafe and undesirable with the sunset and unfavourable weather. The space of the harbour, which reflects civilisation aims being striated by walls, becomes submerged into the smooth space during the night while human orientation in darkness becomes complicated as perceived by female characters of Mina and Lucy in the novel: “I see the lights scattered all over the town, they run right up the Esk and die away in the curve of the valley. To my left the view is cut off by a black line of roof of the old house next the Abbey” (Stoker 86). As with the concept of “aura” in Walter Benjamin's *Illumination* we can trace the feature of romanticising the space of the city (or

town in the case of Whitby) as the text of *Dracula* in this chapter evokes “the city’s sublime splendour” and “acknowledges the fragmentation of its object” (Den Tandt 38–39). The “aura” of the city becomes concealed behind an inaccessible horizon associated with self-delusive mysticism and the town of Whitby at the moment of approaching nightfall appears as the “uncanny totality” (Den Tandt 38) where, from the far distance behind the horizon, mysterious superhuman forces approach.

Interestingly enough, Bram Stoker, in accordance with the late Victorian demand for objectivity and scientific approach both in life and literature, seems to suppress the romantic imagery of his space representation in ironic comments referring to art, especially concerning the imagery of colours. In the crucial scene before Dracula’s arrival the space of the sea is referred to by a journalist who keeps the distance from the aesthetic experience of the sunset, which is accompanied by “myriad clouds of every sunset-colour – flame, purple, pink, green, violet and all the tints of gold; with here and there masses not large, but of seemingly absolute blackness” (Stoker 96). No matter how intensively the description alludes to the paintings of J. M. W. Turner, it is an ironic commentary from the journalist’s point of view, who leaves it up to perceptive artists and painters to make use of the scene later and transform it into a valuable work of art. The journalist’s task is to ignore the aesthetic function of art as he is to report objectively about the things he witnessed. Art in general, through the author’s ironic comment, is to stand in contrast to the objectivity of science and rationality. Nevertheless, ironically enough, the things “reported” by the journalist from a local newspaper are intensively connected with the mysterious and supernatural occurrence of a ship commanded by a dead steersman lashed to the wheel and the only living creature on board being a dog who disappeared onto the moors on the ship landing. As a result of the report, the Victorian reader must have been left in doubt as to what remained to be analysed rationally and objectively. Creating a strong sense of the supernatural, the uncanny and the romantic sublime seems to be the intention of the narrative at this point, especially in connection with the space perception and space representation. In the scene of Dracula’s arrival with the ship heavily loaded with coffins stuffed with soil, Stoker, in a variety of aspects, alludes to *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, partially through the “prologue” of the “ancient mariner” who talks to Mina in the chapel and makes the strange

prophecy of death coming. Another hint at intertextuality within the context of the tradition of the Romantic Sublime has been mentioned before in connection with the allusion to the paintings of J. M. W. Turner – “as idle as a painted ship upon a painted ocean” (Stoker 96). In the scene of Dracula’s landing, the sea in the storm takes all the aspects of the romantic imagery of nature’s convulsion which attacks the shore striated by human aims in the forms of piers and lighthouses. The sea becomes the embodiment of threat through the mass of water and sea fog, its waves being compared to the height of mountains, displaying the potential of the Romantic Sublime and the power of supremacy of the ocean over humans: “the sea, running mountains high, threw skywards with each wave mighty masses of white foam, which the tempest seemed to snatch at and whirl away into space” (Stoker 97). Simultaneously, the stillness of nature before and after the storm becomes associated with death, ominous silence and uncertainty which highlights the tension of the narrative until Lucy’s death and the shift of the place of the narrative to London.

Gothic varieties of the romantic sublime

In the third *Critique of Judgement*, Kant defines the attributes of the Romantic sublime in Nature in terms of greatness of natural features:

Bold, overhanging, and as it were threatening, rocks; clouds piled up in the sky, moving with lightning flashes and thunder peals; volcanoes in all their violence of destruction; hurricanes with their track of devastation; the boundless ocean in a state of tumult; the lofty waterfall of a mighty river, and such like; these exhibit our faculty of resistance as insignificantly small in comparison with their might. But the sight of them is the more attractive, the more fearful it is, provided only that we are in security; and we readily call these objects sublime, because they raise the energies of the soul above their accustomed height, and discover in us a faculty of resistance of a quite different kind, which gives us courage to measure ourselves against the apparent almightiness of nature. (Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, online edition)

However, the sublime should be simultaneously perceived as the immeasurable whole beyond recognition as it opens space to the mystery and fear

of the unknown. In *Dracula* the space of the vast ruined castle in which the narrator keeps on ascending and at the same time sinks deeply into the trap of being imprisoned in the castle intensifies the sense of the Gothic sublime; the space reflects features of Gothic architectural elements such as lofty halls, secret passages, great round arches, tall black windows and broken battlement with its projection against the sky, resulting in the effect of the gloomy atmosphere. The sublime feeling of terror of the unknown is supported by Harker's state of mind on the verge between dream and reality in which it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between the two.

Another place that represents features of the Gothic sublime is the part of Whitby called the Crescent where the ladies became the first victims of Dracula's attack in England. The mystery and horror of the scene is highlighted by Dracula's transformation into a wolf or a bat the images of which remain partially suppressed in the victim's unconscious. The atmosphere of the Gothic sublime is supported by the presence of the bright full moon, heavy black driving clouds with "a fleeting diorama of light and shade" (Stoker 116) which creates a typical romantic contrast. The presence of the ruins of the Abbey and the churchyard associates the poetics of space of the Gothic novel genre and as the scene proceeds, the contrast of black and white becomes significant in the form of two figures, which contrast Lucy's innocence and the presence of the uncanny in the form of Dracula's figure attacking her. Interestingly enough, the scene is witnessed from Mina's perspective who watches the action from over the bay and therefore remains out of reach. At the same time the aspects of the sublime and beautiful combine in the very next scene as the heroine observes a bat flitting in the moonlight and "the soft effect of the light over the sea and sky – merged together in one great, silent mystery – was beautiful beyond words" (Stoker 116).

The wolves

Supporting the notion of the Gothic sublime presence in space the animal aspect (i.e. the presence of the uncanny) in *Dracula* represents Victorian fears deeply rooted in the unconscious; basically all the main characters dream of wolves, dogs, bats or vampire figures. The space of *Dracula* becomes filled with the howls of dogs or wolves, which supports the theory of the smooth space according to Deleuze and Guattari. Nevertheless, later

the wolves are associated with violent force as they break into human shelters to impose Dracula's will upon the sleeping victims.

The presence of wolves whose hostile howls and Otherness become associated with their subordination to the Count's rule forms another source of dramatic tension as well as the Gothic horror atmosphere of the woods. The wolves accompany the process of Dracula's transgression and, interestingly enough, their presence in space forms an essential part of the sublime Gothic both in Transylvania and England. The wolves represent sublime nature accompanied by fear as they remain parts of the unconscious.

Wolves or werewolves have always existed as part of the Gothic imagination either as humans in animal form or animals in human form. According to Gilles Deleuze,⁵ their animality/ humanity classifies them as *liminal creatures* whose main aspect of existence is focused on crossing the threshold between the two worlds. Therefore, the wolves in *Dracula* become the essential part of his transgression and possibly transformation within the Gothic sublime. For Deleuze the wolves are metonyms of forbidding landscapes and their howl as well as appearance defines their identity of monstrous creatures who display the potential to form a multiplicity of difference in terms of space, gender, sexuality etc. Typically enough for *Dracula*, they form the intersection of the real and the imaginary and thus embody human anxiety of difference, which creates the essential aspect of the Gothic sublime in Victorian literature. Deleuze's philosophical term of *becoming animal* supports the perception of wolves as demonised creatures in *Dracula*. The category of the werewolf or vampire supports Dracula's identity in terms of his transgression as a part of the theory of the sublime Gothic which results in the instability of human identity of the late Victorian era. According to Deleuze and Guattari, wolves inhabit the smooth space, they are in constant motion and their movement is unpredictable and vertiginous, resembling a swirl (33). Dracula himself is the wolf-man, an individual creating the multiplicity. The wolves in the pack are considered intensities associated with speed which form "nondecomposable variable distances" (Deleuze and Guattari 35). In Deleuzian terms they create lines of flight which point to their deterritorialisation (Deleuze and Guattari 60). Wolves in *Dracula* represent animality in man and question

5 See especially the chapter, Deleuze and Guattari, "1914: One or Several Wolves?" in *A Thousand Plateaus* (29–44).

sexual identity, becoming bloodthirsty creatures whose bloodlust suggests eroticism in association with becoming inhuman. The werewolf transformation as a part of the transgression then embodies the crisis of human identity and therefore represents the threat for mankind in general.

The presence of wolves in *Dracula* in association with the sublime notion of space is stressed from the beginning of the novel when Jonathan Harker enters the woods of Transylvania. In fact, the wolves are the first creatures he faces in the night wilderness: “Close at hand came the howling of many wolves. It was almost as if the sound sprang up at the raising of his [Dracula’s] hand, just as the music of a great orchestra seems to leap under the baton of the conductor” (Stoker 64). The sound of the wolves’ howl magnifies Harker’s sense of confusion and intense fear as he becomes familiar with the fact that the smooth space he entered is shaped by the presence of the Other, dangerous creatures:

As the door began to open, the howling of the wolves without grew louder and angrier; their red jaws, with champing teeth, and their blunt-clawed feet as they leaped, came in through the open door. I knew that to struggle at the moment against the Count was useless. [...] Suddenly it struck me that this might be the moment and the means of my doom; I was to be given to the wolves, and at my instigation. (Stoker 65)

Harker’s awareness of his subordination to the Count becomes inevitable as he realises the impossibility of escape until the master of the castle decides to set him free. The sublime terror associated with Dracula’s power is demonstrated through his actions that make the castle a prisonlike fortress: “With one sweep of his powerful arm, the Count threw the door shut, and the great bolts clanged and echoed through the hall as they shot back into their places” (Stoker 67).

In the course of the narrative, wolves become parts of the unconscious as the setting of the novel moves from Transylvania to England. The fearful and liminal creatures appear in dreams of main characters and signify the furtive presence of the upcoming danger. Lucy hears dogs howling in her dream but “all seemed to be real” as she was “passing through the streets and over the bridge, leaning over water and she heard a lot of dogs howling – the whole town seemed as if it must be full of dogs all howling at once” (Stoker 121).

The presence of dogs or wolves howling becomes closely associated with the presence of water in Lucy's dreams: "I seemed sinking into deep green water, and there was a singing in my ears, as I have heard there is to drowning men" (Stoker 124). This connection which is used rather frequently in Victorian novels suggests the loss of identity of individual consciousness and a split between the rational and emotional part of human consciousness signifying the conflict with the power of the unconscious. In her dream Lucy becomes as if hypnotised by Dracula's power and her fear of otherness (embodied in the shape of animals) is combined with the fear associated with water. The motif of Lucy's drowning in her dream in the situation when she was attacked by Dracula for the first time has also an erotic connotation of his attack evoked by Lucy's beauty and innocence. However, the threat of Dracula's intrusion is combined with her unconscious pleasure: "I have a vague memory of something long and dark with red eyes, just as we saw in the sunset, and something very sweet and very bitter all around me at once" (Stoker 116). In this respect, Lyotard's interpretation of the Kantian sublime may be used to define the feelings of the sublime sentiments, which is also the sentiment of the sublime, "a strong and equivocal emotion: it carries with it both pleasure and pain. Better still, in it pleasure derives from pain."⁶ This expression of Lucy's suppressed desires suggests the sense of decadent perversion in the novel, undoubtedly shocking in the late Victorian era.

Sublime horizons

Another moment of transgression and the most intensive evocation of the sublime reflected through nature occurs in the final scene of *Dracula*. In the closing chapter Dracula's castle "stood against the red sky and every stone of the broken battlements was articulated against the light of the setting sun" (Stoker 448). Its projection against the sky articulates the aforementioned sublime moment which signifies something that exceeds it and becomes reflected through nature:

We saw it in all its grandeur, perched a thousand feet on the summit of a sheer precipice, and with seemingly a great gap between

6 See Lyotard, "Answering the Question: What Is Postmodernism," *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, 71–82.

it and the steep of the adjacent mountain on any side. There was something wild and uncanny about the place. We could hear the distant howling of wolves. They were far off, but the sound, even though coming muffled through the deadening snowfall, was full of terror. (Stoker 442)

The aspects of the long distance, sublime horizon, the uniqueness of the place and its elevated position intensified in the light of the sunset give rise to the feelings of the presence of the uncanny which ideally support the romantic imagination and weaken the realistic component of space representation.

Dracula's metaphorical invasion of the English soil near the shore of Whitby in the form of "a fierce brute" (Stoker 97) has more than the aspect of animal transgression in its occurrence. Stoker's imagery of the place was probably influenced not only by his stay in the popular 19th century tourist resort of Whitby, but he also took into account the breaking of a Russian schooner on the shore in 1885. The "exotic" origin of the fictitious ship which had set sail from Varna in the novel points out to the Victorian threat of the unknown space of south-east Europe perceived as the Other, dangerous, and the uncanny. The Count and the act of his landing thus represent Victorian fears that are more universal. As Stephen Arata points out in his article,⁷ in the late 19th century Britain felt its decline as a world power, which undermined Victorian beliefs in progress and hegemony and the decline of imperial force found its reflection in the narrative. In this respect Arata uses the term "reversed colonization" in which the "civilized world becomes civilized by primitive forces" (Arata 642) and the colonised takes the position of the coloniser. This aspect of sublime fear of the primitive unknown brings an anxiety of lost values connected with moral, spiritual and racial decline, which makes the nation more vulnerable and exposed to harmful influences from the colonized world. Thus "the count's transgressions and aggressions" threaten the space of Victorian England and problematise scientific progress as well as the boundaries between victimisers and victims. In *Dracula*, Transylvania is seen as a politically and ethnically unstable region in the clash of antagonistic cultures and the complex situation within the empire then reflects the features of

7 See Arata, "The Occidental Tourist: Dracula and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization," *Victorian Studies* 33 (1990): 621–45.

perpetual invasion, human displacement and signs of collapse (Arata 643). The vampire myth and its transformation by Bram Stoker is thus seen as a political threat to the Anglo-Saxon world as the count penetrates into the heart of the Empire and his lust for blood endangers Britain's integrity as a nation as well as of any individual (Arata 630).

Dracula's transgression of categories of animals and the undead further manifests his absolute power over animals and humans. Upon entering the region, the narrator Jonathan Harker revisits the primitive past, in search of business partnerships in the role of the coloniser, but paradoxically falls into the trap of the Count's dominating power. Harker's initial indefinite fear later becomes transformed into the fear of Dracula's power and dominance. Interestingly, what finally wins over Dracula's intentions is Victorian rationality and objectivity as late as when the Count reaches London, the heart of the late Victorian colonial empire. The city of London is therefore a place where the Victorian individuals are able to think rationally as they overcome the fear of the unknown and prime their minds to fight the monstrous Other. In correspondence with the sublime feelings the anguish and terror from the unknown region enlarges the spiritual world of rational Victorian characters and awakens their senses to a higher intensity of life.

In the course of the narrative the sense of the supernatural forms a contrasting view to the scientific methods and Victorian belief in rationality as it brings a new approach of studying the supernatural. The new approach is represented by Dr. Van Helsing whose interest in psychoanalysis and hypnosis uncovers the universal mystery of life and death in *Dracula*.

The sublime perception of space and its connection with Victorian fears becomes a general topic for Elaine Showalter who claims that the crisis of the *fin de siècle* was felt more emotionally and intensively because of the approaching end of the century because it was "weighted with symbolic and historical meaning"⁸ to which the metaphors of death and rebirth are bound. Myths and metaphors are to be closely associated with the end of 19th century literature as a part of our historical consciousness, Showalter claims further. Thus, we can understand Bram Stoker's novel as a representation of such a crisis of both male and female sexual identity, as an exploration of the vampire myth and moreover as a vision of the apoc-

8 See Elaine Showalter, *Sexual Anarchy: Gender and Culture at the Fin de Siècle*, Bloomsbury, 1991.

alypse that mark the *fin de siècle* of literature and culture. Dracula leads us into the space of the sublime nature of Transylvania, the smooth space of the sea as he approaches the English soil to become an invader of our civilisation aims and perhaps opens a vision of the apocalypse that reflects the *fin de siècle* crisis of humanity.

However, it remains only a theoretical postulate that the space of the British Isles could have become guarded, isolated and “Otherness” be prevented from entering. As Showalter claims:

If the different races can be kept in their places, if the various classes can be held in their proper districts of the city, and if men and women can be fixed in their separate spheres, many hope, apocalypse can be prevented and we can preserve a comforting sense of identity and permanence in the face of that relentless specter of millennial change. (Showalter 4)

Interestingly enough, the fears of regression and degeneration, the threat of transgressing the boundaries and fear of the unknown remains more general a theme more than a century after the vampire myth became such an important part of the Gothic sublime notion of space.

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“GLITTERING MYRIADS OF MEN”: H. G. WELLS’S
SPECULATIVE NATURALISM AND THE LATE-VICTORIAN
URBAN SUBLIME

Christophe Den Tandt

This paper interprets Herbert George Wells’s early science-fiction novels as instances of the Late-Victorian urban sublime. The argument suggests that Wells’s works bring into play three strands of the rhetoric of terror and wonder — the oceanic, the gothic, and the neo-classical. Wells depicts cities as boundless fields defying representation, as breeding grounds for evolutionary monsters, or as spectacles of grandeur triggering the elevation of the soul. The paper examines two issues raised by these idioms. First, it examines how Wells’s recourse to the sublime leads us to rethink his status within nineteenth-century urban fiction and British literary naturalism. Secondly, the paper evaluates the impact of the sublime on Wells’s politics. One wonders indeed how urban sublimity relates to Wells’s elitist brand of socialism, and how the politics of the sublime determine Wells’s status as a naturalist author.

1. “[G]littering myriads of men”: Sublime Cities of the Present and Future

Though H. G. Wells’s *The War of the Worlds* is ostensibly concerned with extraterrestrial invasion, its action climax does not involve the presence of Martians. The novel’s greatest commotion occurs instead when the narrator’s brother, accompanied by two ladies, reaches the Great North Road at Barnet (Wells’s London geography is painstakingly meticulous) and seeks to cross the “boiling stream of people” fleeing the capital devastated by the Martians (90). From a distance, the crowd “roa[rs] like a fire” (90). The refugees form “a tumultuous stream of dirty, hurrying people” acting as a violent, indistinct mass: they have “merged their individuality [...] in a receding multitude” (91). Over several pages, we learn how the narrator’s brother and his companions are “swept forward by the stream” (95), and, once immersed in it, “lose volition” and “become part of [the] dusty

roul” (95). After crossing Chipping Barnet in this “indescribable [...] din and confusion (95), they break free of the human stream and seek shelter in a side road. The Barnet incident is the most spectacular of several crowd scenes in Wells’s Martian-invasion novel. It reveals to what extent the English novelist uses a science-fiction premise in order to make visible the spread of mass urbanization. In particular, *The War of the Worlds* depicts urban populations whose social bond is fashioned by new technologies: the movements of the fleeing masses are triggered by the headlines of newspaper reports; the crowds move around by means of the train services connecting the metropolis’s suburbs.

Crowds in a technologically reshaped environment are also a major feature of Wells’s *When the Sleeper Wakes*. In this novel, Graham, a late-nineteenth-century insomniac, falls into a trance of two hundred years. He wakes up to discover that the compound interest on his estate has made him the majority shareholder of a dictatorial oligarchy — the Council — ruling over a society characterized by mass urbanization. Village and country life have disappeared, only megalopolises and leisure resorts called Pleasure Cities have survived while the London megacity shelters under a sky dome. Multiple crowds inhabit this world — street crowds, revolutionary masses, speculators, merry dancers, laborers. Graham’s first experience of this world occurs as he catches a glimpse of the twenty-second-century “[m]oving [w]ays” (26) — three-hundred-foot-wide mechanical sidewalks cutting across London’s “overwhelming architecture” (26). The complex walkways, with swiftly traveling side lanes and a motionless center, accommodate “an innumerable and wonderfully diversified multitude of people” (27). Their “motion dazzl[es] [Graham’s] mind” (26). Crowds in motion also dominate the long description of the Sleeper’s immersion into “a congested mass” of protesters hunted down by the security forces of the oligarchy’s Council. For more than a chapter, Graham is carried along by a “multitude [...] beating time with their feet” (57). His transit through the “glittering myriads of men” (59) and his flight to safety occur in an atmosphere of mental confusion making it hard for Graham to convince himself that “the whirl of [the crowd’s] movement” (58) is “no dream” (68).

The urban masses evoked above qualify as oceanic crowds: they are characterized by great size and motion and reside in locales large enough to justify comparisons to streams and floods. A different portrayal of urban

populations informs Wells's *The Time Machine*, as well as a few passages of *When the Sleeper Wakes* not addressed above. London in the year 802.701, as the Time Traveller of *The Time Machine* discovers it, consists of two contrasted realms. Its "Upperworld" (48) is graced with magnificent yet decaying buildings of monumental size, and is inhabited by bands of "pretty little people" (21) — the "Eloi" (46). These childish, undersized hedonists live in fear of the city's "Underworld" (48) — a network of deep shafts and galleries peopled with creatures resembling "white lemurs" (48) with "lidless, pinkish-grey eyes" (50). To the Time Traveller, the Morlocks, as these Underworld denizens are called (50), seem "nauseatingly inhuman": their bodies display the "half-bleached colour of the worms and things one sees preserved in spirit in a zoological museum" (46). Yet like the Eloi, they are evolutionary avatars of nineteenth-century humankind. The "exquisite creatures" (21) of the Upperworld are the descendants of the leisure classes, while the Morlocks are the offspring of the working classes. The latter, by the evolution of industry, have "lost [their] birthright in the sky" (44), and been "cut off from the natural surface of the earth" (44). In an allegory of the class struggle, they hunt down the Eloi at night and eat them. Wells provides no extensive depiction of the Morlocks' underground city. Instead, his impressionistic approach maximizes the text's gothic intensities: through the protagonist's eyes, we are given frightening glimpses of shafts, galleries, and machine rooms engulfed in darkness. The twenty-second-century society of *When the Sleeper Wakes* has its own "[u]nder [s]ide" too (158). The middle and upper-class world of the London megalopolis owe their prosperity to a toiling underclass characterized by "pale features, lean limbs, disfigurement and degradation" (161). These laborers live among "giant machines [...] plunged in gloom" (159). Deprived of any attractive feature that might gain them acceptance among the pleasure-seeking crowds above, they form "a distinct class, with a moral and physical difference of its own—even a dialect of its own" (159). The gothic denizens of the "[u]nder [s]ide" therefore embody an early stage in the social evolution leading from the nineteenth-century proletariat to the Morlocks.

In the passages above, Wells resorts to the rhetoric of the urban sublime: he depicts future and present cities as objects of fascination and terror. In this paper I wish to examine to what extent Wells's handling of the rhetoric of terror and wonder leads us to re-examine the significance of his works

of anticipation. The corpus for this argument includes three scientific romances — *The Time Machine*, *The War of the World*, and *When the Sleeper Wakes*, as well as Wells's essay *A Modern Utopia*. I shall first develop a few general reflections on the urban sublime as a cultural phenomenon and an academic concept. These introductory remarks are the more useful as Wells's scientific romances do not mobilize one single strand of urban sublimity. Instead, they play several variants against one another. The passages above interweave at least two strands of the urban sublime: oceanic metaphors evoking the city's magnitude and urban gothic stirring accents of abject dehumanization. Secondly, I wish to investigate whether Wells's portrayal of "overwhelming" cities may help us re-evaluate his position within British urban naturalism. Finally, we will examine to what extent the urban sublime empowers or subverts the political agenda ostensibly developed out in Wells's scientific anticipation. To this purpose, we must determine how the affects-laden visions of disaster elaborated by the scientific romances fit in with the rational depictions of advanced societies appearing in late-nineteenth-century utopian writings, including Wells's own *A Modern Utopia*.

2. A Short Genealogy of the Urban Sublime

The rhetoric of sublimity in the representation of urban space has been the object of a fairly small and recent academic corpus. This body of literature can, however, be broadened by factoring in essays examining discourses cognate to the urban experience — studies of the "industrial," the "technological," even the "[n]uclear" sublime (Burtinsky 3; Nye, *American 2*; Ferguson 4).¹ Initial references to urban sublimity focused on architecture and urban planning, emphasizing the overwhelming power of built space. In his history of English architecture, Nikolaus Pevsner mentions the fascination and dread exerted by Victorian buildings — a phenomenon Nicholas Taylor calls the "[a]wful [s]ublimity of the Victorian [c]ity" (Taylor 431; also Walker 138). Similar reflections have been elaborated about skyscrapers and twentieth-century urban development.² Because this architectural concept of the urban sublime is concerned with visual excess as an embodiment of terrifying power, it fits the principles developed in one of the most

1 See also Marx (195) and Wilson (231) for discussions of the technological sublime.

2 See Kingwell (51); Nye ("Sublime" 257) and Lynch (2) for analyses of the sublime in modernist and postmodernist architecture and urban planning.

often-quoted essays on terror and wonder — Edmund Burke's *A Philosophical Enquiry into Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*. Inspired by Hellenistic critic Longinus' treatise *On the Sublime*, Burke defines sublimity as "whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever [...] operates in a manner analogous to terror" (4). Cities fit Burke's criteria by their great size and their capacity to accommodate populations alienated and impoverished to the point of uncanniness.

Fredric Jameson's mid-1980s reflections on postmodernism opened new avenues of research for the urban sublime. Jameson argues that the technologically mediated social bonds of postmodernity are too vast to be amenable to representation. This "impossible totality" is therefore an object of sublime affects, comparable to the emotions inspired by nature under Romanticism (35; see also Tabbi 11–13). Jameson's remarks are significant firstly because they delineate a history of the rhetoric of terror and wonder in which the urban sublime stands as an intermediary stage between nature Romanticism and the postmodern concern for the sublimity of discourse and technology. Secondly, Jameson makes the sublimity of the social landscape an issue of discursive representation, not solely of visual magnificence and power. His approach is therefore comparable to postmodernist philosopher Jean-François Lyotard's reflections on the Kantian sublime. Kant's concept of sublimity, Lyotard indicates, is concerned with the dynamics of cognitive processes (*Leçons* 18–21). For Kant, the sublime arises whenever reason produces an idea of infinity that cannot be objectified by understanding and imagination: the mind struggles with a concept of "absolute totality" with which it cannot catch up (Kant 119). On this basis, Lyotard views the Kantian sublime as the philosophical template for the epistemological crisis of postmodernity, which confronts subjects with an overwhelming proliferation of discourses (*Postmoderne* 18–19). In light of Kant, Jameson, and Lyotard, the metropolis embodies the (post)modern crisis of representation in the materiality of built-up space: it is the visible token of the resistance to representation caused by complex social interconnections.

The remarks above imply that urban sublimity originated from what Carol Berstein, in an analysis of nineteenth-century British fiction, calls the "transfer" of sublime affects "from a natural to an urban [...] scene" (174). We have seen above that the transposition of the sublime from one

landscape to the other informs Jameson's narrative of postmodernist urban aesthetics. It is also a key premise of Tanya Agathocleous's study of urban realism, of Kirsten Jensen and Bartholomew F. Bland's catalogue for the 2013 *Industrial Sublime* exhibition at the Hudson River Museum in New York, and of my earlier studies of the urban sublime in American culture (Agathocleous 104; Jensen and Bland ix, 11; Den Tandt *Urban* 5–8; "Masses" 127; see also McKinsey 139). The corpus most often invoked in order to illustrate this shift in the object of sublimity includes Charles Dickens's *Sketches by Boz* (1836), Edgar Allan Poe's "The Man of the Crowd" (1840), and Charles Baudelaire's sketches of the Paris *flâneur*, especially as the latter are channeled through Walter Benjamin's reflections on nineteenth century Paris. Benjamin's analysis of Baudelaire's urban prose indeed makes him the third most often quoted theoretical reference for the urban sublime besides Burke and Kant. Poststructuralist and neo-Marxist scholars turn to him in when trying to identify the political affects triggered by city crowds in the early stages of urban consumerism.

I believe, however, that a more complex narrative of the development of the sublime across the nineteenth century is in order. We must factor in the existence of a moment of transition between nature Romanticism and late-nineteenth-century urban novels. In British and American fiction after Romanticism, the human environment initially depicted as sublime was often not the metropolis but industry. This industrial sublime is the keynote of the important corpus Sheila Smith calls the "Condition of England' novels" — Charles Dickens's *Hard Times*, Elizabeth Gaskell's *North and South*, and Benjamin Disraeli's *Sybil, Or the Two Nations* (Smith xv). Smith designates thereby the texts in which the social consequences of the Industrial Revolution were first brought into the compass of literary representation. The High-Victorian industrial sublime differs from its late-nineteenth-century naturalist offshoot because it does not necessarily focus on huge metropolises: mill towns of the high Victorian age were not always large. Even when industrial fictions take place in major urban centers — Gaskell's Milton-Northern is a fictional equivalent of Manchester — their emphasis does not lie on urban magnitude but on the hellish spectacle of industrial plants, machines, and industrial violence. Also, taking the industrial sublime into account makes it possible to address texts that enjoy a marginal status in the genealogy of urban sublimity because

of their moment of publication, setting, or genre characteristics. Herman Melville's *Moby-Dick*, for instance, deploys sublime tropes for the depiction of whaling as an industrial activity. Rebecca Harding Davis's "Life in the Iron Mills" offers a sublime depiction of industrial plants anticipating Emile Zola's *Germinal* or Upton Sinclair's *The Jungle* by several decades. In English letters, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* — sometimes depicted as the first SF novel — deserves the same re-evaluation in so far as it stirs fascination for technological processes that later acquired industrial significance.

Across the nineteenth century, the gothic component of the urban sublime boasts a more substantial history than either the oceanic or industrial variants of urban sublimity. Urban gothic is concerned with impoverished city-dwellers, the uncanny local aspects of urban settings, and the city's opaque power structure. This brand of the gothic was a well-established subgenre in American literature in the early and mid-nineteenth century through works such as Charles Brockden Brown's *Arthur Mervyn* and Herman Melville's *Pierre*. In Britain, condition-of-England novels intertwine the gothic and the industrial sublime in the portrayal of proletarian life. Dickens, in works such as *Oliver Twist* (1838) and *Hard Times*, is the prominent practitioner of this discourse. At the time of Wells's early career, British urban gothic experienced spectacular success with works such as Robert Louis Stevenson's *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde*, Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray*, and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories. Evidently, urban gothic was a mainstay of nineteenth-century popular fiction. Some of its key texts were serialized popular narratives ("feuilletons," "penny dreadfuls" and "dime novels") such as Eugene Sue's *The Mysteries of Paris*, George William MacArthur Reynolds's *The Mysteries of London*, and George Lippard's *The Quaker City* in the US. Though Wells's position in the literary market lies outside the scope of this essay, it is worth noting that the author of *The Time Machine*, as he created figures such as the Morlocks, appropriated for the sake of sociologically relevant novels the sensationalistic commercialism of popular romances.

Finally, Wells's predominantly pessimistic romances also display moments of utopian enthusiasm, and therefore occasionally resort to a variety of the rhetoric of sublimity absent from late-nineteenth-century naturalist urban novels. We might call this discourse the neo-classical sublime, distinguishing it from the romantic variety evoked in Burke and Kant.

Recent scholarship on the sublime has been predominantly Burkean: it privileges the terrifying dimension of awe, and views sublime terror as a Romantic antecedent of postmodern ontological dislocation. Yet in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, critical responses to the French and English translations of Longinus were not primarily concerned with fear. Instead, French neo-classical poet and critic Nicolas Boileau, as well as British essayists John Dennis and John Baillie, associated the sublime with grandeur, exaltation, and the elevation of the soul. We may therefore delineate alongside Burke's and Kant's dichotomized characterizations of the beautiful and the sublime a borderline area that fits the neo-classical concept of aesthetic and moral elevation. The discourse thus defined takes for its object, as John Baillie puts it, whatever "raises the mind to fits of greatness" (Section I). Its precariousness may be gauged by Baillie's realization that sublimity is not necessarily linked to virtue: conquerors acting as "immense monster[s]" are sublime too (Section IV). Yet for the most part, Baillie's and his predecessors' comments on Longinus define an aesthetic attitude concerned with extreme magnificence just beyond the border of beauty. In Burkean terms, the neo-classical sublime takes wonder as its main focus, and de-emphasizes terror. The neo-classical sublime may also be used as a transhistorical label fitting works published later than the mid-eighteenth-century. It is indeed a significant component of the literature of sociological anticipation portraying the supreme achievements of future human societies. In this, the neoclassical fascination for grandeur marks the thrill of an optimistically perceived future. Its most visible expression is the urban architecture of utopian cities. Early practitioners of SF like Wells could not envisage the evolution of humankind otherwise than as an enhanced version of awe-inspiring late-Victorian urban planning and industry. This aesthetics of the grandiose would later inform space-opera comics such as *Gordon Flash* or superhero series such as *Superman*.

3. Wells's Speculative Naturalism

Wells's handling of the urban sublime is an index of his relation to literary naturalism. In my previous discussions of American naturalism, I have pointed out that the post-romantic discourse of the sublime is the literary feature by which naturalist novelists signal both their ambition and their

inability to provide a totalizing documentary chart of the urban scene (Den Tandt, *Urban* 31–36; "American" 110; "Masses" 131). This reading of the naturalist sublime takes its cue from Jameson and Lyotard. It suggests that the sublime rhetoric of excess and extreme defamiliarization stakes out the limit of what can be achieved by the methods of documentary investigation. Naturalist texts switch to oceanic or gothic tropes when they address social realities the analytical discourse of documentary realism cannot bring into focus — crowds, networks of speculation and exchange, or poverty and alienation. Therefore, naturalist texts are characterized by a pattern of dialogization whereby documentary components interact with romantic and gothic intensities. The interpretation of naturalist fiction — and notably the analysis of its politics — revolves around the evaluation of this pattern of dialogization.

The above argument is transposable to various national traditions and to modes of writing beyond the classic naturalism derived from Emile Zola. In these pages, we must determine how this dialogized concept of naturalism applies to British literary history and, specifically, to the literature of sociological anticipation. The former task proves difficult if we focus on what we might call programmatic naturalism — a well-demarked movement with explicit principles. Nineteenth-century British writers were more diffident of literary labels than their continental counterparts. As of the 1850s, French writers set up avant-garde groups, each boasting its manifesto. Realism was one of the first of these avant-gardes and its tenets were set out in Louis Edmond Duranty's periodical *Réalisme*. Such programmatic clarity was unavailable in Britain, though a considerable amount of realistic writing was produced there. Ian Watt and Lilian Furst have indicated that the English novel, as of the eighteenth century, was predicated on an implicit endorsement of the realist mode (Watt 34; Furst viii, 10, 23). If the contours of British realism prove sketchy, British literary naturalism is even more elusive. The British writers whose works display naturalist features — George Gissing, George Moore, and Thomas Hardy — did not cohere into a literary circle comparable to Zola's. A more substantial naturalist movement did develop in drama around George Bernard Shaw and John Galsworthy. Yet this makes for a scattered corpus compared to naturalist literary production in France, Scandinavia, and the US.

We can make a stronger case for British naturalism, however, if we disregard programmatic consistency and broaden both the discursive features and literary-historical spread of the genre. Zola's essay "The Experimental Novel" is often read as a validation for the scientifically informed mimetic realism the French novelist favored himself. Yet the practice Zola champions could be widened in order to include discourses tackling social conditions through strategies different from novelistic mimesis. Literary journalism and sociologically oriented reportage should be added to the naturalist corpus. Historians of naturalism have pointed out the affinities of nonfiction works with the naturalist project (Wilson 36–39). Many naturalist authors practiced journalism and nonfiction — particularly essayistic nonfiction with a sociological import — alongside their novelistic activities. Their nonfiction work is contiguous in terms of purpose, if not discursive verisimilitude, with their novels. Similarly, the utopian (or dystopian) genre deserves to be bundled with naturalism. Utopian (dystopian) texts — made popular by Edward Bellamy, William Morris, William Dean Howells, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and Wells himself — are sociologically-focused fictions in a format relying on essayistic arguments. Wells's scientific romances could therefore be described as instances of speculative naturalism. This term, coined by analogy with the more recent SF label speculative fiction, does justice to the fact that Wells develops sociological and biological reflections in the displaced, indirect fashion required by the literature of anticipation. British literary naturalism would be spectacularly enriched by this new classification: it would rank among its greatest achievements naturalist romances such as Wells's *The Time Machine* and *The Island of Dr. Moreau*, as well as Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*. Its precursor, as indicated above, would be Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*. By the same token D. H. Lawrence's major novels, with their discussions of evolutionary and civilizational topics, might be viewed no longer as modernist works but as later manifestations of a broadened naturalism.

Speculative naturalism in Wells's scientific romances manifests itself in the first place in the novelist's thematics, which echo the concerns of sociologically focused turn-of-the-twentieth-century literature. I have suggested that the sociological payload of *The Time Machine* and *The War of the Worlds* does not reside primarily in the SF topic advertised in their titles — time travel and extraterrestrial invasion. Wells's focus, as in *The Island*

of *Dr. Moreau*, is instead how evolutionary theory applies to populations. As such, his descriptions of the Morlocks and the Martians prolong in the mode of quasi-documentary anticipation the literary-scientific experiment Zola depicted as the object of naturalism. Wells's sociological reflections are also pursued through allegories. We have seen that *The Time Machine* is concerned with class difference and *The War of the Worlds* with crowds. The two novels also deal with a social anxiety prominent at the turn of the twentieth century — overcivilization. This term designates the fear that Victorian men might surrender to a feminized culture (Lears 223; Den Tandt, "Amazons" 639). They may therefore become unable to engage in the struggle pitting humans against nature, and, perhaps more worryingly, the contest opposing the middle and upper classes against a militant proletariat. Fear of overcivilization is patent in *The Time Machine's* depiction of the Eloi, who are reduced to decorative dolls. That they are gendered feminine is visible, first, in the charming features of the ill-fated Weena, the narrator's Eloi companion, who dies in a fire fleeing from the Morlocks. Secondly, according to an even more negative gender stereotype, the Eloi are feminized in their futile daily activities and their treacherousness. Overcivilization in *The War of the Worlds* is represented both explicitly and metaphorically. It is explicit in characters lacking the moral fiber to face the Martians. Mrs. Elphinstone, whom the narrator's brother encounters in his flight from London, clings to the privileges of upper-middle-class womanhood—notably on the help of her absent husband George — in a situation that cannot sustain them. When she realizes her plight, she collapses psychologically, "too wretched even to call upon 'George'" (95). In a more subtle fashion, even the ostensibly formidable Martians are metaphors of unmanly sophistication. Wells's technologically advanced extraterrestrials are bodiless "heads — merely heads" (119). Their repellent feeding mechanism — lacking a digestive system, they ingest human blood — is proper to creatures who have renounced physicality. Symptomatically, these overcivilized technophiles are defeated by creatures far lower on the evolutionary scale — Terran bacteria.

Wells's speculative naturalism sets up dialogical interactions among the quasi-naturalistic idioms I mentioned above — sociologically focused fiction and nonfiction —, as well as with the urban sublime. If we disregard the frame narrative set in contemporary London, *The Time Machine*

amounts to a dialogue between the neo-classical and gothic sublime. We have seen above that the Morlocks' underworld is a realm of urban gothic. On the other hand, the Eloi's surface city is sublime in the neo-classical sense of the term: it is made up of "an abundance of splendid buildings" among "clustering thickets of evergreens" and "blossom-laden trees" (36). Set up by the descendants of nineteenth-century Britons, these imposing structures have fallen into "a condition of ruinous splendor" (25). They form a grandiose necropolis bathed in nostalgia. The value of this erstwhile radiant city is determined by its hidden netherworld: it lives in fear of its gothic counter-image, which stands as the repressed embodiment of the social violence that made the building of the Eloi's world possible.

Dialogical interplay in *The War of the World* involves a higher number of components than in Wells's time-traveling fable. The Martian novel features, on the one hand, the realistic portrayal of London under attack and, on the other, several varieties of the sublime from the oceanic to the gothic and the neo-classical. Contrary to *The Time Machine*, Wells's extra-terrestrial invasion narrative is set entirely in the London present, depicted with astonishing documentary accuracy. The narrator's cool-headed invasion exposé stands out in contrast with the sublime crowd scenes analyzed above. Scientific detachment also abruptly shifts into what we might call metaphorical variants of the oceanic sublime — elements evoking sublime crowds by connotation. *The War of the World* displays several of these: the "black smoke" used by the Martians as a chemical weapon; the Martian "red weed" unwittingly transported to Earth by the invaders; and, finally, the swarm of "putrefactive and disease bacteria" that kill off both the Martians and the red weed (81, 121, 161). The black smoke is an "inky vapour, coiling and pouring" across the landscape in a "huge ebony cumulous cloud" (81). Its "pungent wisps" spell "death to all that breathes" (81). The weed produces "red-coloured growths" spreading "with astonishing vigour and luxuriance" from the impact point of the Martian projectiles "throughout the country" (121–22). Feeding upon the rivers, it creates "Titanic water-fronds" emitting a "violet-purple fluorescent glow" (139, 155). These passages, mingling the oceanic and the gothic, evoke entities characterized by uncontrollable spread and the capacity to smother and engulf. They are therefore metaphorical vehicles of Wells's crowds and contribute to the thematics of the erasure of selfhood and civilization itself.

The neo-classical sublime manifests itself in *The War of the World* respectively in the necropolitan depiction of "[d]ead London" after the attack (Wells, *War* 156) and in the portrayal of the Martians' technology, in particular the robotic "handling machine" (118). Devastated and deserted, London becomes a "city of the dead" (*War* 158). Scarred by the black smoke and the red weed, it is reminiscent both of the Eloi's decaying realm in *The Time Machine* and, more distantly, of the eerie necropolis world of James Thomson's "The City of Dreadful Night": dead London "gaze[s]" at the narrator "spectrally" (Wells, *War* 160). Its "desertion" and "stillness" diminish its potential for terror and invite a response tilting toward wonder. The description of the handling machine, on the other hand, is one of the most enigmatic moments of the novel. The Martians' contraption is "an extraordinary glittering mechanism" resembling "a metallic spider" (117). It transgresses the boundary of the animate and the inanimate: "[i]ts motion [is] so swift and complex, and perfect that at first [the narrator does] not see it as a machine" (117). Controlled directly by the living head of a Martian with which it forms a compound being, the handling machine has a "living quality" (117). In part, the passage qualifies as an outstanding instance of the technological sublime. In our classification, the handling machine is an object of the neo-classical sublime because it inspires more admiration than fear. From a Marxist perspective, the scene offers a splendid illustration of what Georg Lukács calls reification: it spuriously attributes lifelike features to aspects of social life that were created by human (or, at least, animate) beings. That the handling machine fosters reification is even more evident from the fact that it produces other machines. The passage thereby evokes the threat of a self-sustaining non-human world — a realm made up of what Jean Baudrillard calls "simulacra" (11). In this, the sublime depiction of the handling machine corroborates the suggestion that the allegorical discourse of *The War of the World* is concerned with the disappearance of human agency, either by dissolution into the communal being of the crowd or by technological supersession.

The Politics of Wells's Urban Sublime

There is admittedly a paradox in the contention that the romance idiom of the sublime contributes to speculative naturalism and therefore retains the sociological acumen and the political orientation of the literary practice de-

finied by Zola. Longinus himself argues that the sublime does not properly “persuade” its audience (Longin 74); instead, it “ravishes” and “transports” them in ways that starkly differ from “persuading” (74). Accordingly, Francis Goyet, the editor of Nicolas Boileau’s translation of *On the Sublime*, indicates that Longinus relies on the distinction between two functions of discourse regarded as incompatible in ancient rhetoric—“*docere*” (to teach) and “*movere*” (to overwhelm) (14; emphasis in the original). If so, the position of the sublime at the opposite end of understanding raises a political issue. The literature of socialism, to which Wells is linked, has consistently favored rational realism, which constitutes the cognitive foundation of critical political economy. Sensationalism in this perspective amounts to covert complicity with capitalist commercialism. The *Schwärmerei* of romanticism and romance is a tool of political manipulation because it neutralizes rational analysis and glamorizes social exploitation. This argument was developed in Marx’s own reflections on literature — notably in his remarks on Sue’s *The Mysteries of Paris* — and in most later Marxist criticism. Its most extended formulation appears in Georg Lukács’s essays on realism. Lukács contends that realism, which he regards as the aesthetic of the Left, counteracts reification — the strategy by which capitalist culture constructs a mystified image of the social world (*Historical* 205; *History* 110–40). Alan Trachtenberg, in an essay on late-nineteenth-century culture, transposes Lukács’s argument to the context of emerging metropolises. On his view, texts claiming to expose “a new inexplicableness in city crowds” and “a new unintelligibility in human relations” (103) foster an apparatus of control working to the advantage of dominant groups. Thus, Wells’s recourse to the sublime for the depiction of present and future cities should be perceived as misguided and conservative.

When the Sleeper Wakes illustrates the ideological impasse evoked above because its recourse to the urban sublime leaves readers deprived of a clear political focus. Apart from the enigmatic prologue set in turn-of-the-twentieth England, Wells’s dystopia relentlessly rushes from one overwhelming oceanic crowd to the other. Graham’s discovery of twenty-second-century London unfolds in an emotional atmosphere set at maximum intensity. The novel can accordingly not differentiate among different modalities of the oceanic sublime: the awe-inspiring peaceful masses Graham discovers on the “moving ways” are barely distinguishable from the insurrectional mobs

struggling against the Council. One wonders even whether the repression of the London insurrection by colonial troops — an event planned by the masters of the Council yet averted by Graham's intervention — would have differed from other sublime spectacles depicted in actual scenes of the novel. One politically significant dialogical tension does, however, cut across this poorly contrasted picture: the chasm separating the gothic-looking laborers of the "[u]nder [s]ide" from the prosperous populations of the domed city. The latter's obliviousness to the social inequalities sustaining their welfare is underlined before Graham's visit to the lower depths. The Sleeper beholds a crowd of "lightly clad, bare-armed" dancers celebrating "The Festival of the Awakening" with "ecstatic faces" and "eyes half closed in pleasure" (152). One recognizes in these revelers the precursors of the Eloi: they are "painted fools" (154) whose "elaborate coquetry" (152) makes them ignorant of the gothic underworld a few hundred feet below their theater of pleasure. Yet these moments of social critique are overshadowed by the recurrence of sublime intensities. Symptomatically, the gesture allowing Graham most effectively to distance himself from the domed city is not social criticism but ecstatic contemplation. His release from this oppressive environment is indeed afforded by his mastery of flying machines. The novel, written shortly after Orville and Wilbur Wright's pioneering flight, contains breathtaking scenes of flying phrased in the idiom of the neo-classical sublime: the capacity to soar above the metropolis inspires elevation and grandeur. The flight scenes are barely functional from a narrative point of view, they express the novelist's delight at making readers share the "exhilaration" and "intoxication" of a thrilling new invention (Wells, *Sleeper* 120). Graham's flying becomes narratively significant only at the end of the novel when, as a seasoned "aeronaut" (123), he thwarts the airborne invasion of colonial troops. Overall, the flying scenes are emblematic of a discursive economy functioning as a calculus of emotional intensities. To the mesmerizing or horrifying spectacle of the metropolis, the novel opposes sublime elevation rather than critical enquiry.

The rhetoric of sublimity of the scientific romances is not the only discourse by which Wells represents the future. In *A Modern Utopia*, the novelist resorts to classic utopian anticipation. The latter genre is inimical to terror and wonder: it cultivates rational speculation. William Morris's *News from Nowhere* — a text Wells's *A Modern Utopia* emulates yet also criticizes —

flouts this utopian rationalism. Morris shies away from grandiosity. His time-traveling sleeper discovers a communist future devoid of colossal machines and big cities. All work is accomplished according to the principles of aestheticism and the arts and craft movement: objects are both useful and beautiful; they are produced by laborers acting by personal inclination. A rationalized variant of the picturesque, early-twenty-second-century Britain never subjects Morris's time traveler to the shock of the sublime. Rather than confronting him with titanic architecture and technology, it surprises him by the bathetic realization that Victorian industrial sublimity has withered away.

Wells's *A Modern Utopia* differs from Morris's perfect future by its content, not by its literary discourse. Instead of a realm of craftsmen, farmers, and artists, Wells imagines a paradise of tasteful engineers, scientists, and population managers. This future is less communistic than Morris's "splendid anarchy" (Wells, *Modern* 12): it blends twentieth-century social democracy with the nondemocratic elitism that remained Wells's hallmark to the end of his life. Instead of government by universal democratic representation, Wells's utopia is managed by the Samurai, a brotherhood of technophiles. The literary strategies Wells adopts in order to portray this world are complicated by the fact that he departs from the tradition of social anticipation aimed at evoking "Utopia[s] of dolls in the likeness of angels" (*Modern* 23). Wells's future knows no static perfection: it is a society in process, "an animated system of imperfections" (*Modern* 21). In order to evoke it, Wells mingles the travel narrative with the philosophical dialogue. His novelistic persona discovers the utopia step by step, and shares his impressions with a skeptical interlocutor mired in sentimentalism. This format does not make *A Modern Utopia* depart from rational, expository prose; however, the text comprises sociological essays tacked on to a *pro forma* narrative. The travel narrative's rational tenor is underscored early on: it begins in a Swiss landscape antithetical to the nature Romanticism of Shelley's sublime evocation of Mont Blanc. The first chapters are steeped in the practicalities of turn-of-the-twentieth-century upper-middle-class tourism. Within this utopian perimeter, the only spectacle leading Wells's prose to rise to grandeur is utopian London. The architecture of the future city is not cluttered with the "gawky muddle of ironwork" (*Modern* 163) plaguing late-Victorian architecture. Its structures are built by engineers trained as artists, who "exul[t]

in the liberties of steel" (164). The "great arches" and "domes of glass" of "stupendous libraries" and "mighty [...] museums [...] weave into [...] subtly atmospheric forms" the rational inventiveness of their creators (164–65). The buildings are as such embodiments of the neo-classical sublime. Ironically, whereas in *When the Sleeper Wakes* the latter idiom offers release from the turbulence and horror of the gothic and oceanic sublime, in *A Modern Utopia* it constitutes the only channel of liberation from austere rationality.

Thus, Wells's sociological vision is paradoxical because it uses antagonistic voices for the portrayal of present and future worlds. One aspect of this paradox falls outside the scope of the present paper: I have mentioned above that the sublime, especially its gothic variant, may betoken a gesture of accommodation with the literary market. It is therefore symptomatic that Wells's supposedly more serious works of social anticipation — *A Modern Utopia*, typically — should eschew post-romantic intensities. While this Marxist-inspired reading does have some purchase on Wells's status as a popular writer, a more sympathetic approach of the scientific romances is required if we wish to maintain the hypothesis of a discursively pluralistic speculative naturalism. This less censorious perspective acknowledges that the romantic idiom of the sublime need not undercut social anticipation: the sublime acts as the voice of defamiliarization and dystopian clear-sightedness. A contrastive reading of Wells's romances and Morris's *News from Nowhere* illustrates this point. The difference between Morris's rational utopia and the sublime intensities of *The Time Machine* indeed betokens antithetical judgments about the evolution of society. The gothic Morlocks refute the prospect of Morris's angelic anarchistic communism. Similarly, Wells's portrayal of the Eloi reveals what Morris's social aestheticism amounts to in practice. For Wells, release from the obligation to work will not result in a harmonious communist collective but in the feminized futility of a leisure class living in the magnificence of a city in ruins. Class differences do not disappear: they are dichotomized to the point of biological difference.

Symptomatically, the tension between rational and romantic anticipation cuts across Wells's separate works themselves. I have so far indicated that, with the exception of its neoclassical portrayal of London, *A Modern Utopia* resists the sublime. One passage, however, invalidates this claim. As he depicts the education of the Samurai, Wells mentions that each year,

the members of this governing elite must “go right out of all the life of man into some wild and solitary place” (202) and be “alone with Nature” for seven days (203). During these “yearly pilgrimages” (203), the Samurai immerse themselves into the stereotypical environments of the Romantic natural sublime: they “commun[e] with the emptiness, the enigmatic spaces and silences, the winds and torrents and soulless forces that lie about the lit and ordered life of men” (206). Thus, Wells’s rational utopia does justice to a nonhuman realm that threatens society. In *The Time Machine*, Wells had already offered a horrifying portrayal of non-human environments. The text’s last passages depict the Earth millennia beyond the era of the Eloi and the Morlocks. The Time Traveller finds himself in a space of “abominable desolation” populated by “monster crab[s]” treading the shore of a “salt Dead sea” — a waste land of “poisonous green [...] lichenous plants” (74). The rhetoric of sublimity therefore acknowledges this type of experience: it signals that non-human otherness manifests itself in human societies by the irruption of phenomena irreducible to rational planning. The sublime in sociological anticipation alerts readers to the ineradicable share of inhumanity in the social arrangements and urban design of the present and near future. At its most optimistic, the non-human takes the form of the neo-classical sublime, which implies grandeur beyond the compass of humankind. At its worst, it manifests itself as gothic horror, and evokes regression into irremediable dehumanization. If read along those lines, the rhetoric of urban sublimity does struggle against reification as effectively as the documentary components of the multivocal discourse of speculative naturalism. Its specific object consists in making perceptible the factors that impede the development of what Wells calls a “sane order” of human sociability capable of “increasing the beauty, the pleasure, the abundance and the promise of life” (*Modern* 88, 69).

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THE ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE SUBLIME IN MODERN
ENGLISH FANTASY
(ROWLING, PULLMAN, HIGGINS)

Kamila Vránková

As an aesthetic category, the sublime has a rich and complex cultural heritage. On the one hand, it reflects desires and anxieties of particular cultures, and different periods involve different approaches to and concepts of the sublime experience. On the other hand, various definitions share an important uniting element: the emphasis on a strong impression and intense feelings, as well as on the idea of a threshold.

The idea of a boundary dividing the knowable, familiar world and the spheres of the unknown, the incomprehensible and the uncontrollable remains a significant attribute of the sublime from the ancient periods through the 18th-century revival till the theories of postmodernism. This boundary, despite the significant subjective aspect of the sublime experience, can be discussed with respect to a distinct ethical concern. Longinus, for example, describes the sublime as a state of being carried away from the everyday reality to the world of noble ideas and feelings, transcending the common experience. This excited state of mind, inspired by the power of art, is morally desirable as it leads man from superficial material concerns to the search for true and lasting values.

The ethical aspect of the sublime is given a religious context in the work of John Dennis, pointing out the healing function of art (and religious poetry in particular) which can reconcile the conflicting tendencies of human nature, symbolised by the biblical image of the Fall. His emphasis on passion as a crucial element of the sublime corresponds with Longinus's emotional experience of nobility and moral truth, and it anticipates Addison's concern with admiration and astonishment, Shaftesbury's employment of enthusiasm as a synonym of the sublime, as well as the Romantic concept of higher, elevated consciousness.

In Edmund Burke's analysis of the sublime, there is another concept of the threshold, connecting the idea of the sublime with the fear of the unknown, which involves a threat of destruction. Burke's theory deals with the terrifying aspects of absence and excess, the opposites that dramatise the plots of the Gothic novels. As Fred Botting points out, the Gothic sublime draws on the theme transgression (embodied by the villainous figures), which turns the reader's attention to the role of moral boundaries. Evil deeds both distort and reaffirm these limits by exciting fears of social disintegration.¹

The Gothic tales, in accordance with Burke's ideas, suggest the paradox of the sublime in describing its effects on self-preservation, as well as on social relationships. According to Burke, the experience of the sublime involves feelings of sympathy and pity,² making the individual imagine himself in the position of a person in distress, and (by instinct or impulse, not by reasoning) seek relief in "relieving those who suffer."³ In this respect, the sublime can become a life-giving force as it leads the individual from indolence to activity, and even to a moral action (cf. in Rowling's *Harry Potter*).

Ethical aspects of the sublime are emphasised in Immanuel Kant's concern with the moral will, by which man can elevate himself above his natural impulses (e.g. the feeling of fear). It is through the sublime that the nature of man (and around man) can be defeated by the supremacy of reason. According to John Zammito, the Kantian sublime is the aesthetic experience which par excellence symbolises the "moral dimension of human existence."⁴ In Kant, with the emphasis on unhumiliated humanity during an encounter with higher forces, the recognition of helplessness becomes a presupposition of greatness.

The inclusion of the moral meaning in the experience of the sublime is closely connected with Kant's concept of imagination. As it is implied in *The Critique of Judgment*, it is the faculty of imagination that produces the

1 See Fred Botting, *Gothic*, London, New York: Routledge, 1996, 8.

2 Cf. W.P. Albrecht's *The Sublime Pleasures of Tragedy*, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1975. As Albrecht points out, Burke "identified the sublime with the tragic" by his emphasis on the "strong excitement," on "emotional impact and moral force" (7–8).

3 Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry*, ed. Adam Phillips, Oxford: O.U.P., 1998, 38–43.

4 John Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgement*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, 279.

unimaginable, which is, for Kant, just another term for the sublime. In other words, it is the recognition of the limits that may inspire the idea of the unlimited. In the Kantian play of imagination and reason there is a mutual dependence of pleasure and pain: “the feeling of momentary checking of the vital powers” initiates a “consequent stronger outflow of them”⁵ and results in what Jean-Francois Lyotard describes as an “increase of being.”⁶

In Levinas’s concept of “ethics as first philosophy,”⁷ the sublime experience is described as a desire for the invisible and the unknowable, which corresponds with Levinas’s new, ethical way of looking at human being: the being is not based on the individual’s subjectivity but on the individual’s relationship with other individuals. In this respect, Lyotard, dealing with the presentation of the unrepresentable, finds a correspondence between Levinasian ethics and Kantian aesthetics. As Will Slocombe observes, the “postmodern obsession with unrepresentability”⁸ is a product of the ethical response towards the other.

It is the idea of unrepresentability as an ethical demand from the other that permeates through the postmodern effort to avoid categorisation. According to Levinas, the search for knowledge that allows presentation is concerned with the totalising incorporations of the other into the self, with the dismissal of the boundary between the familiar and the incomprehensible, in other words, with the disappearance of the sublime. In *Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard connects the sublime with “‘lack of reality’ of reality,” (77) with the fear of “nothing further happening,” and with the invention of other realities as a challenge to the notion of absence and emptiness.

In the Latin roots of the word “sublime” (sublimis / lofty), the prefix “sub” means “under,” “up from underneath,” “below,” while the meaning of the root, “-lime/-liminal” includes both threshold (limen) and a boundary (limes). Moreover, the link between “limen” and “limus” refers to a “sidelong vision,” thus, the term refers both to the vertical movement “up to a threshold” and to a horizontal movement “out to the margin.”⁹ With

5 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J.H.Bernard, London: Macmillan, 1914, 102.

6 J.-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, 75.

7 “Ethics as First Philosophy” is the title of Levinas’s study, transl. by Seán Hand and Michael Temple and published in *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Seán Hand, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, 75–87.

8 Will Slocombe, *Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern*, Routledge: New York and London, 2006, 63.

9 Twitchell, J.B., *Romantic Horizons*, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1983, 2.

respect to the meaning of the morpheme “sub,” “up and out” allows an opposite direction, “down and in.” A correspondence with the Greek word “lekhrios” further suggests the “process of slanting, of being diagonal.” It is the contradiction between the ‘upward and outward’ movement and the movement ‘down and in’ that gives the essence of sublimity. It involves “the process of physically transcending external limits while simultaneously crossing a psychological boundary of the consciousness” (Twitchell 3).

The discussion of “sub-liminal” experience as a mode of perception and a purification of awareness leads Twitchell to consider it as a “rite of passage,” in which the human mind moves to a new level through a disturbing tension between the inner and the outer worlds, between the physical and the spiritual, between the individual and his surroundings. In this suggestive comparison, Victor Turner’s idea of an “ordeal” (Twitchell 25)¹⁰ as an inevitable part of the passage is employed, and the “in-between” experience of the sublime can be viewed as an “initiation” into the questions of human identity.

In children’s fantasy fiction, this initiation (and especially its liminal phase) becomes a crucial theme drawing on the Kantian idea that virtue (and moral resistance) must be tested by adversity.¹¹ In this respect, the child protagonists experience their limitations (concerning both physical capacities and spiritual experience) face to face with overwhelming external vastness and power (corresponding, in fact, with Kant’s description of mathematical and dynamic types of the sublime). At the same time, the experience of fear and terror leads the young heroes to realise their true power, i.e. the ability to defend not just their own life, but particular social relationships, which allows them to fulfil the passage by the reunion with their fellows during the final, post-liminal phase of the initiation.

As Anna Jackson points out, contemporary children’s literature draws in many ways on the Gothic tradition, and children’s books become a new and suitable location for Gothic imagery.¹² Particular Gothic themes, deal-

10 Twitchell draws on Turner’s study *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors, Symbolic Action in Human Society* (1974). Arnold Van Gennep’s *Rites of Passage* (1909) should be remembered here because of his influential analysis of the three phases of the initiation process: the pre-liminal, the liminal and the post-liminal.

11 Cf. Paul H. Fry’s “The Possession of the Sublime”, *Studies in Romanticism*, 26.2, 1987, 194.

12 *The Gothic in Children’s Literature. Haunting the Borders*, eds. Anna Jackson, Karen Coats and Roderick McGillis, London and New York: Routledge, 2008, 1–9.

ing with the experience of the sublime as a life-threatening force (and with the traditional antinomy of the villains and their victims), frequently take the form of children's fantasy.

In fact, the imagery of fantasy tends to be similar to the imagery of Gothic fiction. In both cases, authors draw on the notion of a mysterious world and unimaginable powers surrounding our reality and exceeding our understanding. Like Gothic novels, children's books are concerned with transgressing the bounds of possibility, they indulge in fanciful ideas and flights into imagination and they focus on the play on contradiction (good – evil, natural – supernatural, past – present, real – fantastic, etc). Moreover, child readers, like the readers of Gothic tales, like to be frightened and enjoy the feeling of fear. According to Freud, their tendency to imagine themselves in the position of orphans or persecuted heroes corresponds with the process of their liberation from the world of adults.

The popularity of J.K. Rowling's *Harry Potter* series (1997–2007) reveals a remarkable potential of the sublime experience and its literary employment for the development of the fantasy genre. Rowling's work, both in its subject and form, conforms to the typical criteria of the traditional Gothic novel and the Burkean concept of the sublime. The title hero's struggle to renew a sense of self and social value through the experience of otherness follows the traditional theme of the test (or ordeal) described by Bakhtin in his *Dialogic Imagination*. The hero's true nature is concealed, being linked to the secret of his origin. In this respect, Harry Potter is a descendant of the noble heroes searching for their identity, such as Theodore in Walpole's *The Castle of Otranto* or Edmund in Reeve's *Old English Baron*.

Furthermore, the hero is haunted both by his past and the future. J.K. Rowling draws on distorted family relationships (murdered parents, hateful relatives) and her story focuses on the motif of a secret task. As in Gothic novels (especially those of Ann Radcliffe), the uncanny notion of mystery and terror is intensified by a number of hints, half-uttered messages, the images of labyrinths, supernatural phenomena, doubles and disguises, increasing the feeling of uncertainty and the hidden anxieties of the unconscious: "There were a hundred and forty-two staircases at Hogwarts: wide, sweeping ones; narrow, rickety ones; some that led somewhere different on a Friday; some with a vanishing step halfway up that you had to remember to jump" (Rowling 99).

It is the personal experience of otherness (the metaphorical motif of the scar, which makes him abandoned but also superior and special) that allows Harry Potter to feel a kind of fulfilment and reassurance only in the world of the other, represented by Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry. In its depiction of the uncanny, Rowling's novel follows the rules of the Gothic tale with its performative mode and the use of exaggeration. Echoing the image of Gothic castles, Hogwarts can never become a real home. Its inhabitants get repeatedly lost, ghosts flash through the doors, sinister creatures and threats are hidden within its walls, which increases the subliminal effect. At the same time, the supernatural appears against the backdrop of the natural, which is in accordance with Tzvetan Todorov's idea of the fantastic.

Like Clara Reeve, J.K. Rowling employs the theme of dreams and desire as a response to the feeling of loss and sadness following separation (the motif of the magical mirror, bringing the image of Harry's parents and, at the same time, of Harry's hidden self). In dreams, according to Donald Winnicott, "there are no brakes on fantasy, and love and hate cause alarming effects".¹³

The central dream of the series, which is built into the very plot of Harry Potter's story, is the dream of power and omnipotence, represented by the theme of magic, and also by the popular Gothic theme of alchemy, as the title image of the first sequel suggests.¹⁴ It may remind the reader of the traditional meaning of the sublime, connected with the term sublimation, i.e., the transformation of matter into purer forms. An object like the philosopher's stone represents the ultimate extension of human will, giving the hero, in the words of L.D. Rossi, "a kind of immortality, but also a dangerous power."¹⁵ The motifs of the magic wand or the invisibility cloak can be remembered as other examples of this idea.¹⁶ Experiencing this dream, or, in other words, the desire to possess distinctive strength of extraordinary proportion, initiates an inevitable inner struggle between good and evil. Dumbledore's ambition, for instance, only seems to be the opposite of that of Voldemort.

13 Donald Winnicott, *Home is Where We Start From*, London: Pelican, 1987, 85.

14 In particular, in alchemy the term sublimation describes the process of converting matter by fire.

15 Rossi, Lee D., "The Politics of Fantasy: C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien" (Ann Arbor: UMI Research, 1984), as quoted by J. Robertson, *ChLA Quarterly* (Winter 2001–2002), 202.

16 Throughout the novel, however, there are reminders of the limitations of magic: the use of magic cannot rescue the murdered victims from death (Sirius, Cedric, Dumbledore, Snape).

However, the desire for absolute power may get split and made representable as something primitive and evil, which is also suggested by the etymological meaning of the name Voldemort (the word “vol,” from the Latin “volo,” expresses wish, intention or determination, and “mort” means death). *Harry Potter* follows the traditional Gothic theme of the divided personality as a result of an evil act and a cause of unavoidable destruction. Thus Voldemort’s desire for immortality, accompanied with his crimes including patricide, results in the multiplied split of his personality (the motif of horcruxes), finally leading to his death.

In this respect, there is an interesting relationship between Harry Potter and Voldemort: the motif of the sibling wands (the two-tail feather of the phoenix) or Voldemort’s unintentional placing a part of his soul into Harry as a horcrux suggests the idea of duality and the sharing of a hidden bond. According to J.P. Robertson, the symbolic displacement provides fantastic expression of hidden anxiety, jealousy and aggression, the emotions that may accompany human thirst for love, attention and need.¹⁷

Within Rowling’s fantasy projection all protagonists are confronted with the unconscious instincts of envy and hate. It is the ethical demand to overcome these feelings that becomes, in fact, the main (liminal) test and the most difficult (and sublime) task of the characters in their particular encounters (Harry – Voldemort, Harry – Snape, Voldemort – Voldemort’s father, Snape – Harry’s father, etc.). Accordingly, life is supported by unselfish love (Harry’s mother and Snape) and Harry is finally saved by his decision not to attack his enemy but rather to defend himself.

In the *Harry Potter* series, even humorous, relaxing scenes imply ethical questions, e.g. the motif of the talking chess figures: “Don’t send me there, can’t you see his knight? Send HIM, we can afford to lose HIM” (Rowling 147). In the connection with the image of the chess game as a part of Harry’s, Ron’s and Hermione’s dramatic passage in *The Philosopher’s Stone*, it anticipates the polarity between sacrifice and self-sacrifice, between the power relations and the Levinasian responsibility for the life of the other (embodied by Snape and finally also by Harry Potter), which reaches its climax at the end of the series.

Harry’s constant concern with the world of the unknown may be viewed as a symbolic expression of his initiation: his effort to overcome separation

17 J.P. Robertson, “What Happens to our Wishes,” *ChLA Quarterly* (Winter 2001–2002), 206.

(the pre-liminal phase of the rites of passage) and find the way to the others (the post-liminal phase) through exploring the other around, as well as within himself (the liminal phase). At the same time, he must learn to manage his capacity for the dark arts (in other words, his hidden power) in a way that is in accordance with the demands of justice and morality. It is through the transformative effect of the sublime that this aim can be achieved. Harry Potter's adventures may be thus interpreted as the painful challenges of growing up when the young hero has to find harmony between his independence and particular social relationships.

A similar fantasy context for the same struggle is developed in Philip Pullman's trilogy *His Dark Materials* (1995–2000), which draws on the model text of C.S. Lewis's *Chronicles of Narnia* (1950–56), dealing with the relation to the unknown through the experience of religious faith. Pullman uses Lewis's concept of other worlds as imaginative alternatives to the everyday reality to challenge Lewis's ethical ideal of the religious authority; in other words, he rejects the representation of the moral truth in terms of power. Lewis's sublime is, in fact, suppressed by his effort to make the idea of the inexpressible (God) understandable to young readers: the sensuous images of the invisible reality clash with the biblical emphasis on the impossibility to create a picture of the divine, which is, for Kant, as well as for Levinas, a unique example of sublimity.

In accordance with the demands of fantasy genre, however, Pullman employs almost identical visual images in Lyra's and Will's passage to other worlds (various fantastic creatures, talking animals, ghosts and spectres). In contrast to Lewis he points out the feelings of uncertainty and confusion, which intensifies the Burkean notion of helplessness in the encounter with the unknown.

Pullman's ethics draws on the intensification of the sublime by the young heroes' inability to achieve the knowledge that could explain or solve the conflicts. Pullman's children, like Rowling's heroes, gradually realise that they are repeatedly mistaken in their believing (or disbelieving) in the external examples of authority. This loss of certainties, together with the end of the unity and stability of meaning corresponds, in a way, with Lyotard's analysis of the postmodern culture. Paradoxically, it is this anxiety that can lead to the liberating notion of infinity (the motif of other worlds): the meaning may be lost or doubted or denied but such a failure opens space for a new search, and for the intensification for the feeling of life.

In this respect, adversity can counteract (as in the Gothic novels) the threat of impending emptiness. In Pullman, moreover, there are accumulated examples of violence and horror from which there is no rescue (the motif of spectres), including human evil (the mad-scientist figures). A moral strength is closely linked to the emphasis on the individual freedom and the harmony between body and soul (or, in Pullman's terms, the man and his daimon). Pullman also employs the motif of the divided self, which anticipates the death of the individual; the split personality is a result of cruel scientific experiments, connected with the search for absolute power and immortality.

In Pullman's fantasy, Lyra's moral resistance is not supported by any higher force but by her own faculty of imagination, echoing the Kantian concept of the sublime. She can touch the truth by deciphering the messages of the alethiomether (or, the golden compass¹⁸), which works against the dependence on definite knowledge or ultimate explanations by offering a number of various answers to any question. In contrast to the university scholars, failing to grasp the suggested information, Lyra is like an artist who can transgress "the limits of experience" in conceiving things that "lie beyond the confines" of this experience with the completeness of which physical nature affords no parallel.¹⁹ As a child, she moves on the threshold of the visible and the invisible, the finite and the infinite,²⁰ where imagination can become a "productive faculty of cognition," (Kant 2008, 143) as well as of the process of creation: it can re-model experience in producing the image which can surpass the familiar reality. In the end, however, imagination must sacrifice itself for the sake of the return to this reality, and the entrances to other worlds (in contrast to Lewis) must be closed.

Lyra's passage towards adulthood results in the encounter with the mystery that is implied by the title of the trilogy. The dark matter is an intertextual Miltonic image, referring to the original sin (the Fall) through the motif of

18 This is, in fact, one of the numerous allusions to Milton's *Paradise Lost*. In Milton, the "golden compasses" are prepared by God to "circumscribe the universe" and "all created things". (Book VII, lines 224–226).

19 See Kant, Immanuel, *Critique of Judgment*, § 49 / 314, 2008, trans. J.C. Meredith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 143.

20 The liminal character of childhood is symbolised by the changeability of Lyra's 'daimon,' representing her inner self, unconscious instincts and emotions.

dust as a physical reminder of human weakness and the transitoriness of physical existence. For Pullman, paradoxically, this “Fall” becomes an entrance into life,²¹ and in the acceptance of one’s limitations there is a source of the moral strength.

A constant concern with human weakness and the feeling of guilt permeates through Fiona E. Higgins’s *The Black Book of Secrets* (2007), in which the young hero’s passage confronts him with the disquieting presence of the unspeakable and the inexpressible. Ludlow Fitch, reminding the reader of Dickens’s young characters, escapes from the escalated physical violence imposed by his parents to become an apprentice of a stranger Joe Zabbidou, a secret pawnbroker, whose Black Book records the stories of transgression and crime. People who narrate these stories try to liberate themselves (like Hilda from Hawthorne’s *Marble Faun*) from the oppression of their experience of evil.

Ludlow, as a listener and a reader of these grotesque ‘Gothic’ texts, encounters the sublime from the position of safety, which can be described in Burke’s terms as the “tranquility shadowed with horror,” (32) inspiring the feelings of fear, pity and social affection. The function of the Black Book is not only to remove pain and anxiety (by pronouncing them), it gradually appears to be a mirror of the hero’s hidden self, and it provides an opportunity for him to approach the “inaccessible parts” of his nature (Burke 48).

According to Edmund Burke, there is a significant ethical aspect in realising one’s passions as a result of the sublime experience: it has an important practical value for understanding and regulating distorted emotions, which can finally contribute to the elevation of the mind. This transformation of terror into the “sublime delight” allows Ludlow to accept a dark side of his past and of his self, the physical conflict with his father, which he blames himself for, and which is not fully described by him but at the end of the novel. The importance of this confession is supported by the fact that Higgins’s narrative is written in the first person, and in the introductory passages the crucial information concerning the hero’s traumatic experience is missing.

The Black Book represents a liminal knowledge, which initiates the hero into dangerous recesses of human nature and of his own destructive force.

21 A similar interpretation is partly implied by *Paradise Lost* itself and it repeatedly appears, for example, in the work of Nathaniel Hawthorne.

The traditional theme of the Fall is employed as a beginning (the pre-liminal phase) of the hero's rite of passage, and it is repeatedly referred to in the whole story (e.g. the motif of curiosity). The fulfilment of the passage can be found in the experience of reconciliation, and in the hero's decision to use his knowledge for helping and encouraging other people.

In conclusion, the above children's fantasy adventures deal with the ethical aspects of the sublime experience, dramatising the initiation into maturity as a struggle for self-improvement and a rediscovery of one's moral identity, which is in sharp contradiction to the so called "ethical nihilism" of the postmodern sublime (Slocombe 147).

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“DECAY STILL IMPREGNATE WITH DIVINITY”:
LES LIEUX DE MÉMOIRE IN BYRON’S *CHILDE HAROLD’S*
PILGRIMAGE

Nataliya Novikova

In one of his recent interviews Harold Bloom, an outspoken defender of the Western Canon, defined the main subject of his life-long research as “metaphorical thinking” (Bloom). It means to explore how “cognitive power” finds expression through the literary medium, which he generally refers to as “metaphor”. In spite of Bloom’s proverbial mistrust for any sort of Cultural Studies – and Memory Studies seem to owe much to the field – I supposed that the idea might be worth developing. On the one hand, Byron’s engagement with history in his first great poem written in and about Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic Europe is clear.¹

On the other hand, it is no less evident that he conceives both the historical and the geographical dimension of the poem from a very personal angle. I agree with those who define ‘memory’ against other forms of past consciousness primarily through its perspectivism, partiality and affective value.² That’s why it seemed promising to give a parallel reading of Byron’s subjective treatment of the past in *Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage* and of certain theoretical points recently made within Memory Studies. My question is, can we think about cultural memory *through* Byron’s poem? In other words, does it suggest any working metaphors that could be useful as cognitive tools?

1 See, for instance, Carla Pomarè, *Byron and the Discourses of History*, Ashgate, 2013.

2 Needless to say that while no historical knowledge is *actually* characterised by ‘objectivity’ and ‘impartiality’, these qualities remain an ideal though unattainable standard for it. For a discussion of different aspects, see Boyer, Pascal and James Wertsch, *Memory in Mind and Culture*, N.Y.: Cambridge UP, 2009. and Jan Assmann, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization. Writing, Remembrance and Political Imagination*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. For a concise and thought-provoking revision of the memory/history issue, see: Kerwin L. Klein, “On the Emergence of *Memory* in Historical Discourse”, *Representations* 69, Winter 2000, 127–150.

The shaping of “cultural memory” as a concept owes much to the insights of Pierre Nora.³ First, his vast research project on French “lieux de mémoire”, both in its empirical and theoretical aspect, was a way to reflect on the current cultural situation when memory ceased to be a self-evident normative and formative force that ensures social bonds – “we speak so much of memory because it is so little of it left” (Nora 7). It is this sense of crisis that informs the crucial differentiation between the traditional memory and the modern memory, and consequently, explains why such a phenomenon as “sites of memory” comes into being. They originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize celebrations [...] because such activities no longer occur naturally. [...] Making their appearance by virtue of the deritualization of our world [...] museums, archives, cemeteries, festivals, anniversaries, treaties, depositions, monuments, sanctuaries, fraternal orders [...] [are] illusions of eternity [...] devotional institutions [...] that mark the rituals of a society without ritual. (Nora 12)

Meanwhile, in the traditional culture “each gesture, down to the most everyday, would be experienced as the ritual repetition of a timeless practice in a primordial identification of act and meaning. With the appearance of the trace, of mediation, of distance, we are not in the realm of true memory, but history” (Nora 8).

What is important for my argument is that “modernity” is understood through secularization or, to use Max Weber’s metaphor, “disenchantment” (*Entzauberung*) of the world.⁴ Memory is no longer spontaneous, but voluntary and deliberate, always conscious of the distance it has to cover and always mediated. Thus, the shaping of the “modern memory” can be seen as a parallel and a counter-current to the claims to rationality that the developing historical discourse is making more and more assertively.

The last thing I would like to draw attention to is, probably, the most original and fruitful of Nora’s ideas – namely, that “locations” of memory are treated broadly rather than narrowly “spatial”. Social institutions and practices alongside with texts, names and images as well as monuments

3 Strictly speaking, Nora himself employs the term “*mémoire collective*”, but I preferred to follow the word usage that is widely accepted today. See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*”, *Representations* 26, Spring 1989, 7–24.

4 For a recent overview of the problem see: Richard Jenkins, “Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment,” *Max Weber Studies* 1.1 (2000): 11–32.

and places in their proper sense may be considered "sites of memory [...] where memory crystallizes and secretes itself" (7) haunted by acute historical sensibility. In fact, the metaphor of "lieu" stretching as far as it does come close to the idea of "medium" of memory, the bearer of changeable meanings open to re-reading and re-inscription. At the same time, the flexibility and comprehensiveness of Nora's theory enables us to look at it not only from our present context hyper-conscious about "media" and "mechanisms" of cultural transmission. A strong classical background behind the term "sites of memory" has long been noticed.⁵ Initially, *topos/locus* referred to an individual memorizing technique based on an imaginative link between a certain place and a turn in the argument. However, as long as rhetoric is considered to be a model that has shaped the ways of thinking and artistic self-expression in the West, the term acquires a wider significance. *Topoi/loci communi* constituted a formal element that represents a reworking of a traditional store of specific, typical themes, formulas, phrases and figures and thus maintained the continuity of the Western intellectual tradition from Antiquity.⁶ They actually functioned as an important means of accumulating cultural experience and structuring *what* and *how* should be remembered and reproduced.

What I find intriguing about *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* is that the poem appears sensitive to the whole range of meanings that emerge around "sites of memory". The constitutive metaphor of the "pilgrimage" is a particularly rich one. Byron's poem, as I would briefly remind you, passed two stages of composition: during the first two cantos the "pilgrim" travels from the Iberian Peninsula to the Levant with Greece as his destination, in the Cantos III and IV he passes the German lands and Switzerland and through the north of Italy arrives in Rome. In both cases Byron gives a somewhat accurate account of his own journeys: the first—at the outset of his public career (1809–1811) and the second marking the dramatic turn that his private and literary life took five years later with his self-exile from England (1816–1817).

5 See Pim den Boer, *Loci memoriae – Lieux de mémoire*, in: *Media and Cultural Memory*, ed. by Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nunning, Walter de Gruyter, 2008; and Assmann, Jan, *Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance, and Political Imagination*, Cambridge UP, 2011, 24–25.

6 See Ernst R. Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, Harper & Row, 1953, 64–78.

Since Maurice Halbwachs' seminal work *The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land* (1941) the link between pilgrimage and "collective memory" has been firmly established. The symbolic events viewed both as "past" but relevant "now" and thus "timeless" were projected onto real Mid-eastern geography through social practice binding together the Christian community across time and space. However, in Byron's case the idea of the pilgrimage is rather estranged by the presence of such an "unworthy" and "unknightly" protagonist⁷ and at the same time inverted in a profoundly secular context, which makes it a perfect example of Nora's "ritual of the society without ritual".

The Greek episode from the second canto opens with an eloquent statement of enlightened skepticism, but its abundance in religious lexicon is unparalleled even in the Italian canto:

[...] Even gods must yield – religions take their turn:
 'Twas Jove's – 'tis Mahomet's – and other creeds
 Will rise with other years, till man shall learn
 Vainly his incense soars, his victim bleeds;
 Poor child of Doubt and Death, whose hope is built on reeds. (II, 3)

Where'er we tread 'tis haunted, *holy* ground,
 No earth of thine is lost in vulgar mould,
 But one vast realm of wonder spreads around [...] (II, 88)

[...] What *sacred* trophy marks the *hollow'd* ground,
 Recording Freedom's smile and Asia's tear? (II, 90)

[...] But he whom Sadness sootheth may abide,
 And scarce regret the region of his birth,
 When wandering slow by Delphi's *sacred* side,
 Or gazing o'er the plains where Greek and Persian died. (II, 92)

Let such approach this *consecrated* land,
 And pass in peace along the magic waste;
 But spare its *relics* – let no busy hand

⁷ See Byron's sharp responses to some of his baffled audience in the Preface to the 7th edition.

Deface the scenes, already how defaced!
 Not for such purpose were these altars placed:
Revere the remnants nations once *revered* [...] (II, 93)⁸

Sparta and Athens, Marathon, Parnassus, Arethusa's lake, the oracles of Dodona and Delphi are the places where a life more just, noble and beautiful, more in accordance with civic virtue and aesthetic perfection can be remembered and to a certain extent re-imagined. These are obviously the places canonised by classical tradition, and thus even a private "homage" paid by a lonely "pilgrim" becomes an act of cultural remembering. Almost the same set of values is shared by Italy which is the destination of the second part of the pilgrimage. What is new is the image of military splendour evoked by Venice and imperial grandeur coming to mind in Rome, while a stronger emphasis is placed on art and artistic personalities: Arquà is associated with Petrarch, Venice and Ferrara—with Tasso, Florence and Ravenna—with Dante.

However, the classical and the Renaissance ideal projected on the "legendary topography" of Greece and Italy can not account for all "sites of memory" in the poem. In the third canto Ferney, Lausanne, Geneva and Clarens are visited with a tribute paid respectively to Voltaire, Gibbon and Rousseau. As in other cases, it is a faithful travelogue of Byron's own journey from April to June 1816, which does not make it less symbolic. He evokes key figures of the Enlightenment who had a decisive impact on the shaping of modern subjectivity.

The one was fire and fickleness, a child [Voltaire],
 Most mutable in wishes, but in mind,
 A wit as various, – gay, grave, sage, or wild, –
 Historian, bard, philosopher, combined;
 He multiplied himself among mankind,
 The Proteus of their talents: But his own
 Breathed most in ridicule, – which, as the wind,
 Blew where it listed, laying all things prone, –
 Now to o'erthrow a fool, and now to shake a throne.
 The other, deep and slow, exhausting thought [Gibbon],
 And hiving wisdom with each studious year,

8 Italics are mine. All quotes are from: Lord Byron, *The Major Works*, ed. Jerome J. McGann, Oxford World's Classics, 2008.

In meditation dwelt, with learning wrought,
 And shaped his weapon with an edge severe,
 Sapping a solemn creed with solemn sneer;
 The lord of irony, – that master-spell,
 Which stung his foes to wrath, which grew from fear,
 And doom'd him to the zealot's ready Hell,
 Which answers to all doubts so eloquently well. (III, 106–107)

Here the self-torturing sophist, wild Rousseau,
 The apostle of affliction, he who threw
 Enchantment over passion, and from woe
 Wrung overwhelming eloquence, first drew
 The breath which made him wretched; yet he knew
 How to make madness beautiful, and cast
 O'er erring deeds and thoughts a heavenly hue
 Of words, like sunbeams, dazzling as they past
 The eyes, which o'er them shed tears feelingly and fast. (III, 77)

“Protean” Voltaire and “studiously” toiling Gibbon represent the intellectual power of critical reasoning, while Rousseau brought together the power of passion and the intricacy of reflection, all three showing a masterful command of discursive art. What makes these evocations an act of cultural remembering is that the enlightened principles embodied in these figures belong rather to the past than to the present. It is not only that they lose the war to human ignorance, prejudice and ambition – there are deep ironies working at the very core.

For then he [Rousseau] was inspired, and from him came,
 As from the Pythian's mystic cave of yore,
 Those oracles which set the world in flame,
 Nor ceased to burn till kingdoms were no more:
 Did he not this for France? which lay before
 Bow'd to the inborn tyranny of years?
 Broken and trembling to the yoke she bore,
 Till by the voice of him and his compeers
 Roused up too much wrath, which follows o'ergrown fears?

The “prophetic” and “Promethean” (III, 105) impulse turns against itself with the excesses and consequences of the French Revolution – a historical

irony expressed through a highly ambiguous metaphor referring to cultural memory:

They made themselves a fearful monument!
The wreck of old opinions – things which grew,
Breathed from the birth of time: the veil they rent,
And what behind it lay all earth shall view.
But good with ill they also overthrew,
Leaving but ruins, wherewith to rebuild
Upon the same foundation, and renew
Dungeons and thrones, which the same hour refill'd,
As heretofore, because ambition was self-will'd. (III, 81–82)

What is important is that Byron's authoritative intent to turn a formerly religious ritual into a "site" of secular cultural memory had personal as well as far-reaching cultural implications. Before he finally sailed off to Lisbon in June 1809, his plans had long been taking shape.⁹ While the initial itinerary corresponded to the idea of the Grand Tour, later there appeared some options as extraordinary as Iceland and the Hebrides, West India, Persia and the Caribbean. Though neither of these places was finally visited by Byron, his travels to the Iberian Peninsula, Greece, Albania and Turkey still bore a sharp contrast to the conventional journey that would have been expected from a young aristocrat and peer of England. The Grand Tour developed throughout the 18th century as a major vehicle of socialization and elitist education within the ideological framework of the Enlightenment. Its geographical boundaries stretching as far as France, Italy and the German lands reflected the European *oikoumene*, the civilised world of civic and artistic achievement worth of transmission.¹⁰ As soon as Romantic thought began questioning the basic enlightened assumptions of rationality, historical progress and aesthetics based on classical models, the backwardness of the former "cultural periphery" turned into a privilege. Thus, the itinerary of the Grand Tour changed conspicuously. A good example is provided by Spain: while Voltaire called it as obscure as "the most savage parts of Africa" and remarked that "it [was] not worth the trouble of

9 See William Borst, *Lord Byron's First Pilgrimage*, New Haven: Yale UP, 1948, xix–xxi.

10 See Jeremy Black, *The British Abroad: The Grand Tour in the Eighteenth Century*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992.

being known”¹¹, in the 19th century it became a fascinating and challenging exotic Other, an unsullied source of cultural energy. It intrigued not only Byron, but also Mérimée, Hugo and Gautier, Bizet and Lalo, Tennyson, George Borrow, David Roberts and David Wilkie and many others.

Such a redistribution of values on the symbolic map of Europe may be described in terms suggested by Memory Studies. Alongside with educating the young man in social intercourse, the European journey was dedicated to visiting historically significant places, but with interests far from being scholarly. Acquaintance with the European past was guided by a pedagogical concern for the present and constituted an important act of remembering—an act which, according to Jan Assmann, is “a realization of belonging, even a social obligation. One has to remember in order to belong”.¹² In fact, the difference between the Enlightened and the Romantic tour lies in how far memory should reach: the places that oddly enough represent the “barbaric” past in a more civilised European present like Spain or Albania in Byron’s case become worth commemorating and remembering. Although neither of them represents such a rich palimpsest as Italy or Greece, still there is more in these places than natural beauty and warlike spirit. It is especially true of the Spanish episode, where centuries old historical recollections of the Reconquista form an important background for the interpretation of the current military action.

Thus, the practice that used to remind the believer about the canonical history and guide him through the way of salvation was now cultivating the memory that sustained the worldly man and helped him to survive in the world where there is nothing beyond “Doubt and Death” (II, 3). However, the idea of the pilgrimage is revised further. As Frederick Bartlett usefully remarked, “remembering is always an effort after meaning”,¹³ and the construction of meaning on the basis of past evidence is constantly under strain in Byron’s poem. The persistent image of the ruins is the most recognizable particularity in the second and the fourth cantos, and it received, probably, its most famous interpretation in the painting by Byron’s

11 Gavin DeBeer and André-Michel Rousseau (eds), *Voltaire’s British Visitors. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century*. Vol. 49. Geneva, 1967, 182.

12 Jan Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory”, *Media and Cultural Memory*, ed. by Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nunning. Berlin, N.Y.: Walter de Gruyter, 2008, 114.

13 Bartlett, Frederick, *Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology*, Cambridge UP, 1995, 44.

contemporary, J. M. W. Turner (*Childe Harold in Italy*, 1832). Ruins, both Gothic and antique, were a conventional element in pre-romantic and Romantic architecture, painting and literature. They had a set of references established by the beginning of the 19th century that ranged from an emotional state of melancholy or fear to philosophical generalizations about the decline and fall of empires and the triumph of nature over man's efforts.

The principle "places of worship" in the poem are (virtually) in ruins which maintains the tension between the material and the symbolic, the actual miserable state and the sublimity of suggested meaning that remains unattainable. It is reminiscent of Nora's observation that "sites of memory are to stop time, to block the work of forgetting, to establish a state of things to immortalize death, to materialize the immaterial—all of this to capture the maximum of meaning in the fewest of signs ... [They] only exist because of their capacity for metamorphosis, an endless recycling of their meaning" (Nora 19)..

The metaphor of the "unintelligible" and "unrememberable" past has its subtleties. Ruins become the material for further cultural artifacts, either grand or petty, or they are succeeded by other ruins. St. Sophia in Istanbul and imperial burial urns replaced in Rome by statues of apostles also represent the process of forgetting through a vivid image of cultural palimpsest.

Through the classical references that function on the formal level as well as on the level of content the poem is further engaged with memory. In perfect accord with the etymology of the term "sites of memory", the "sites" of Harold's travels are not only geographical, but discursive. Byron employs a whole set of poetically significant *topoi*, and here I dwell upon three of them:

Save where some solitary column mourns
Above its prostrate brethren of the cave;
Save where Tritonia's airy shrine adorns
Colonna's cliff, and gleams along the wave;
Save o'er some warrior's half-forgotten grave,
Where the gray stones and unmolested grass
Ages, but not oblivion, feebly brave,
While strangers only not regardless pass,
Lingering like me, perchance, to gaze, and sigh 'Alas!' (II, 86)
Stop! – for thy tread is on an Empire's dust!

An Earthquake's spoil is sepulchred below!
 Is the spot mark'd with no colossal bust?
 Nor column trophied for triumphal show?
 None; but the moral's truth tells simpler so,
 As the ground was before, thus let it be; –
 How that red rain hath made the harvest grow!
 And is this all the world has gained by thee,
 Thou first and last of fields! king-making Victory? (III, 17)

These are reworkings of the *sta viator topos* that passed from the public discourse of funeral epigrams to literature, as can be seen, for instance, in Thomas Gray's graveyard elegies. In the following stanzas the *ubi sunt topos* can be identified:

Oh! where, Dodona! is thine aged grove,
 Prophetic fount, and oracle divine?
 What valley echo'd the response of Jove?
 What trace remaineth of the Thunderer's shrine?
 All, all forgotten – and shall man repine
 That his frail bonds to fleeting life are broke?
 Cease, fool! the fate of gods may well be thine:
 Wouldst thou survive the marble or the oak?
 When nations, tongues, and worlds must sink beneath the stroke!
 (II, 53)

Admire, exult – despise – laugh, weep, – for here
 There is such matter for all feeling: – Man!
 Thou pendulum betwixt a smile and tear,
 Ages and realms are crowded in this span,
 This mountain, whose obliterated plan
 The pyramid of empires pinnacled,
 Of Glory's gewgaws shining in the van
 Till the sun's rays with added flame were fill'd!
Where are its golden roofs! where those who dared to build? (IV, 109)

The next stanza is one of the many examples of the *vanitas*:

What from this barren being do we reap?
 Our senses narrow, and our reason frail,

Life short, and truth a gem which loves the deep,
 And all things weigh'd in custom's falsest scale;
 Opinion an omnipotence, – whose veil
 Mantles the earth with darkness, until right
 And wrong are accidents, and men grow pale
 Lest their own judgments should become too bright,
 And their free thoughts be crimes, and earth have too much light.
 (IV, 93)

As it is evident, "death" is the idea common to all the *topoi* exemplified above. As Jan Assmann observed, death taken in its social dimension might be called "the primal scene of memory culture", because it represents the experience of rupture and discontinuity in its most basic form and thus demands an immediate decision whether the community should act consciously let the dead "live" on or should reconcile with the loss (Assmann, *Cultural Memory* 19–20). However, the inability to preserve the past—in other words, to remember—is the other common denominator in Byron's treatment of the theme. Even the *sta viator topos* which traditionally referred to heroic commemoration, is far from unproblematic.

In spite of the narrative's rather loose composition, it reaches its culmination at the sanctuary of both religion and art, that is, at Saint Peter's cathedral. The magnificent church interior is the source of a sublime, but utterly benign and creative experience that strikes a new note after four cantos of remorse, doubt and moral critique. However, the poem does not end with the narrative of Harold's pilgrimage—it ends with the famous self-assertive apostrophe to the ocean. What can Memory Studies add to the interpretation of this old image that has been associated (not without Byron's influence) with overlapping and sometimes conflictive notions of freedom, eternity, mutability, fate, superhuman power or, on the contrary, mirror of human psyche?

The armaments which thunderstrike the walls
 Of rock-built cities, bidding nations quake,
 And monarchs tremble in their capitals [...]
 These are thy toys, and, as the snowy flake,
 They melt into thy yeast of waves, which mar
 Alike the Armada's pride, or spoils of Trafalgar.

Thy shores are empires, changed in all save thee—
 Assyria, Greece, Rome, Carthage, what are they?
 Thy waters washed them power while they were free,
 And many a tyrant since; their shores obey
 The stranger, slave, or savage; their decay
 Has dried up realms to deserts: –not so thou,
 Unchangeable save to thy wild waves' play—
 Time writes no wrinkle on thine azure brow—
 Such as creation's dawn beheld, thou rollest now.

Thou glorious mirror, where the Almighty's form
 Glasses itself in tempests; in all time,
 Calm or convulsed—in breeze, or gale, or storm,
 Icing the pole, or in the torrid clime,
 Dark-heaving;—boundless, endless, and sublime—
 The image of Eternity [...] (IV, 180–182)

The poetical contrast between the earth and the sea is that between the world of ruins and the world of waves, between culture and nature. Ruins as evidence of human ambition and achievement represent a tantalizing, but mostly illusory opportunity to reconstruct the past, a struggle between forgetting and remembering. Meanwhile the ocean leaves no trace, no tokens of the times, no opportunity for recollection—it may fairly be called a “site of no-memory”.

By way of conclusion, I would like to return to my initial question: can *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* be considered as a reflection on cultural memory taken in highly specific—metaphoric—terms? I would answer in the affirmative, and point out three metaphors: the pilgrimage, the ruins and the sea. They came to be strongly associated with Romanticism though all of them reach much further into cultural history that tends to makes them more subtle cognitive tools. All three are “spatial”, the first two—the pilgrimage and the ruins—add an important temporal dimension to spatiality, that is, they refer either to a progress or a regress in time, while the third—the sea—is fundamentally a-historical. In Byron's poem they lend themselves to conceiving the modern cultural memory that is fragmented, volatile and always in search of a material medium to be attached to.

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MEETING MARY – MEETING YOUR SELF THE FUNCTIONS OF DREAMS IN THE MARY POPPINS BOOKS

Renáta Marosi

The purpose of this paper is to explore dreams in the Mary Poppins books and propose that they are the location of another reality, the manifestation of wish fulfilment and punishment, that they assist in the individuation process as well as being a tool for the recollection of ancient knowledge. It is suggested that one of Poppins's tasks, as a magical nanny, is to lead Jane and Michael on a journey of personal development and offer them a glimpse of the world of the collective unconscious and self-understanding. To this end, this paper, on the one hand, approaches Sigmund Freud's and Carl G. Jung's concepts of dream, (collective) unconscious and archetypes; and on the other, deals with Joseph Campbell's comments on the hero's journey of self-discovery.

Keywords: dream, collective unconscious, archetypes, wish fulfilment, punishment, recollection, individuation.

The functions and the features of dreams in the Mary Poppins collection have already been analysed in Cristina Pérez Valverde's and Giorgia Grilli's papers; they approached these experiences from a theosophical standpoint (Travers was a follower of this school of esoteric philosophy), demonstrating amongst other things liminality and threshold. This paper expands on Valverde's and Grilli's thoughts with reference to Joseph Campbell's ideas about the mythological hero's journey and his self-exploration as well as approaching the dreams from the point of view of the individuation process, thus describing the collective unconscious and pointing out the revelation of the forgotten and hidden self with respect to the dreams in the Mary Poppins stories. Furthermore, the paper comments upon several archetypal figures – the Self, the Shadow, the Coyote and embodiment of the wise old man and woman – in accordance with Mary Poppins's and other characters' personalities. Those archetypal characters – i.e. the Sha-

man, the Dandy, the Trickster, and the Goddess – already discussed in Grilli's book titled *Myth, Symbol and Meaning in Mary Poppins* and in Valverde's paper, "Dreams and Liminality in the Mary Poppins Books" are not covered in any great detail in this paper.

It is mostly those stories and chapters in which dreams are analogue to each other that form the basis of my analyses. The common aspects of the dreams are the following: 1. they all take place at night, 2. each involves a ceremony of celebration (birthday, new year, Halloween), 3. the universal unity, the collective unconscious and the individuation process are manifested in all these dreams. Thus, the discussed chapters are: "Full Moon" (*Mary Poppins*), "Evening out" (*Mary Poppins Comes Back*), "High Tide" (*Mary Poppins Opens the Door*), "Happy Ever After" (*Mary Poppins Opens the Door*), and "Hallowe'en" (*Mary Poppins in the Park*). The only exceptions are: "Bad Tuesday" (*Mary Poppins*), "Bad Wednesday" (*Mary Poppins Comes Back*) and "Lucky Thursday" (*Mary Poppins in the Park*) in which other distinct functions of dreams are expressed.

Literary dreams "reflect not just their author's insights into the human mind, but also contemporary theories about dreams (from both scientific and popular sources), as well as conventional literary representations of dreams and visions" (Glance 2001). Since Travers was enthusiastic about Victorian (fantasy) literature and she followed its representation of dreams, the Mary Poppins books reflect some features that are akin to several Victorian works which take place in a dream-state. This explains why strange, extraordinary characters, the act of shape shifting (growing and shrinking) and self-discovery can be found in both *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and the Mary Poppins stories; moreover, allusions to indigestion (as a possible determining factor of the dream) and the revelation of the truth are present in *A Christmas Carol* and on Jane and Michael Banks's dream journeys as well.

Furthermore, dreams in the Mary Poppins stories are not only based on P. L. Travers's thoughts and fantasies but, intentionally or unintentionally, on the dream theories of Freud and Jung. While Freudian theories were well-established by the time Travers's masterpiece was written, (from a chronological point of view) Travers could not have been aware of the Jungian concepts of the unconscious until her later works. Consequently, the fact that the author independently adopted ideas of the unconscious, the

imperishable myth and archetypes in her essays proves the existence of the collective unconscious (Koralek 1999, 37; Travers 1999, 193, 194).

1. Theoretical Background: the Collective Unconscious and Archetypes

The concept of the (collective) unconscious had been laid down aptly by Jung who asserted that the unconscious is the unknown in the inner world. Moreover, everything of which we know, but of which we are not at the moment thinking; everything of which we were once conscious but have now forgotten; everything perceived by our senses, but not noted by our conscious mind; everything which, involuntarily and without paying attention to it, we feel, think, remember, want, and do; all the future things that are taking shape in us and will sometime come to consciousness: all this is the content of the unconscious (Jung 1987a, 185). In my analysis, I emphasise the *forgotten* content of the unconscious.

In the Mary Poppins stories the Moon projects its light onto all dream spots or foreshadows dreams, and indicates the unknown, hidden thoughts since the “moon often symbolizes the unconscious, illuminating the dream-time” (Bowen 2012, 9). Therefore, before the dreamy adventure was about to begin Jane was wondering about a likely circus in the sky “[t]he pointed roofs of Cherry Tree Lane were shiny with frost, and the moonlight slid down the gleaming slopes and fell soundlessly into the dark gulf between the houses” (Travers 2010, 255). Similarly, on New Year’s Eve the silver rays of the white moon “poured down on the wide lawns of the Park” (Travers 2010, 465) and on Halloween when “[e]very house was fast asleep the full moon filled the world with light” (Travers 2010, 651). The Moon is frequently in its ‘full phase’ when there is a “perfect equilibrium” (Travers 1989b, 44) since the Earth, the Sun, and the Moon are aligned with each other which could be a manifestation of the universal unity and the collective unconscious which Jane and Michael are about to discover on their journeys. The full moon is not the only natural phenomenon which indicates the presence of the (collective) unconscious. The elder Banks children become aware of the stars Castor and Pollux, who introduce themselves in the following way: “[w]e have a single heart and mind between us. We can think each other’s thoughts and dream each other’s dreams” (Travers 2010, 259).

This strong harmony between the Twins could be explained by the existence of the collective unconscious. Since this deeper layer of the unconscious is not individual but universal; in contrast to the persona psyche, it has contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the same everywhere and in all individuals (Jung 1980a, 3–4). Moreover, the “collective unconscious comprises in itself the psychic life of our ancestors right back to the earliest beginnings” (Jung 1987b, 112).

Concerning its content, instincts and archetypes together form the collective unconscious (Jung 1965, 485). Archetypes (or mythological motifs) are meaningful, inherited patterns, forms of situations, thoughts and figures which always repeat themselves and in which the collective phenomena are experienced (Jung 1980b, 183; Jung 1981, 219). We fill in the content of the same inherited forms differently according to our individual life experiences (Coster 2010, 5).

Since “the archetype is, in itself, invisible” (Cicchetti 2006, 42) archetypes are manifested in symbols because a true symbol (without any fixed meaning) “points to a greater reality that can never be totally understood because it contains wisdom that transcends the knowing mind” (Cicchetti 2006, 43). These symbols – symbolic thoughts, situations, figures – are apparent in fantasies, in trance states and in “the dreams of early childhood, from the third to the fifth year” (Jung 1936, 103). Furthermore, “a child’s earliest dreams often manifest in symbolic form the basic structure of the psyche” (Jung 1988, 165). It is noteworthy that Jane and Michael are the same age when they undergo their adventures and are exposed to the ancient knowledge in their dream-like situations.

“When a situation occurs which corresponds with a given archetype, that archetype becomes activated and a compulsiveness appears” (Jung 1936, 102). Similarly, archetypes embodied in Mary Poppins show themselves in accordance with the situations and circumstances. Therefore, Poppins either shows her mother side (Earth Mother) by taking care of the children and nature, or her wise old side (Crone) by giving advice and delivering maxims to the children, or her daemonic self by taking revenge on her enemy; or she can behave like a Shaman, a Trickster, even a Coyote.

2. Jane and Michael’s Dream Journey

In order to understand the Banks children’s dream better it is necessary to contemplate upon their dream journey and ask such questions as: what do

their dream journeys look like? How can their rites of passage be described and classified? Who is responsible for helping them on the dream journeys? Joseph Campbell who built his ideas upon Jungian theories can assist in providing answers to such questions.

In the rites of passage of the heroes' journey, Jane and Michael's dream travel can be divided into: Separation, Initiation and Return (Campbell 2004, 28). I suggest that to some degree Jane and Michael follow the mythological or fairy tale hero's journey yet they are neither heroes on all levels nor do they participate in all the rites of passage (e.g. no fights, enemies and perilous adventures await them).

2.1 Separation and Initiation

When Grilli introduced Mary Poppins as a Shaman she cited that the shamanic miracles demolish the barriers between dream and present reality (Grilli 2014, 52; cited from Eliade 1972, 511). Since in the dreams with the magical nanny we are unable to see when exactly the children leave reality and their dream adventures begin, it is difficult to discern Jane and Michael's journey stages; thus, the first two rites of passage, separation (call to adventure) and initiation (crossing the threshold), are discussed together here.

Throughout the dream adventures Jane and Michael are always aided by a Herald and a *Threshold Guardian*. The latter is always Mary Poppins who "acts as mediator between the mythical world and everyday reality" (Grilli 2014, 59). She is a sort of door who separates these two worlds but also allows contact between the real and the magical (Grilli 2014, 60). Thus, she performs the task of the Threshold Guardian who protects "the Special World and its secrets from the Hero" (Coster 2010, 10). Anyway "threshold [or the in-between time, beyond place] is the frontier between two worlds where sacred and profane at the same moment oppose and communicate with each other, when one world begins and another ends" (Travers 1999, 190). In Mary Poppins the threshold is explicitly depicted and described, for instance when the children are told where they are celebrating, Sleeping Beauty explains the threshold like this: "The Old Year dies on the First Stroke of Midnight and the New Year is born on the Last Stroke. And in between – while the other ten strokes are sounding – there lies the secret Crack" (Travers 2010, 469). Similarly, other extraordinary dream experi-

ences take place ‘beyond’ and ‘in-between’: when the relation between the living and the dead is renegotiated (Halloween), between night and day (Heavenly circus, Full Moon), between the land and the sea (High Tide).

Herald, the former aide “make[s] their appearance anytime during a Journey, but often appear at the beginning of the Journey to announce a Call to Adventure” (Coster 2010, 10). In the children’s dream-state the herald differs in each scene: it is a whispering voice, a shooting star, a Sea-Trout’s voice, a living toy or a message on leaves. They move and lead the Banks children toward the dream spot, and they guard them after the threshold has been crossed, as well: right after Jane and Michael fell asleep “they heard a low voice whispering at the door” (Travers 2010, 104) which guided them to the Zoo; “A very bright star, larger than any they had yet seen, was shooting through the sky towards Number Seventeen Cherry Tree Lane” and urged Jane and Michael to follow it and step onto the stars in the Park (Travers 2010, 256); similarly a Sea-Trout’s voice from the Cowrie Shell brought them under the sea; furthermore, Michael’s Golden pig which came alive led them to the Park to celebrate New Year. The children received more hidden but allusive signs about the Halloween journey. Mrs Corry and her daughters, as Mentors, prepared Jane and Michael for their journey by talking to them about the importance of their shadows; then whilst crossing the threshold the children found messages ‘Come’ and ‘Tonight’ on two leaves in the Nursery, later they followed their shadows to the Park where characters were celebrating with their shadows.

2.2 Return

At the point of their return, the music dies away, the actions slow down and extraordinary figures dissolve in the air. Thus, when the party was about to finish in the Zoo “[t]he cries of the swaying animals dwindled and became fainter. Jane and Michael as they listened felt themselves gently rocking too, or as if they were being rocked” (Travers 2010, 118). Similarly, when it was time for the children to return from the heavenly circus “the sounds of the ring were growing fainter. Their heads fell sideway, dropping heavily upon their shoulders” (Travers 2010, 273). Furthermore, at the end of the Halloween party, right before midnight “[d]arkness dropped like a cloak on the scene and before the eyes of the watching children every shadow vanished, the merry music died away. And as a silence fell upon the Park the

steeples above the sleeping City rang their midnight chime” (Travers 2010, 666). Once they are sent back to sleep by the supernatural characters, it seems that Jane and Michael are never really aware of their return, instead suddenly finding themselves back in the nursery the next morning.

This progress of return does not correspond with a certain explanation which claims the final images of the dream are vivid because they are near waking (Freud 2010, 179). In *Mary Poppins* the opposite is true, the closer the children get to reality the further they move from the vivid pictures, instead the whole scene becomes fainter and more opaque. Although events ‘beyond the door’ in Poppins’s stories are primarily “sensory experiences enriched by a heightened perception of taste, smell, colour, and touch” (Grilli 2014, 9). This is already in accord with the Jungian dream concept since “images produced in dreams are much more picturesque and vivid than the concepts and experiences that are their waking counterparts. One of the reasons for this is that, in a dream, such concepts can express their unconscious meaning. In our conscious thoughts, we restrain ourselves within the limits of rational statements – statements that are much less colourful because we have stripped them of most of their psychic associations” (Jung 1988, 43). Thus “sensually powerful descriptions grant the reader a truer and more disinterested reality” (Grilli 2014, 20). Dreams also make use of auditory images (Freud 2010, 18). It means that when “in a dream something has the character of a spoken utterance [...] then it originates in the utterances of waking life” (Freud 2010, 135). By the same token children meet their questions, sentences in their dreams which have been uttered in their waking life.

By the end of their journey the heroes have already learned and found something in the supernormal range of human spiritual life, and then come back and communicate their gifts after the return (Campbell, “The Shoulder We Stand On”, § 17). In the case of Jane and Michael this reward is acquired and unveiled at a special moment and in a particular place but is not exercisable, since after the return, their existence in reality is no longer comprehensible. Only objects remind them of these boons: a belt from the Zoo, a brooch from under the sea, a cowrie shell, Sand Dollars, etc. But what are the boons which are apparent only for a short time? This is the question that can be answered by examining the function of dreams in the *Mary Poppins* stories.

3. The Functions of Dreams in the Mary Poppins's Books

Dreamtime is a timelessness and spacelessness state which includes matter, spirit, life and death, everything and always. (Travers)

Travers's thought above mirrors the traditional belief of her homeland with respect to dreamtime. In the Australian aborigine dream belief, there are at least four aspects of dreamtime: the beginning of all things; the life and influence of the ancestors; the way of life and death; and sources of power in life (Crisp 2010). They all occur at the same time; Jane and Michael Banks appear to be experiencing dreamtime.

With respect to this I suggest there exist five functions of dreams in the Mary Poppins collection. In the first place, Jane and Michael's dreams fulfil their daily wishes; secondly, in the form of nightmares dreams punish children for their bad behaviour and thus educate them; thirdly, these dreams offer an opportunity to encounter another true reality (the unconscious); fourthly, dreams make the children reveal ancient knowledge thus recollecting thoughts from the collective unconscious; finally, the Banks children's dreams promote the individuation process.

3.1 Wish fulfilment

"The dream is the (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed, repressed) wish" (Freud 2010, 55). According to Freud, one of the possibilities for the origin of a wish is that "it may have been excited during the day, and owing to external circumstances may have remained unsatisfied; there is thus left for the night an acknowledged and unsatisfied wish" (Freud 2010, 173). Regarding the Banks children's daily wishes and reveries Mary Poppins stands for the 'external circumstance' since she does not let the children ask questions and does not satisfy their curiosity. So, although they 'acknowledge' their wishes, they remain 'unsatisfied' until the dark night descends and the moon appears.

Freud asserted that the simplest dreams of all are to be expected in the case of children whose psychic activities are certainly less complicated than those of adults. Thus, the little children's dreams at the beginning are often simple, undisguised and frank fulfilments of wishes which are not satisfied during the day (Freud 2010, 45–46). Although it is not sufficient to claim that Jane and Michael's dreams only depict simple and frank wishes. Since

as I have already pointed out, on the one hand, early childhood dreams reflect archetypal symbols, on the other hand, “conscious wish becomes effective in exciting a dream only when it succeeds in arousing a similar unconscious wish which reinforces it” (Freud 2010, 173) or it may happen that the waking activity and the unconscious wish coincide. In other words, on the surface the Banks children are interested in the world around them and have their childish questions, on a deeper level (probably once their waking activity has been aroused their unconscious) they yearn after past memories and the forgotten unity with the cosmos.

Therefore, all the journeys begin with the children’s questions that then move them toward the dreamy adventures and deeper understanding: Michael wonders “what happens in the Zoo at night, when everybody’s gone home?” (Travers 2010, 104); before the experience in the circus in the sky Michael asks for the Moon and comparing the star-shower to a circus, being interested whether there are circuses in Heaven too. At the same time his sister Jane wishes they were among the stars and is wondering “what makes the stars shoot” (Travers 2010, 254). Furthermore, before the children take a journey to the sea and drink wine Michael wishes he “could have a Glass of Port” (Travers 2010, 439); at the end of the year, waiting for the New Year, Michael is interested about what happens in-between the first and the last stroke of twelve.

3.2 Education and Punishment

Jane and Michael Banks, just like other children, are not always kind and pleasant. On one Tuesday, Michael behaves very rudely and is unsatisfied with everything, he even steals Mary Poppins’s compass which they have found in the Park. Similarly on a particular Thursday he has to stay inside because of his illness and cannot play outside like his siblings do. This makes him angry. Finally, Mary Poppins evokes nightmares in Michael in order to make him become aware of his bad deeds. Once he has stolen the compass he dreams of monstrous animals standing in his nursery; on the Thursday after stealing Poppins’s silver whistle he dreams about cats (living in the future) who force him to live with them far away from his family on the Cat Planet – one of his wishes was to go miles from home. When Michael awakens Mary Poppins is always with him (she is the one who rescues him) and he feels peace and behaves well again.

Similarly, on one special Wednesday (the day when she was born) Jane is very rude, naughty and fed up with the duties she has to do around the house because she is the eldest sibling. She even wishes she was an only child and breaks the family's Royal Daulton Bowl. Then Mary Poppins leads her into a nightmare situated inside the broken bowl. Eventually frightening figures – the patterns of the bowl who have come from the past – do not let her go home and want to keep her as the only and the youngest child in that family. When she gets up (rescued by Poppins) she is well-behaved and dutiful again.

These dreams all function as means of education. Instead of preaching and rebuking, Mary Poppins highlights the children's bad behaviour in their dreams thereby warning them that their wishes and deeds have their own outcome: they realise they have to be more careful about what they wish for otherwise it may come true. The only thing with which she foreshadows that something bad is going to happen is expressed with her sight and short remarks: before Jane's nightmare was about to happen Poppins's "voice was gentle, but there was something very frightening in it" (Travers 2010, 189). Before Michael 'travelled' to the Cat Planet, from his nanny's look he guessed that something was going to happen but then he did not care about it (Travers 2010, 558). Similarly, after the nightmares she concludes the moral only with short remarks like "I told you that was my compass, didn't I?" (Travers 2010, 73) and without any further comment she continues her housework.

Thus, Mary Poppins both educates and punishes the children. However, she cannot be the only initiator of these dreams because children themselves also make these dreams happen since "the essential characteristic of punishment-dreams that in them it is not the unconscious wish from the repressed material (from the system Ucs) that is responsible for dream-formation but the punitive wish reacting against it, a wish pertaining to the ego, even though it is unconscious (i.e. preconscious) (Freud 2010, 175). The children's guilt is manifested in their nightmares: Michael turns round guiltily expecting to see Mary Poppins in his dream after he has stolen the compass and before dreadful animals appear in front of him. The wish to be good again and their apology for being bad always arrive by the end of the nightmares. Finally, even though Poppins's teaching method is unusual and extreme, it is also very impressive since Jane and Michael learn to appreciate what and who they have.

3.3 Encountering the other Reality

*There are worlds beyond worlds and times beyond times, all of them true,
all of them real, and all, as children know, penetrating each other.*
(Travers)

In the Mary Poppins stories one can observe reality and approach it from two points of view: by separating real from unreal actions and by differentiating the physical (outer world) and the psychic reality (inner world, unconscious).

With respect to the first, children try to find and explain the true reality and place a border between reality and their dreams. This border always remains blurred for them. One cannot disregard the strong connection between dreams and reality. Since “[w]hatever the dream may offer us, it derives its material from reality, and from the psychic life centred upon this reality. However extraordinary the dream may seem, it can never detach itself from the real world, [its material] must be taken from that which we have already experienced” (Freud 2010, 6).

The search for truth manifests itself in children’s questions. While Mary Poppins, Mrs Corry and her daughters Annie and Fannie are sticking gingerbread stars onto the sky Jane is wondering: “Are the stars gold paper or is the gold paper stars?”(Travers 2010, 92). As Jane hurries through the garden toward the adventure to the heavenly circus she is thinking to herself whether she could be dreaming or not (Travers 2010, 257). In the circus the Sun answers these questions by emphasising a relative reality and denying an absolute one: “What is real and what is not? Can you tell me or I you? Perhaps we shall never know more than this – that to think a thing is to make it true” (Travers 2010, 271). Imagination and different perception is able to create a relative reality. The Sun’s thought and advice is analogue to Theosophy and thus Travers’s concept of reality according to which “everything that exists has only a relative, not an absolute, reality, since the appearance which the hidden noumenon assumes for any observer depends upon his power of cognition. Nothing is permanent except the one hidden absolute existence which contains in itself the noumena of all realities” (Blavatsky 2003, 39). The way of perceiving reality is not absolute, only an individual action – that is why there is no *one* definite answer to everything for Jane and Michael. The only absolute perception of all

the realities is possible in a certain unity (e.g. in the Crack). When the children understand this, Jane acknowledges that celebrating in the Crack, for that moment, knows it is true that she is happy for ever (Travers 2010, 472). Since any Secondary World is true, because “it accords with the laws of that world” (Tolkien 1939, 12).

Concerning the second viewpoint (physical and psychic reality), the bout with the unconscious is the encounter with the ‘other’ reality (Jung 1965, 18). As dream and reality correlate with each other, outer and inner reality do the same. Since the “unconscious [...] in its inner nature it is just as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is just as imperfectly communicated to us by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the reports of our sense-organs” (Freud 2010, 190). What I call physical and psychic reality others called ordinary and non-ordinary reality. “Ordinary reality is the day-to-day reality that most of us usually inhabit or are aware. It is the reality of the five senses and the left-brain [...] Non-ordinary reality, perceived by the intuitive mind of the right brain, lies beyond our five senses” (Coster 2010, 17).

Once when the children return from that psychic reality, Mary Poppins does not let them interpret their dream lest it becomes a narration. She rebukes Jane and Michael because “back in the realm of logic and order, any narration would give those fantastic experiences a compromised and imperfect form” (Grilli 2014, 19) since language limits the capacity for full, accurate representation (Kilroe 2000). Yet what the children intend to do is a normal human deed since “[t]he human mind so greatly tends to perceive everything in a connected form that it intentionally supplies the missing links in any dream which is in some degree incoherent” (Freud 2010, 18). Once the dreams have come to an end the children immediately want to continue or narrate them. Thus, the statement “I had such a strange dream last night” (Travers 2010, 118) or asking for objects which were present in their dreams is an acknowledgement of an “isolatable experience with temporal and local boundaries” (Kilroe 2000).

Finally like guardians of a sacred knowledge Jane and Michael understand that they must experience their dreams and the other reality rather than narrate them (Grilli 2014, 19). They have learnt that there “were things, they knew, that could not be told” (Travers 2010, 670).

3.4 Recollection: Back to the Long-Forgotten Realm

Everyone who goes down to the sea brings something back. (Travers)

Joseph Campbell, in connection with myth and fairy tales, points out that both adventures and misfortunes move the characters toward learning and transformation (Campbell 2004, “Introduction: The Mystic Question”, § 7). Learning and transformation is equivalent to becoming aware of the hidden self and thus the revelation and recollection of memories from the long-forgotten past, which are actually manifested in the unconscious and in dreams. In dreams by going down to the unconscious, as the wise Terrapin said, we can bring something back. Travers also believed that everything that is known is in the bloodstream, which gathers itself from the vital centre of the human what Australian aborigines call the *dreaming* (Cott 1999, 164).

Therefore, the main task of dreams is to bring back a sort of recollection of the prehistoric right down to the level of the most primitive instincts (Jung 1988, 98–99). We can reveal our ‘dead selves’ since “[w]hen asleep we go back to the old ways of looking at things and of feeling about them, to impulses and activities which long ago dominated us, in a way which seems impossible in the waking hours, when the later self is in the ascendant” (Sully 1893, 120–121). We can also recollect our undeveloped, rudimentary self. Heroes neither discover nor find anything throughout their journey: “They remember. They remember that they are remembering. They tell what has been since the beginning of time” (Campbell, “The Shoulders We Stand On”, § 7). Thus, the heroes’ wisdom and recognition of the unconscious attained on the journey reflect the knowledge that they once possessed but have forgotten by stepping into their physical reality. Similarly, Jane and Michael are active and involved, they gain knowledge through an epiphanic revelation of truth. The revelation is held for those who are accepted into the new world as guests but do not remain there (Grilli 2014, 15). Jane and Michael are not only guests but more, “Special Visitors” (Travers 2010, 105) at the Zoo and “Guests of Honour” (Travers 2010, 444) under the sea which indicates the importance of these occasions.

Furthermore, in the psychological approach, digging into the depth symbolises the revelation of the unconscious (Antalfai 2002, 3). Jane and

Michael also dig into the depths or approach the ‘up’. Both directions account for the same act: they go deep (under the sea) to their unconscious and attain a higher spiritual state (circus in the sky). When they “hurried up to the frosty sky, leaping over the gulfs between the stars Jane paused, and glancing down, caught her breath to see how high they were” (Travers 2010, 257). Jane catches her breath because meeting the unfamiliar, approaching the way toward the recollection of what has been repressed are both comforting and frightening (Zipes 2010, 12). This upward progress is a series of progressive awakenings, each advance bringing with it the idea that now, at last, we have reached ‘reality’” (Blavatsky 2003, 40). Therefore, psychic development brings one closer to absolute reality and the individuation process.

3.5 The Individuation Process: Wholeness and Unity

3.5.1 The Loss of Unity

*There is something I wanted to remember [...] it was something important.
Something beginning with B. (Travers)*

The main task of the pre-oedipal – phase of the infants’ first few months, when they still turn inward by perceiving themselves – is to regain the lost unity of the Self (Grilli 2014, 97–98). The Self is the totality of the personality which embraces both conscious and unconscious personality (Jung 1965, 481). “The self, as the symbol [archetype] of wholeness [and order], is a coincidentia oppositorum, [the unity of opposites] and therefore contains light and darkness simultaneously” (Jung 1986, 368).

Since in dreams we are free to regain this unity and Anabel as a newborn baby is in her pre-oedipal phase, she recollects the experience of the perfect unity with the Universe. She “remembers past lives and foresees ones before the moment of birth” (Valverde 2007, 70) while Mary Poppins is cradling the baby, in her dream-state:

I am earth and air and fire and water [...] I come from the Dark where all things have their beginning [...] I come from the sea and its tides [...] I come from the sky and its stars; I come from the sun and its brightness [...] I come from the forests of earth. As if in a dream, Mary Poppins rocked the cradle – to-and-fro, to-and-

fro with a steady swinging movement [...] Slowly I moved at first [...] always sleeping and dreaming. I remembered all I had been, and I thought of all I shall be. And when I had dreamt my dream, I awoke and came swiftly [...] I past the beast of the jungle and came through the dark, deep waters. It was long journey. (Travers 2010, 227)

However, this state does not last a long time. Mary Poppins and the Starling warn Annabel that she will lose the sense of unity: “By the time the week’s out you won’t remember a word of it” (Travers 2010, 228). That is why it is possible that when she wants to remember something beginning with B, she is no more able to recall her memories of Birth from the unity.

The loss of unity is further depicted with the story of the Banks Twins. John and Barbara insist that Jane and Michael are stupid since they neither understand the language of the Starling nor that of the Wind. Mary Poppins explains to them that their elder siblings did once understand, but they have forgotten it all since “they have grown older” (Travers 2010, 97); furthermore, the Starling says to the Twins that they will forget that language too because they “just can’t help it. There never was a human being that remembered after the age of one” (Travers 2010, 98).

This means that as a child is growing up the “sense of [cosmic] unity and wholeness quickly transforms itself into a fading memory” (Grilli 2014, 95) and they lose their primitive psyche (Jung 1988, 98). The reason for forgetting is that as human consciousness develops the conscious mind loses contact with some of that primitive psychic energy and original mind. Fortunately, the unconscious is able to bring back all the elements from which the mind freed itself as it evolved – illusions, fantasies, archaic thought forms, fundamental instincts, etc. (Jung 1988, 98). The other consequence of the evolving consciousness is that the man is no longer involved in nature and has lost his emotional “unconscious identity” with natural phenomena which have slowly lost their symbolic implications (Jung 1988, 95).

Regarding symbolism, man “produces symbols unconsciously and spontaneously, in the form of dreams” (Jung 1988, 20). The interpretation of dream symbols enriches the poverty of consciousness so that it learns to understand again the forgotten language of the instincts. The symbol-producing function of our dreams is thus an attempt to bring the original

mind of man (the Self) into “advanced” consciousness, where it has never been before (Jung 1988, 52, 98). By the same token, Mary Poppins uses dreams and archetypal characters for the representation of those things which children would not have comprehended in other ways, and she helps find a new understanding.

3.5.2 The Individuation Process

“Dreams function to promote the most important developmental process of human life, namely, the uniting of consciousness and the unconscious in a healthy, harmonious state of wholeness (Kelly Bulkley 1993). Jung calls this process individuation, the “complete actualization of the whole human being” (Jung 1966, 160). This life-long process takes place in the unconscious; it is a process by which man lives out his innate human nature and in which one must repeatedly seek out and find something that is not yet known to anyone. Furthermore, the individuation process is a unique and individual process; each of us has to do something different (Jung 1988, 162–165). Presumably another reason is concealed here and explains why Mary Poppins does not permit the children to ask and why she does not allow them to get but one answer: we are all different, our mission, life and personality differ – we all require distinct answers to our questions.

“[I]n dreams we put on the likeness of that more universal, truer, more eternal man dwelling in the darkness of primordial night. There he is still the whole, and the whole is in him” (Jung 1965, 475). Mary Poppins in the children’s dream offers them an opportunity to get an insight into the whole state. Thus, her gift is the “gift of a greater, fuller life” (Grilli 2014, 19) and a new, more positive approach toward life. Since “for the individual to enter seriously into the process of individuation [...] means a completely new and different orientation toward life” (Jung 1988, 229).

For the successful and real process of individuation it is essential to be aware of it and make a living connection with that, respecting and listening to the inner totality of the Self (Jung 1988, 162–164). By the same token, on Halloween Mrs Corry draws the children’s attention to taking care of their shadows:

They feel twice as much as you do. I warn you children, take care of your shadows or your shadows won’t take care of you [...]

what's man without a shadow? Practically nothing, you might say.
(Travers 2010, 649)

3.5.3 The Realisation of the Shadow

The unconscious contains all aspects of human nature light and dark, beautiful and ugly, good and evil, profound and silly (Jung 1988, 103) since “man’s real life consists of a complex of inexorable opposites” (Jung 1988, 85). The importance of the opposites, the dark are considered valuable phenomena in Theosophy as well and it adopted the following idea from Eastern Occultism: “[D]arkness is the one true actuality, the basis and the root of light, without which the latter could never manifest itself, nor even exist [...] Darkness [...] is subjective and absolute light; while the latter in all its seeming effulgence and glory, is merely a mass of shadows, as it can never be eternal, and is simply an illusion” (Blavatsky 2003, 70).

The Shadow is our other selves, the inferior, repressed, hidden part of the personality, which also displays both bad (fears) and good (normal instincts) qualities and which can be realized in dreams (Jung 1988, 168 and 481–482). “Only the integration of good and evil and the stern acceptance of opposites will change the situation and bring about the condition that is known as Happy Ever After” (Travers 1989a, 268). In the psychological approach we could decode this thought as an enunciation of the importance of the reconciliation of the opposites due to the ‘happy ending’ – the successful individuation. Moreover, that reconciliation leads one to “an expansion of awareness and a broadening of the personality” (Cicchetti 2006, 44).

The state where the opposites meet each other (e.g. the Crack, the Full Moon) is being in the continuous present, in which past and future are never again separated (Antalfai 2002, 11). In Australian aboriginal dream theory, this continuous present is found in dreaming since “[t]he dreaming is objective Now, the everlasting nonexistence from which existence rises” (Travers 1989c, 34). It is a “condition beyond time and space as known in everyday life and the aborigines call it the ‘all-at-once’ time [which means that] they experience Dreamtime as the past, present and future coexisting” (Crisp 2010).

Mary Poppins uses Halloween to demonstrate the reconciliation of the opposites (within one) and thus the individuation process. Herself, Mrs Corry and the Bird Woman make Jane and Michael encounter their hid-

den self, their Shadow and make them aware of the importance of their connection with it. Eventually Jane and Michael dance with their shadows like friends do with each other. “Whether the shadow becomes our friend or enemy depends mostly upon ourselves. The shadow becomes hostile only when he is ignored or misunderstood” (Jung 1988, 173). That is why Mary Poppins tells the children that it all depends on them whether they will live happily afterwards: if they concentrate on their inner selves they could be happy and live healthily, if they ignore it problems may arise.

“[T]he function of the shadow is to represent the opposite side of the ego and to embody just those qualities that one dislikes most in other people” (Jung 1988, 173). In other words, our shadow mirrors our other real self as well, as Miss Lark’s does it when she rebukes it when it is making merry with strangers in the Park: “I’m gayer than you think, Lucinda. And so you are. If you but knew it. Why are you always fussing and fretting instead of enjoying yourself?” (Travers 2010, 661). Thus, the shadow also holds a mirror against its owner and judges him, tries to guide him: “Well, you needn’t be so high and mighty. You are only a Lord Mayor. You know – not the Shah of Baghdad!” (Travers 2010, 665).

The Shadow, as the part of our unconscious is the human’s wise part, smarter than our mind, our rudimentary selves since as Cock Robin asserts “You can have a substance without a shadow, but you can’t have a shadow without a substance” (Travers 2010, 653). Since the shadow is invisible the appreciation of its existence is difficult. That is why the Banks children claim that shadows are not real since they are made of nothing and they go through things. To persuade the children that shadows are crucial phenomena, the Bird Woman explains that

Nothin’ is made of nothin’, lovey. And that’s what they’re for – to go through things. Through and out on the other side – it’s the way they get to be wise [...] when you know what your shadder knows – then you know a lot. Your shadder’s the other part of you, the outside of your inside. (Travers 2010, 656)

Thus, the crone admits that the Ego (belonging to our outside, small part of the total psyche) must submit to the Self to fulfil the process of individuation (Jung 1988, 161,163): the Shadow goes through the Ego by filling it with wisdom which the Shadow already possesses.

The importance of the shadow is pointed out further by describing characters after they recognise that their shadows have been lost (they have gone to celebrate in the Park). They are all anxious, Admiral Boom is even roaring, because as Miss Lark said they “can’t get along without it” (Travers 2010, 660). The Professor is also very glad when he finds his shadow, and makes a promise to never let them part again since it remembers what the Professor forgets (Travers 2010, 662). This also strengthens the concept that in the unconscious dwell the hidden, forgotten memories.

Finally, by the end of the party, approaching midnight, all the characters learn to be reconciled to their shadows: they recognise the other (forgotten or repressed) part of their Self and they set out on a journey toward successful individuation and harmony with the Universe.

3.5.4 In Harmony with the Universe

In the primitive vision of the world, the forces of the universe were felt so strongly by each individual that it was impossible to talk in terms of an external physical experiment: the individual was seen to be bound to the cosmos. Mary Poppins’s ‘beyond’ journeys on a very profound level are seen to be in harmony with the cosmos as a whole and its own ‘logic’. These experiences belong to a greater life, to the universe and they always take place at very particular moments (solstices, equinoxes, full moons, midnight), following special astral movements, and being linked by a series of coincidences that create a sense of harmony and reach out to the idea of the eternal (Grilli 2014, 89). This (individual and universal) unity is manifested in an unrepeatable, special moment and place otherwise it would not be comprehensible in the physical every-day reality. Jane and Michael encounter the unity “when [Mary Poppins’s] Birthday falls on a Full Moon” (Travers 2010, 106); when Mary Poppins’s “Second Thursday fell upon our High Tide” (Travers 2010, 453); by the same token shadows are free on Halloween because it is the Full Moon which even falls on Poppins’s Birthday Eve.

Before the memory of unity fades away, the harmony with the Universe is depicted in Jane’s, Michael’s and Annabel’s relationship with nature. Mary Poppins is also able to understand and speak the animals’ language (talking to Ms Lark’s dog and Ms Andrew’s bird) and she takes care of nature (sticking gingerbread stars onto the sky, changing the winter into

spring). These things actually refer to the Shaman's task who "enters into contact with the whole of the natural world and the entire cosmos" (Grilli 2014, 47). Similarly, "young children experience an intimate, immediate bond with the natural world whose language is by no means alien to them" (Grilli 2014, 94): John is complaining to the Sun that it is right in his eyes, but the Sun answers that this is its task, to move from East to West. Barbara and Anabel are enjoying the feel of the sunshine. Annabel even gets curly hair from the Breeze and John is complaining to the Starling that his growing teeth hurt so much. Both Barbara and Annabel give crumbs to the bird, while they all talk about everyday things and behave in a casual way with each other.

Since the eldest Banks children lose their intimate, pristine bond with the Cosmos, Mary Poppins and other extraordinary characters aid them to comprehend, remember and recollect the memory of that. Experiences, like dancing and celebrating emphasise this idea. Moreover, in these actions not only the unity but the reconciliation of the opposites and the perfect human state (individuation) are reflected as well. This is evidenced in the descriptions of dancing or celebration scenes.

At the Zoo, in their dreams, Jane and Michael "learn that animals, people, imaginary characters, and stars are all made of the same substance, and that all elements in the world can in fact communicate with and understand each other" (Grilli 2014, xvii). Their teacher here is one of the crones, Mary Poppins's cousin, the lord of the animal's world in the Zoo, the Hamadryad who says:

We are all made of the same stuff, remember, we of the Jungle, you of the City. The same substance composes us – the tree overhead, the stone beneath us, the birds, the beast, the star – we are all one, all moving to the same end. Remember that when you no longer remember me. (Travers 2010, 117)

The serpent intends to help children retain their memory of the unity and recall the ancient knowledge. Moreover, it reflects the theosophical idea, namely that there is "One Universal Element, which is infinite, unborn, and undying, and that all the rest – as in the world of phenomena – are but so many various differentiated aspects and transformations [...] of that One" (Blavatsky 2003, 75).

The wholeness is further depicted in the rituals like dancing in a ring. Jane and Michael are having fun under the sea by dancing the Sailor's Hornpipe as the fish swam round Mary Poppins in shining rings. Furthermore, in the Zoo in the 'Grand Chain', animals are singing their Jungle songs, "leopard and lions, beavers, camels, bears, cranes, antelopes and many others all forming themselves into a ring round Mary Poppins" (Travers 2010, 116). This Grand Chain (in Theosophy the Great Chain of Being) symbolises the development from the least conscious to the highest consciousness (Wenger 2001, 108) which can be interpreted as the process of the individuation.

Furthermore, in the circus the magic nanny and the Sun are waltzing with arms outstretched, opposite each other, thus they mirror each other as representatives of the earth and heaven. The star and the nightlight in Number 17 also stand for the shadows of each other (Travers 2010, 668) and the land and earth, earth and heaven reflect each other. The Terrapin, another wise animal, intends to interpret this mirror reflection which leads us back to the pristine unity of the universe:

The land came out of the sea, remember. Each thing on the earth has a brother here – the lion, the dog, the hare, the elephant. The precious gems have their kind in the sea, so have the starry constellations. The rose remembers the salty waters and the moon the ebb and flow of the tide. (Travers 2010, 456)

3.5.5 The Embodiment of the Self

In dreams the Self is personified as a superior female figure, masculine initiator or guardian. By the same token, in Jane and Michael's dreams the presence of the Self is apparent for instance in Mary Poppins, Mrs Corry, Annie and Fannie. They are the only ones whose shadows would never leave them. It means that if the shadow stands for the hidden side of the self, these crones live in harmony with their unconscious. Mary Poppins even got a butterfly as a birthday present which "settled on the left shoulder of Mary Poppins's shadow" (Travers 2010, 663). Butterfly also refers to the inner side since in several cultures, among other things, it is the symbol of the soul (Haynes 2013, 28). Mary Poppins, Mrs Corry and her daughters are able to be reconciled to their shadows since they have reached a higher spiritual state, they are sage, they are Crones.

A crone is a Wise Woman who always appears to help lead a dream quest of self-knowledge (Coster 2010, 31). Furthermore, a crone has both good and bad facets, “she takes on one aspect or the other according to the laws of the story and the necessity of events [...] They change with changing circumstances” (Travers 1989a, 267). Therefore, Mary Poppins can be really strict and offensive, but also very nice and helpful: she kindly helps Gaia the star with Christmas shopping, she behaves very respectfully with other wise creatures like the Terrapin and the Hamadryad; but she is rude to Mr Banks’s former governess, Ms Andrew (the Holy Terror). With Ms Andrew’s criticism of Poppins, the magic nanny’s evil side is evoked. She uses magic to punish the Holy Terror. However, since the dark and light goes side by side, Poppins’s revenge also serves a good deed: she releases the Holy Terror’s bird Caruso from its cage.

In this situation Mary Poppins does not behave like a Crone, rather like a Coyote who is probably the most notorious Trickster from Native American Mythology: “The coyote represents both foolishness and wisdom and the balance between the two [...] Coyote allows people to see their weaknesses through foolish acts, allowing them to become aware of their mistakes and learn from them” (Coster 2010, 28). For the same reason Mary Poppins enchants Ms Andrew and locks her in Caruso’s cage. She feels extremely threatened and experiences the same as Caruso did in the cage. After this the frightened Ms Andrew apologises to Poppins and leaves the house.

It is discernible that Mary Poppins, Mrs Corry, the Bird Woman (and the Balloon woman of whom now I am not discussing) are not the only wise characters, crones in the stories. There are other wise creatures in whom the wholeness, the Self is embodied, who are not humans but animals. Terrapin, described as the “oldest and wisest thing in the world” (Travers 2010, 452), introduces himself like this:

I am the Terrapin. I dwell at the roots of the world under the cities, under the hills, under the very sea itself, I make my home. Up from the dark root, through the waters the earth rose with its flowers and forests. The man and the mountain sprang from it. The great beasts too, and the birds of the air [...] I am older than all things that are. Silent, and dark and wise am I, and quiet and very patient. Here in my cave all things have their beginning. And all things return to me in the end. (Travers 2010, 454)

Thus, in him the wholeness, the ancient knowledge, the cosmic unity, the beginning and the end of everything are revealed: since in his cave all things have their beginning and their end.

The Hamadryad, since it is a serpent is another example of the embodiment of the wholeness, wisdom, perfection and regeneration (Blavatsky 2003, 65, 73). The wholeness, the reconciliation of the opposites is reflected in his eyes: his deep eyes are long and narrow, with a dark sleepy look in them, and in the middle of that dark sleepiness a wakeful light shines like a jewel (Travers 2010, 113). Furthermore, the renewal is depicted when through a ritual movement he casts his skin and gives it to her cousin, Mary Poppins, as a birthday present.

Conclusion

The paper has been built upon the tenets of theosophy (Blavatsky, Valverde), mythology (Campbell, Grilli) and psychology (Freud, Jung). My research reacted to and commented upon Valverde's paper, which analysed the Mary Poppins collection from a theosophical standpoint. Jane and Michael's dream journeys were examined in light of Campbell's and Grilli's theories about the mythological heroes' journey, the rites of passage the children underwent and the figures that guide them during these situations. Furthermore, Freud's theories on dreams and Jung's definition of the (collective) unconscious, archetypes and the individuation process aided in analysing the aspects and functions of dreams in the stories of Mary Poppins.

The functions of dreams in the Mary Poppins books are varied and appear to encompass a mix of aims including wish fulfilment and punishment. The former verifies one of the basic Freudian assertions of the functions of dreams, since Jane and Michael's wishes always serve as inductions of dreams. Furthermore, the magical heroine, the nanny both educates and punishes her protégés in an extraordinary way: giving them nightmares which, according to Freud, are initiated by the children's worries (in this case about their bad behaviour).

However, the dreams in the Mary Poppins collection also work at more profound levels explored here with the assistance of Jungian theories on dreams. Consequently, dreams aid Jane and Michael to recollect knowledge from the ancient past and to become aware of the collective unconscious; furthermore, to meet with their unconscious and get closer to the

individuation process in a special and unrepeatable moment and place (e.g. in the Crack). Finally, one can view the Mary Poppins collection as a work of fantasy both in the sense that it is entertainment but also as evidence that fantasy literature is able to offer more than a depiction of a supernatural world and miracle. It can also reflect psychological and philosophical truths as well.

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