

The Semantic Analysis of OE *munan*

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1. Introduction

According to Anglo-Saxon Dictionary (BT, sv. *munan*), OE *munan* is related to Goth. *ga-munan*, O Sax. *far-munan*, and Icel. *muna*. As Anglo-Saxon Dictionary (sv. *munan*) illustrates, the following senses can be distinguished in OE *munan*:

- 1) to remember, be mindful of, be careful of
- 2) to consider, think.

Before engaging in close analysis, it should be pointed out that no empirical investigations concerning the semantics of *munan* have been carried out. Hence, this verb, similar to other preterite-present verbs that did not survive, has not had due attention paid to it. With the exception of *witan*, which has been subject to investigation (Koivisto-Alanko 2000, Radden 2003), other lost preterite-present verbs have been neglected.

We should also emphasise that the concept of *gemunan*, whose semantics is interpreted in terms of *remember* (Campbell 1959: 345) was conceived of differently than its Present-Day English equivalent. The aim of this study will thus be to show differences in the conceptualisation between Old English *munan* and the Present-Day English corresponding sense – ‘remember’. However, the present analysis will not focus on the semantics of *remember*, but rather on the semantic path of *munan*. Therefore, the semantics of Present-Day English *to remember* will serve only as a background to illustrate better differences in the conceptualisation of the seemingly corresponding Old English equivalent. Moreover, the analysis will aim to distinguish between senses that could be referred to as root, hence, logically objective and epistemic ones, thereby subjective and individual. Furthermore, the study will illustrate a mechanism that could account for the development of epistemic senses, as well as the time when such senses were first recorded.

In the analysis of *munan*, three stages within the Old English period will be distinguished: 10th c., 10th/11th c. (the transition stage), and 11th c. The present analysis is based on the Toronto Corpus compiled by Antonette di Paolo Healey (1986) and presents a quantitative approach based on detailed statistics within the concept of *munan*. In order to achieve maximum accuracy, *munan* was analysed in all attested contexts from the Toronto Corpus. Nevertheless, one should take into account the fact that however detailed and accurate the corpus

is, it may not always reflect the semantic reality of the distant past. The data can thus be distorted as not all the texts that were written down in the Old English period are preserved in corpora. Consequently the semantic analysis may be more of a corpus artefact rather than a reflection of the actual semantics of *munan* in the Anglo-Saxon period. Nevertheless, corpora are valid sources of information. Therefore, one can hope that its contents reflect, to a certain extent, the semantic reality of *munan*. Still, the data should not be taken with statistical accuracy as they seem to be fragmentary. Moreover, some senses are scarcely documented as often happens with data from the distant past. Rather, the available figures should be treated as drawing the plausible path of change from the objective to a subjective sense by indicating which senses were most numerous in the three analysed stages.

It should also be emphasised that a path of a semantic change that can be seen in *munan* reflects a general tendency that accompanies other mental verbs. Such tendencies or paths of semantic changes have been vastly described (Traugott 1989, Sweetser 1990, Radden 2003). According to Traugott (1989), the directionality of semantic change reflects a path from the initial, root meaning, thus from the real-world domain, to the epistemic, abstract, logical one, which focuses on the internal world of a speaker's belief and knowledge status. Similarly, Sweetser (1990) claims that the internal self is understood in terms of bodily external self and hence described by the vocabulary connected with the external self. She highlights that these correspondences are not isolated but they are a part of a larger system, which involves our conceptualisation of one area of experience in terms of another. In other words, physical functions and states are metaphorically associated with mental functions and states. Sweetser sees the shift of meanings from the concrete to the abstract as a change from the socio-physical level to the abstract, logical, epistemic level. For her, it is the speaker's reasoning process that is a subject to metaphor. The path of a change from the concrete to the abstract has also been discussed by Radden (2003). In his study of verbs denoting perception, Radden analyses the shift from PIE *weid* (to see) to OE *witan* (to know). He claims that this process should be referred to as metaphor based on metonymy. The sequential ordering of the two events *I know it because I saw it* hence the Effect sanding for the Cause constitutes metaphorical basis for the metaphor in which the two domains of perception and cognition are mapped. A similar mechanism of the metaphor based on metonymy can also be observed in *munan*.

The paper will thus confirm the widely held assumption that meanings tend to move toward greater subjectivity, thereby reflecting the shift from a relatively objective control of some entity to a more subjective one.

Moreover, the purpose of the paper is also to show which morphological forms might have developed epistemic senses prior to other forms. This kind of distinction has been implemented by Aijmer (1985). She maintains that such changes come about by the gradual application of the form to more and more contexts. Such was the case, according to Aijmer (1985: 13), with the

development of the *volitional will* into a future being initiated in the 3rd person singular. The aim of the final part of my analysis is to juxtapose *munan* with *āgan* not to show the similarity in their semantic profiles but to indicate that in both verbs new senses developed in particular contexts in particular morphological forms and they spread to other forms only later.

2. Semantic analysis of *munan*

Before moving to an analysis of Old English *munan*, the aim of this section will be to compare it to its Present-Day English apparent equivalent: *remember*. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), (sv. remember) *remember* is given the following senses:

- 1) to retain in, or recall to the memory; to bear in mind, recollect
- 2) to think of, recall the memory of
- 3) to record, mention
- 4) to have or bear in mind
- 5) to have mind, memory or recollection of something

Thus, the essential attributes in *remember* are related either to storing events/entities in one's memory or recollecting them. The semantic content imprinted in *remember* presupposes the individual keeping in mind events related either to his/her life or the life of others he/she has been directly or indirectly involved with. There are three main attributes that can be distinguished in the verb *remember*. Firstly, it is related to the individual and his/her mode of storing events. Secondly, it is subjective, as it presupposes how an individual keeps events in his/her mind. In other words, the semantics of *remember* implies that the event restored in memory and then retold is fragmentary and subjective rather than reflecting an actual reality. Moreover, there are frequently as many versions of past events as many people who can remember them. Finally, *remember* is a mental verb, as it is related to the process of either storing events in one's memory or recollecting them.

In examining the Old English sense of *munan*, one notices that its semantics implied different attributes when compared with the Present-Day English *remember*. To begin with, the original idea behind Old English *munan* was not to remember in the sense *to recollect* or simply *to keep in one's memory*. The available data from the Toronto Corpus indicate that this sense developed only in the 11th c. and was indicative of a high degree of subjectivity. The original sense of *munan* was *to be aware of*, *to be conscious of* and implied that one should implement in one's life what one should be conscious of. In other words, the semantics of *munan* was not mental but rather normative and social. It was directed toward principles, Christian norms rather than events related to the individual. Hence, the meaning of *munan* initially was objective and excluded

personal, subjective undertones. This sense of *munan* seems to be the only one in the 10th c.

Changes in the semantics of *munan* can be observed in further stages, as well. In the 10th/11th c. (II stage), subjective undertones start to emerge, yet the objective sense prevails. In the 11th c. (III stage), the subjective senses of *munan* seem numerous, and the verb can also perform a speech-act function. Nevertheless, objective senses are also present. Thus, in the 11th c., *munan* can express both an objective, root sense, and a subjective epistemic one.

In the present study, the following senses of *munan* will be taken into account:

- 1) to be aware of, to be conscious of, to realise (objective sense)
- 2) the sense ‘to remember’ behind *munan* becomes related to one’s personal life; (the sense of ‘being conscious of’ is still present but at this point becomes directed to an individual’s life)
- 3) the pure sense – ‘to remember’ (to keep in mind or recollect from memory)
- 4) the sense ‘to remember’ as a speech-act verb

Hence, the analysis of all morphological forms of *munan* will show the gradual semantic development from sense 1 (logical, objective) through the intermediate stage (sense 2) to the subjective, epistemic stage (senses 3, 4). Sense 1 is normative, collective and will be referred to as a root one. Sense 2 occupies the intermediate stage on the development to epistemicity as it focuses on individual events but with the old meaning – to be aware of – prevailing. Hence, at this stage, the meaning of *munan* is only partly subjective. Senses 3 and 4 are epistemic. The meaning of *munan* at stage 3 is ‘to remember’, ‘to recollect’, while the former sense ‘to be conscious of’ is no longer present. Thus, the activity behind *munan* is typically mental. The verb focuses on the internal world of the speaker’s belief and knowledge status, and is not underpinned by moral undertones but by the subjective capacity to recollect events as viewed by the speaker. Sense 4 marks *munan* as a speech-act verb in discourse situations, where it functions as a discourse marker, and its application is automatic. Its role is only introductory and used to invite a hearer to a discourse. The speaker, hence, does not intend to emphasise what he/she remembers but to state what happened at a particular time. *Munan* had already developed this function in Old English. At that point, *munan* is devoid of the sense ‘to remember’, ‘to recollect’, but rather permits an extension of meaning to involve the speaker’s attitude to the message. It is no longer a lexical item but a purely pragmatikalised expression.

The following subsections will analyse the morphological forms of *munan* separately to show the path of semantic development of particular forms and to draw the differences in the conceptualisation of present and past forms of *munan*.

3. Semantic analysis of the infinitive of *munan*

An analysis of the infinitive *munan* based on the Toronto Corpus records the following senses:

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have in mind (objective sense)	5 cases, 100%	9 cases, 82%	14 cases, 45%
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	2 cases, 18%	12 cases, 39%
to remember, recollect	–	–	5 cases, 10%
speech act verb	–	–	–

The analysis of the infinitive *munan* leads us to the following conclusions. *Munan* in the 10th c. was scarcely documented. The Toronto Corpus records only five cases of *munan*, and their meaning is objective, hence ‘to be aware of’, ‘be conscious of’. The concept of objectivity underlying *munan* in the 10th c. can be illustrated by the following sentences:

- (1) *Forþon we sculon a hycgende hælo rædes gemunan tone selestan sigora waldend.*
 ‘Mindful of saving salvation from an ordinance, must we keep in mind the disposer of victories.’
 (Vainglory: Krapp and Dobbie 1936, 147-9)
- (2) *Hwæs weneþ se þe mid gewitte nyle gemunan þa mildan meotodes lare.*
 ‘What expects the one who in his wisdom will not keep the teaching of Christ.’
 (Christ: Krapp and Dobbie 1936, 3-49)

Hence, *munan* in both sentences implies the idea of ‘keeping in mind’, being aware of, rather than the pure sense of remembering. Moreover, in sentence (2) *munan* is juxtaposed with the phrase *mid gewitte*. This phrase, *munan mid gewitte*, indicates that *munan* is applied here to the act of ‘being aware of’ rather than of ‘remembering’; otherwise, the above context would be tautological. The analysis records only one phrase with apparently tautological expression, other contexts with *munan* from the 10th c. record the concept of ‘keeping in mind’ as illustrated in sentence (1). These contexts use *munan* in the following phrases:

- *gemunan soþ and riht* ‘to keep in mind what is true and right’
 (Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)
- *gemunan meotodes streng þo* ‘to keep in mind God’s strength’
 (Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)
- *gemunan gastes bled* ‘to keep in mind the blood of Holy Spirit’
 (Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)

3.1 Semantic analysis of *munan* in the 10th/11th c.

The data, though fragmentary, gives a hint as to which senses were the most numerous and which were scarcely documented. The most highly documented sense seems still the objective one (have in mind/be aware of) – 9 cases, (82%). Yet, at that time, there appears a tendency to use the concept *keep in mind personal events*. Hence, another sense emerges, which is partly subjective and which constitutes an intermediate stage to the epistemic sense. The objective sense of *munan* in the 10th/11th c. can be shown in the following examples:

- (3) *And ute gemunan þæt we sculon ealle deade beon.*
 ‘Let keep in mind/be aware that we all shall be dead.’
 (Third Sunday after Epiphany: Willard 1935, 38-56)
- (4) *Donne sceolon we nu gemunan þone eges fullan domes dæg se cumeþ nu ungeara.*
 ‘We should keep in mind that the Judgement Day comes soon.’
 (Morris 1874-80, Blicking Homily no. 8: Morris 1874-80, 97-105)

The partly subjective senses from the 10th/11th c. can be exemplified by the following contexts:

- (5) *Da reafaras geþencap swi þe oft hu micel hie sellap and swi þe seldon hie willap gemunan hu micel hie nimap.*
 ‘Thieves think very often how much they give and very rarely they are willing to be aware how much they take.’
 (Gregory the Great, Pastoral Care: Sweet 1871, 24-467)
- (6) *Gif he wile gemunan þa þe he o þrum monnum deþ.*
 ‘If he were willing to realise what he does to other people.’
 (Gregory the Great, Pastoral Care: Sweet 1871, 24-467)

The meaning of *gemunan* is still underpinned by the sense ‘to stick to’, ‘have in mind’ with normative connotations, yet an increase in subjectivity can be noticed, as the event in focus is personal and subjective, rather than universal.

3.2 Semantic analysis of *munan* in the 11th c.

Though the objective sense is still numerous, it is less common in comparison with previous stages. Moreover, the percentage of partly subjective senses seems higher than in previous stages (39%). Furthermore, in the 11th c. one can observe the emergence of a new sense – ‘to remember’, ‘recollect’, thus, an epistemic one, constituting 5 cases (16%) in the infinitive *munan*.

- (7) *Bide þinne drihten eadmodlice forgifnesse ealra þara synna þe þu wiþ Godes willan geworht hæbbe þara þe þu gemunan mæge and þara þe þu gemunan ne mæge.*
 ‘Ask God for forgiveness for all the sins that you did against God’s will that you can and cannot remember.’
 (Leofa man þe is mycel þearf þu þas drihtenlican tide georne geþence: Dictionary of Old English transcript, edited from Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Junius 121)
- (8) *Nu gyt syndon manige men lifigende þu þa þis gemunan magon.*
 ‘There are many people still alive who can remember this.’
 (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Book 1: Hecht 1900-7, 11, 14-90).
- (9) *And on þis ylcan geare com se stranga winter mid forste and mid snawe þæt nan man þa on like þæt mihte gemunan swa strange winter.*
 ‘That same year came a strong winter with snow and frost and there is hardly any man that can remember such a strong winter.’
 (London, British Library, MS. Cotton Tiberius B. 1: Rositzke 1940)

One can see in these sentences that they have developed the sense of recollecting/remembering. Yet, even though these sentences are based on the concept of remembering/recollecting, it seems that sentence (7) could be also viewed as belonging to the intermediate stage, where the sense ‘to be aware of’ could equally fit. Hence, sentence (7) could be interpreted in two different ways:

- i. Ask God for forgiveness for sins that you can and you cannot remember, or
- ii. Ask God for forgiveness for all sins that you are, and you are not aware of.

The mechanism that is involved in the development of the sense ‘to remember’ seems to be the conventionalisation of conversational implicature. Hence, if a person is not aware of having committed a sin, he/she does not have this sin on his/her mind, thus he/she does not remember it. In other words, the consequence of not being aware of committing a sin is not to have this sin on one’s mind, which leads to the development of a new sense:

Ic *gemunan ne mæge* – I am not aware > I do not remember.

Although the positive senses ‘be aware of’ and ‘remember/recollect’ look distinct, with the former inviting the implications ‘to dwell on’, ‘to think of’, hence a broad insight, while the sense ‘to remember/recollect’ implies a process of focusing on something rather than dwelling on it, hence a narrower insight. In

the negative form these senses look much more similar. Thus, conceptually in a positive context, the following differences can be distinguished:

- to remember/recollect — focus on only one point, one specific instance, not deep process
- to be aware of — focus on many points, serial perspectives, deep process.

Yet, in negative form, these concepts look more similar:

- I am not aware of having committed a sin.
- I do not remember having committed a sin.

Both look like short, momentary processes. The speaker relies only on his/her memory and makes the following inferences. Thus, the new sense ‘to remember’ developed from a negative context via the mechanism of conventionalisation of conversational implicature. On the other hand, one can also claim that the sense ‘not be aware of’ and ‘not remember’ are similar, but only to a certain point. Namely, the sense ‘not be aware of’ can be viewed conceptually as a path, while the sense ‘not remember’ can be seen as a point. The sense ‘not be aware of’ at the end of the path looks similar to ‘not remember’. The example below illustrates this assumption:

- I am not aware of committing this sin (this implies I have been focusing on this problem thoroughly from many dimensions and cannot retain a trace of it in my memory).
- I do not remember having committed this sin (this implies I just cannot retain it in my memory).

Thus, ‘not be aware of’ implies a path where the subject starts the process, is in the middle of it, and ends it. The sense ‘not remember’ implies a point, as the subject instantly announces what he/she has on his/her mind.

However, it seems that a path and a point can only be analysed separately when the senses ‘not be aware of’ and ‘not remember’ are developed well enough and can be kept as distinct ones. Nevertheless, during the process of a new sense emerging – ‘remember’ – there have been degrees of overlapping when sentences could be interpreted as either ‘not be aware of’ or ‘not remember’. Thus, conceptually one can say that a point became part of a path, or that a path made a space for a point. From this perspective, the idea of ‘remembering’ is the final stage, the consequence of ‘being aware of’. Hence, the cause is ‘I am not aware of it’ and the consequence is ‘I cannot remember it’.

In these contexts, *munan* can be semantically analysed as a complete, last stage activity, which ends the initial, or opening stage of ‘be aware of’. Consequently, the development of the sense ‘to remember’ in *munan* can be attributed to the mechanism of conversational implicature based on a metonymic

relationship that includes sequential events, and which becomes the source of the emerging metaphor (Radden 2003: 98). These two events are temporally linked and can be described as PRECEDENCE PLUS CAUSE and SUBSEQUENCE PLUS RESULT, and may be interpreted as CAUSAL PRECEDENCE.

At this point Traugott's (1989) Tendency I can be tested:

Meaning based in the external described situation > meaning based in the internal situation.

When viewed from a certain perspective, the semantic change in *munan* seems metaphorical, yet the particular steps that lead to the final stage are metonymic. In other words, even though what takes place is an extension from the concrete field (objective sense) to the subjective one (mental recollection), the shift that triggers this extension is metonymic. Consequently, the above mechanism should be interpreted as a process of an emerging metaphor (Radden 2003: 98).

4. Semantic analysis of *geman*

In analysing *geman*, a distinction needs to be drawn between the first and third person singular, as the semantic path in both forms proceeds differently.

geman (first person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have in mind (objective sense)	1 100%	–	1 11%
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	1 100%	–
to remember	–	–	6 67%
speech-act verb	–	–	2 22%

geman (third person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have in mind (objective sense)	–	3 100%	4 80%
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	1 20%
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act verb	–	–	–

The analysis of *geman* leads to the following conclusions. *Geman* in the 10th c. seems to be scarcely documented. The Toronto Corpus records only one instance of *geman* in the first person singular and no instances in the third person singular. Moreover, its meaning was objective, hence 'to have in mind' in the sense of 'to be aware of' or 'to be conscious of'.

(10) *Ne eom ic ana þæt on mode geman hu se maga fremde, godbearn on grundum.*

'I am not the only one who is aware in soul how Christ acted, divine child on Earth.'

(Andreas: Krapp 1932a, 3-51)

According to the available data, in the 10th/11th c., *geman* in the first person singular is recorded once but in the partly subjective sense, while in the third person singular the root objective form is still preserved. Thus, at this point, a gradual distinction in the development of the semantic path can be observed between the first and third person singular. The first person singular initiated the emergence of new subjective senses through the process of conventionalisation of conversational implicature, which later spread to other forms.

In the 11th c. one can see further consequences of this divergence. According to the available data, *geman* in the third person singular is recorded four times in the objective sense (80%) and only once in a partly subjective one (20%). *Geman* however, in the first person singular is documented mostly in epistemic senses. The sense ‘to remember’ constitutes 67% and the speech act function 22%. The objective sense is recorded only once:

– to have in mind (objective sense)

- (11) *Ic þine soþæstne geman, drihten.*
 ‘I truly keep you mind, God.’

(The Paris Psalter: Krapp 1932b, 3-150)

– to remember

- (12) *Ic geman þæt þu swa sædest.*
 ‘I remember that you said so.’

(Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149)

- (13) *Ic geman þæt gedon wæs nu for þrym gærum in minum mynstre.*
 ‘I remember what was done in my monastery three years ago.’

(Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Preface and Book 4:
 Hecht 1900-7, 260-350)

– speech act function

- (14) *Donne ic geman mines ærran lifes, þe ic on mynstre ær wunode, þonne asworette ic and ageomrige gelice þam, þe on lefan scipe neah lande gelæfaþ, and se storm uþ adrifað swa feor þæt hy æt necstan ne magon land geseon.*

‘I remember well my earlier life when I lived in a monastery. I experience real grief like they who travel on infirm ship near the land and the storm comes so far that those who are the nearest cannot see land.’

(Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Preface and Book 4: Hecht 1900-7, 1-9)

In sentence (14), one can see that *geman* performs the role of a speech-act verb. *Geman* in this context is purely introductory and encourages the hearer to a discourse. Its function is hence pragmatic. At this point, *geman* marks Traugott’s (1989) Tendency II:

Meaning based in the external or internal situation > meaning based in the textual situation.

Thus, by developing into a discourse marker, *geman* represents a change from a mental state to a speech-act verb meaning.

Another mechanism that can be observed during the semantic development of *geman* is divergence (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 113). According to Hopper and Traugott (1993: 113), when a lexical form undergoes pragmaticalisation, the original lexical form may remain as an autonomous lexical item. Apart from being a fixed item with a different set of attributes in analysed pragmatic expressions, *geman* behaves like an autonomous lexical item when found in other contexts.

5. Semantic analysis of *gemanst*

The Toronto Corpus records only two instances of *gemanst*, which are dated to the 11th c. They denote the sense ‘remember’ and speech-act function respectively:

– to remember:

- (15) *Gemanst tu hwæt wiþ ær spræcon?*
 ‘Do you remember what we were talking about before?’
 (Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149)

– speech act function:

- (16) *Ðar þu gemanst broþer þin hæf þ ænig þincg ongean þe, forlaþ þær lac þine and ga gesibsumian broþer þinum.*
 ‘If you remember/think your brother has something against you, abstain from your fight and reconcile with your brother.’
 (Defensor, *Liber scintillarum*: Getty 1969)

Thus, the second person singular seems to have emerged in the 11th c., yet reflected the newly developed senses.

6. Semantic analysis of *gemunon*

In the analysis of *gemunon*, a distinction should be drawn between the first, second and third person plural. The study will show that the semantic path the first and third person plural *gemunon* underwent reflected the path underlying the first and third person singular *geman*.

gemunon (first person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	3 100%	1 50%	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	1 50%	2 67%
to remember	–	–	1 33%
speech-act function	–	–	–

gemunon (second person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	1 50%
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	1 50%
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–

gemunon (third person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	3 100%
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	–
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–

The analysis of *gemunon* leads to the following conclusions. To begin with, one can see parallels in the semantic development of *geman* (first and third person singular) and *gemunon* (first and third person plural). These similarities should not be conceived in terms of the frequency of epistemic senses, but rather in terms of the mechanism that underlies the divergent development between the first and third person singular and plural. In terms of the first person plural *gemunon*, one notices parallels with first person singular *geman*. In the 10th c., the only meaning of *gemunon* is ‘to be aware of, to keep in mind’ as an objective sense, which can be exemplified by the following:

(17) *Gemunon we þone halgan drihten.*

‘Let us keep in mind the holy God.’

(Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)

In the 10th/11th c., a partly subjective sense emerges, hence a tendency towards subjectivity can be seen. Thus, in the 10th/11th c., the Toronto Corpus records two senses of *gemunon* (first person plural); one of them is objective, and the other partly subjective:

– objective sense

(18) *Gemunon we þæt we þa god don þe us Godes bec æraþ.*

‘Let us keep in mind that we should do good as God’s books teach us.’

(Palm Sunday: Morris 1874-84, 65-83)

– partly subjective sense

(19) *Gemunon we ure dæghwamlīcan synna.*

‘Let us keep in mind *our* every-day sins.’

(Quinquagesima Sunday: Morris 1874-80, 15-23)

In the 11th c., the recorded senses in *gemunon* (first person plural) are partly subjective ones (67%) and one that is epistemic (33%):

(20) *Gemunon we þæt se wītiga cwæþ, Hyrat Drihtere mid ege and mid hogum.*

‘Let us keep in mind what the wise man said, Listen to God with fear and care.’

(Chrodegang of Metz, Regula Canonicorum: Napier 1916, 1-99)

The sentence presupposes a group of people who met the wise man (individual experience) and keep in mind what he said. Thus, the partial subjectivity of the sentence is evoked due to the close relation between individual experience and abstract, normative values all are aware of:

– remember

(21) *We gemunon hu fela fixa we hæfdon on Egypta lande.*

‘We remember how many fish we had in Egypt.’

(Numbers: Crawford 1922, 304-32)

The analysis of the third person plural *gemunon* evokes a different semantic path when compared with first person plural *gemunon*, and a parallel one when compared with the third person singular *geman*. Thus, it appears that the only recorded sense of *gemunon* in the third person plural is an objective one, which is also the central one in *geman* in the third person. In other words, the above form shows no traces of subjectivity.

Objective sense:

(22) *Ic mingie þæt hi gemunon þæs preostlican regoles and hæbbon gebodu æfre æt foran eagan.*

‘I warn that they should be aware of priest’s principles and the prayer before their eyes.’

(Bury of St. Edmunds, Possessions, Rents and Grants: Robertson 1956, no. 104)

The semantic analysis of the second person plural *gemunon* points to a divergent path of development when juxtaposed with the second person singular *gemanst*. The study records two senses dated to the 11th c., one objective and the other

partly subjective. Even though the analysis of *gemanst* indicates only two senses, they are both epistemic. The apparent dichotomy between second person singular and second person plural can be accounted for by the discourse function. Namely, *gemanst* was used between two interlocutors, while *gemunon* in relation to a larger group of people. Consequently, it was the second person plural that evoked evaluative, normative associations and was applied in instruction and teaching. Thus, both forms *gemanst* and *gemunon* were used in different contexts; the former in more personal, informal ones, while the latter was used in social, normative, and hence more formal ones.

Objective sense:

(23) *Ge ne gemunon ne ongitap þone heofoncundan anweald and þone weorþscipe.*

‘You are not aware of nor you understand the power of heaven and its magnificence.

(Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149)

(24) *Ic myngie þæt ge synt Godes sacerdas and þæt ge gemunon hu mide byrþena ge habbaþ underfangen.*

‘I advise you/warn you that you are God’s priests and that you keep in mind what burden you have undertaken.’

(Chrodegang, of Metz, *Regula Canonicorum*; Napier 1916, 1-99)

7. Semantic analysis of *gemunde*

Similar to *geman* and *gemunon*, *gemunde* will be analysed with a distinction made between the first and third person.

gemunde (first person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	3 100%	1 33%	2 50%
to remember	–	2 67%	1 50%
speech-act function	–	–	–

gemunde (third person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	1...20%	3 9%
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	1 100%	4 80%	28 85%
to remember	–	–	2 6%
speech-act function	–	–	–

In looking at the past form *gemunde* and juxtaposing it with present forms, one notices differences in the semantic development of the past when compared to the present. To begin with, partly subjective senses seem to be recorded often. There are no traces of objective senses for *gemunde* in the first and third person. Yet, similarly to the present tense, the amount of epistemic senses in the first person appears to be higher than in the third. The Toronto Corpus records 67% in the 10th/11th c. and 50% in the 11th c. of the sense ‘remember’. In contrast, in the third person, this epistemic sense constitutes just 6%.

Remember:

(25) *Da gemunde ic hu ic geseah.*

‘I remembered it how I saw it.’

(Gregory the Great, *The Pastoral Care*: Sweet 1871, 3-9)

(26) *Ne gemunde þæt he ær þæs gespræc.*

‘He did not remember that he talked about it before.’

(*Beowulf*: Dobbie 1953, 3-98)

Moreover, *gemunde* in the first person is rarely documented, much less so than in the third one. Study of the third person *gemunde* indicates that partly subjective senses are frequently recorded. The above sense constitutes 100% in the 10th c., 80% in the 10th/11th c. and 85% in the 11th c. of all the senses of *gemunde*. Its general meaning is ‘to be aware of’, yet the subjects of awareness are events from one’s individual experience. Thus, while such senses are sporadic in present forms, they are numerous in past form *gemunde*.

8. Semantic analysis of *gemundest* and *gemundon*

The aim of this section is to analyse the semantics of other past indicative forms, hence *gemundest* (second person singular) and *gemundon* (first and third person plural). It should be emphasised that no contexts of *gemundon* in the second person plural were recorded.

gemundest (second person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	1 100%	–	6 100%
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–

gemundon (first person plural past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	–

to remember	–	–	1	100%
speech-act function	–	–	–	–

gemundon (third person plural past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	1 100%	8 100%
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–

The analysis indicates that the central meaning in the studied forms is partly a subjective sense, hence ‘to keep in mind’, when the subjects of awareness are events from one’s personal experience. It is the only sense of *gemundest* in the 10th c. and 11th c., and in the third person plural *gemundon* in the 10th/11th c. and 11th c. The analysis records only one context when *gemundon* referred to the first person plural, yet its meaning was subjective and epistemic. Thus, one should emphasise that the first person in the indicative developed epistemic senses prior to other persons.

The above senses can be exemplified by the following contexts:

– partly subjective

- (27) *Lyt þu gemundest to hwan þirne sawle sittan wurde.*
 ‘You were little concerned what happened to your soul afterwards.’
 (Soul and Body: Krapp 1932a, 54-9)

- (28) *Ne gemundest þu hwilc hit biþ on helle?*
 ‘Why didn’t you keep in mind how it would be in hell?’
 (Fourth Sunday after Epiphany: Assmann 1889, 164-9)

- (29) *He þa gemunde Petrus þæt word þe Crist him ær cwæþ, þæt he him sceolde þriwa witsacan ær þam se hana creowe.*
 ‘Peter kept in mind these words Christ told him that he would reject Him three times before the cock crows.’
 (In Parasceve: Schaefer 1972, 285-314)

– remember

- (30) *We gemundon þæt ofter flodas babilones þær we sæ þon.*
 ‘We remember that we were sitting by the rivers of Babilony.’
 (Psalms, London, British Library: Oess 1910, 26-231)

9. The juxtaposition of *munan* and *āgan*

The aim of this section is to juxtapose the development of OE *munan* and *āgan* to indicate that the development of new senses could be initiated by some

morphological forms, and only later these new senses were adopted by other morphological forms. *Munan* was not an isolated verb in which the development of the epistemic sense evolved in one particular morphological form (first person singular). My earlier analyses of OE *witan* (Wawrzyniak 2006), OE *āgan* (Wawrzyniak 2008) and OE *unnan* (Wawrzyniak 2010) as well as Aijmer's analysis of *will* (1985) lead to the assumption that a new sense may evolve in a specific context often tied with a certain morphological form and then gradually spread to more and more contexts. Hence, this section will not deal with the detailed analysis of *āgan*, which was presented in my earlier study (Wawrzyniak 2008), but instead it will attempt to show in which morphological forms the sense of obligation emerged, and which morphological forms were more prone to use the older sense of possession. The analysis of *āgan*, similarly to *munan*, has been based on the study of all contexts from the Toronto Corpus.

It should be emphasised that the development of the sense 'ought to' did not proceed at the same pace in all morphological forms but that some forms were more prone to the new sense than others. The distinction between the former sense of possession and the latter sense of obligation emerged in certain contexts, like Christian speeches, sermons, i.e., contexts emphasising community rather than individuals. Consequently, *āgan* evokes collective rather than individual undertones. The obligation sense emerged first in the present tense in the first person plural *wē* and in the third person singular *hē*, *hēo*, and then was spread analogically in the corresponding past forms. Therefore, the form *āg* / *āh* when linked with the first person pronoun, did not denote the obligation sense but the possession sense. Likewise, *āgon* related to the first person plural by implying a larger group (Christians, community) is attested to with the sense 'ought to'. Likewise, the obligation sense is also central in *āgon* (second person plural present) but not in *āhtest* (second person singular past), where the emphasis is put on the individual. Therefore, it should be emphasised that the pronouns referring to an individual retained the former sense in *āgan*, while those denoting a larger group or a community when linked with *āgan* developed the new obligation sense. Consequently, the meaning that emerged in this mode had a normative character.

āh / *āg* (first person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	–	–	–
to have the need to	–	–	1 100 %
ought to	–	–	–

āh / *āg* (third person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	5 100%	4 66%	4 23%
to have the need to	–	2 34%	9 54 %
ought to	–	–	4 23%

āgon (first person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	–	–	1 10%
to have the need to	–	–	7 70 %
ought to	–	–	2 20%

āgon (third person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	1 100%	2 100%	1 100%
to have the need to	–	–	–
ought to	–	–	–

āhte (first person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	4 100%	1 100%	1 100%
ought to	–	–	–

āhte (third person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	2 100%	4 80%	3 75%
ought to	–	1 20%	1 25%

āhtest (second person plural past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	2 100%	–	2 100%
ought to	–	–	–

āhton (third person plural past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	1 100%	–	–
ought to	–	–	–

10. Conclusion

The aim of the present analysis was to present the semantic profile of OE *munan*. The study shows that the semantic development of *munan* was contingent on tense, mood and person. Hence, the epistemic function was the most frequently used in the first person singular indicative *geman*, which also developed a speech-act function. The subjective, epistemic sense then gradually spread to the first person plural indicative *gemunon*, as well as to the first person past forms, singular and plural – *gemunde*, *gemundon*. In contrast, the third person regardless of the tense and mood did not develop epistemic senses. Regarding the second person, the subjective sense developed in the singular present, *gemanst*, and the singular past, *gemundest*, in discourse, while the

second person plural present *gemunon* records no epistemic senses due to its normative character. Moreover, an epistemic function also emerged in the infinitive *munan*, yet the analysis shows no trace of a speech-act function in the infinitive. As for the past indicative forms, they record epistemic senses, yet only in a marginal number of instances and only in the first person. The semantic development in the third person singular did not proceed beyond the intermediate stage within Tendency I, thereby giving rise to partly subjective senses.

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